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ABSTRACT
Airlines offer combinations of price level and purchase restrictions, or fare
products, designed to best maximize revenues on their flights. This dissertation
provides the first comprehensive examination of the differentiated fare product
structure on the market today in terms of passenger demand, airline revenue,
and societal welfare. The role of pricing in the airline revenue management
function is established first. The types of price discrimination currently practiced
by airlines, as defined in the economics literature, are then identified. Although
the terms airline product differentiation and price discrimination have
previously been used interchangeably, the two practices are shown to differ and
exist simultaneously in the current industry environment.
Next, airline revenue management techniques and, in particular, fare product
differentiation are examined from the standpoint of economic efficiency. This
dissertation concludes that both efficiency in exchange and Pareto optimality are
unattainable under the current structure of airline fare product differentiation as
a result of the costs incurred by passengers due to applied purchase restrictions.
It is found, however, that a differentiated fare product structure with a wide
range of price levels coupled with effective revenue management techniques can
provide airline seats to those consumers who value them most when demand
exceeds supply. Efficiency in allocation can thus be achieved in the current
industry environment.
Virtually every existing yield management seat allocation model assumes that
consumers view differentiated airline fare products as separate products with
uncorrelated demands that compete for space on a fixed capacity aircraft. Such
formulations ignore the dependence of the demand for a given fare product on
the price levels and characteristics of the other available (competing) fare
products. In this dissertation, a model of product differentiation that considers
the interrelationships of the available airline fare products as well as the cost
incurred by consumers of accepting more restricted (and less flexible) products is
presented. This generalized cost model of airline fare product differentiation
explicitly incorporates the techniques of fare product differentiation and price
discrimination currently used by airlines.
The generalized cost model is extended to incorporate the "buy down" or
diversion of passengers to lower-priced fare products as a result of their ability to
meet the additional purchase restrictions imposed by airlines. Moreover,
diverting passengers may be induced to "sell up" to higher-priced fare products
when booking limits are applied to the lower-priced products. The generalized
cost model contributes the first behavioral motivation of both passenger
diversion and sell up. The dissertation demonstrates the use of booking limits as
devices to control and limit the revenue dilution effects of passenger diversion.
The effects of pricing and other fare product design decisions are quantified for
any set of OD market conditions using the generalized cost model. The model
provides insight into the underlying effects of the tradeoffs made by airlines
when making pricing and marketing planning decisions. In summary, this
research provides the first cohesive look at the relationships between price level,
purchase restrictions, demand, and revenue in the context of airline product
differentiation and yield management.
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Chapter One
Airline Fare Product Differentiation and Revenue Management
The travel options that are available to consumers contemplating the purchase of
airline services have grown extensively following the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978 which gave U.S. carriers complete control over the pricing and supply of
domestic air transportation services sold. Similar to the U.S. domestic trend, the
number of air travel options available to consumers around the world has also
grown. The trend in international markets has been less dramatic, in general,
since fare changes require bilateral government approval.
The large number of carrier choices in each market complicates matters further
when combined with the many service choices. Increases in carrier choices have
been fueled by the development of large hub and spoke route structures which
enable airlines to offer service in more numerous origin to destination (OD)
markets. In addition to the plethora of published fares that exist in the computer
reservations systems (CRS) of the airlines for immediate sale to the public, all
airlines are willing to negotiate different price levels with important consumers
or volume buyers such as group tour operators, increasing the number of air
travel options further.
The increases in air travel options have not come without cost since the vast
array of choices available to the traveling public and the ability of airlines to
change the structure of the services that they offer has lead to confusion among
many consumers. This confusion stems from the large number of options
available and the difficulties that most passengers have in obtaining up-to-date
travel information, even with the assistance of travel agents. In the eyes of many,
the primary result of the service provision flexibility given to airlines has been an
overcomplication of available air travel service offerings. In fact, the pricing
structure that exists in the airline industry today has routinely been characterized
as unfair, complicated, and incomprehensible.
The U.S. domestic industry provides an illustrative example of how complicated
the air travel service structure has become. Pricing by United States domestic
airlines has changed dramatically as a result of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978. Within the coach class cabin, airline product choices have increased from a
single type of service to the multiplicity of service options that are available on
the market today. The complexity has increased rapidly over the fifteen years of
deregulation, considering the relative stability and simplicity of airline fare
setting policy during regulation.
The services purchased by the public are for travel in a specific origin to
destination or OD market. The travel services available can be for one way or
round trip travel within the OD market. While many consumers purchase air
travel services through special negotiated deals with the airlines, the majority of
consumers purchase the bundles of price level and purchase restrictions, or fare
products, from the published fares listed on the CRS systems. The published
fares are, in general, for scheduled airline services since the impact of charter
flights in the U.S. market has declined to relative insignificance. The focus of this
dissertation is the effect on air travel demand and revenue of the airline fare
product structure and, in specific, the fare products offered for sale to consumers
contained within the computer reservations systems. The pricing and restriction
setting policies engaged in by airlines are explained and suggestions for their
improvement are made.
With the new differentiated structure of airline fare products and the fixed
capacity that characterizes all airline services, techniques of capacity control have
been introduced to best utilize the scarce resource of available seats. The
dissertation shows that the current structure of service offerings can be justified
in the presence of correct capacity control. Moreover, the structure may even
benefit the majority of consumers. In any case, the changes in the nature of
airline services require a new way of looking at airline pricing in the face of
product differentiation and yield management. From the perspective of the
airline, analysis of the fare product structure requires a method of measuring the
effects of the price levels and restriction setting policies on revenues and
demand. In this vein, airlines are interested in knowing how to best set price
levels to maximize revenue. This dissertation focuses on the characterization of
pricing differentiated airline fare products in the current industry environment.
This chapter examines the evolution of airline service offerings from regulation
in the U.S. to the current deregulated environment. Product differentiation as
practiced by airlines is described. Next, the airline (managerial) functions that
attempt to manage demand are described. An in depth look at how pricing is
done at airlines is then undertaken. Finally, an outline of the dissertation is
presented to provide a foundation for the further exploration of airline pricing
and product differentiation.
1.1 Differentiated Airline Fare Products
During the greater part of U.S. airline regulation, the vast majority of traffic was
carried at a single fare set by the governing board of commercial aviation, the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). A single type of reservation was required (and a
single fare paid) for travel in the coach class cabin. In essence, the airline
provided a service guarantee to the consumer. Fares were set according to a
mileage-based formula that was developed by the CAB. The formula sought to
provide airlines with a reasonable rate of return on investment for providing air
transportation service in the markets designated by the CAB. Note that the term
"market", in this case and throughout the dissertation, refers to a single origin to
destination (OD) market. The unit of sale in the airline industry is the individual
seat in an origin to destination market. All transactions made by consumers and
airlines happen at the OD market level making it the relevant reference. Prior to
1979, exclusively carriers licensed by the CAB provided service in interstate U.S.
air transportation markets thus ensuring conformity to the single fare pricing
structure.
The CAB fare formula guaranteed a return of over 10% on investment for all
carriers, given standard industry load factors and flight operations. The fare
levels received by the airlines were increased annually to cover costs. The
dramatic improvement in aircraft efficiency that occurred during the course of
regulation was not entirely transferred to the passenger population in the form of
reduced fare levels but rather through greater service levels. Some might argue
the efficiency gains were translated into airline employee benefits. Since airlines
were not allowed to compete on price and were virtually guaranteed a return on
investment, non-price competition resulted. Airlines offered increased service
levels to passengers. In-flight amenities, frequency of service, and other
passenger inducements increased under regulation while unit costs and fare
levels did not.
There was incentive for CAB licensed carriers to increase capacity since there was
little risk of not recovering costs and passengers were sensitive to frequency of
service. The simplest solution to the problem of not rejecting demand was to
increase aircraft size and frequency of flights. The excess capacity resulting from
this form of non-price competition presented a challenge to the industry --
finding passengers to purchase the unused seats. Under regulation, however, the
methods available to carriers to stimulate passenger demand were quite limited,
although some attempts were made.
1.1.1 Historical Perspective: Surplus Seat Sale
Discount fares were offered to people in an attempt to fill empty or "surplus"
seats with passengers willing to pay significantly less than the unrestricted fare.
The targeted passenger populations of the lower-priced fare products were not
willing to pay the full fare but would choose to purchase air travel, at the right
price. The airlines attempted to fill their excess capacity by developing products
that appealed to the price-sensitive travelers while not decreasing revenues
received from those willing to pay the unrestricted fare.
To stimulate demand among the non-traveling population, the price of airline
travel needed to be reduced. Early attempts at stimulating demand on low load
factor flights in regulation included "night coach" fares which were offered on
late night flights operated primarily for repositioning aircraft due to schedule
inefficiencies. First introduced in the fifties, the night coach fares sought to
recover at least some revenue from the repositioning flights to contribute to fixed
costs since little full-fare demand existed late at night. To stimulate deimand -
further, student fares with 50% off on a stand-by basis or 20% off on a reservation
basis were introduced in the mid-sixties. Fare discounting sought to stimulate
incremental demand, increase load factors, and fill excess capacity.
In 1977, near the end of U.S. airline regulation, more wide-ranging fares aimed at
stimulating leisure demand were introduced to the market. The "Supersaver"
offered by American Airlines was aimed at stimulating demand in the price-
sensitive segments of the markets. The Supersaver fares provided a 45%
discount but required a 30 day advance purchase, round trip travel and an
minimum stay of seven days. The Supersaver fares were similar to the "Peanuts"
discount fares, originally offered by the Texas intrastate carrier Texas Air
International, provided a 50% discount off of the unrestricted fare on a flight-
specific basis in five low demand markets.
Travel and purchase restrictions were attached to the air travel services to
prevent full-fare passengers from purchasing the discounted services. The
discounted fare products with attached purchase restrictions enabled the airlines
to stimulate traffic on their routes from passengers less sensitive to service
convenience and travel flexibility without diluting the revenues earned by the
airline from the more price-insensitive members of the consumer population.
The intention of the fare discounting practiced during regulation was to sell off
the surplus seats to make contributions to fixed costs.
Drawbacks of Discounts
The discount fare offerings were not, however, without their drawbacks. The
student stand-by fares resulted in operational problems for the airlines when the
students learned the system and flooded certain flights with bogus bookings to
create stand-by space for themselves. This resulted in lost revenue for the
airlines and decreased level of service for the full-fare passengers (Kahn, 1970).
Another problem facing airline managers was the coincidence of preferred travel
times for the full-fare and discount travel markets. Many flight departures
popular with full-fare passengers were also quite popular with the discount
travelers. Because of capacity constraints on the peak utilization flights, the
airlines were required to impose limits on the number of discount fare products
sold. For example, Supersaver sales were limited to 35% of the aircraft capacity,
an early application of booking limits to prevent revenue dilution. In fact, any
discount passenger accepted on a flight in lieu of a full-fare passenger on the
same itinerary would have a negative revenue impact for the airline. Thus,
stimulation of traffic without displacement of full-fare passengers was the true
goal of the airline industry.
1.1.2 Market Segmentation Through Fare Product Differentiation
The surplus seat concept has been modified somewhat during deregulation.
Instead of viewing the offer of discount seats to consumers as selling off the
excess capacity, airlines now view the different combinations of price levels and
restriction bundles, or fare products, as separate travel options to be marketed to
different segments of the population. Airlines attempt to segment the market by
offering fare products designed to identify the population by their willingness to
pay for air travel.
The segmentation centers on the belief that passengers who place a higher value
on air travel tend to value flexibility and guaranteed availability more than price
level. Passengers placing lower values on air travel are assumed more sensitive
to price level and less so to flexibility and availability. An entire spectrum of
passenger types ranging from the least price-sensitive/most service-sensitive
passengers to the most price-sensitive/least service-sensitive exists. To
approximate the desired segmentation of demand, airlines have imposed
purchase restrictions and other devices. The purchase restrictions are expected
to act as "fences" to prevent passengers with higher values of willingness to pay
for air travel from purchasing discount fare products. Common industry fare
restrictions include:
1) advance purchase requirements
2) required Saturday night stay-over
3) blackout periods
4) peak vs. off-peak travel requirements
5) weekday vs. weekend travel requirements
6) flight validity restrictions (good for travel between...)
7) ticketing purchase restrictions (purchase tickets by...)
8) required round trip travel
The above devices have been found effective by airlines in preventing
passengers with high values of willingness to pay from purchasing lower-priced
fare products using traveler sensitivity to season, day of week, time of day, and
trip purpose. These flexibility-based "fences" attempt to exploit the relative
sensitivity of passengers to convenience and convertibility of airline travel
services.
The different fare products are developed to appeal to a certain type of air
traveler. For instance, the full-fare unrestricted fare products are aimed at
appealing to customers who value the flexibility of an itinerary and are willing to
pay a higher fare to insure ticket changeability. The deepest discount fares, on
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the other hand, are targeted to consumers who are willing to plan their trip far in
advance, make an extended stay in a location, and sacrifice departure time to
secure the lowest available fare. The discount fare products offer reduced price
levels in exchange for the acceptance of flight restrictions. The lower the price
level, the more severe the restrictions.
In the ideal, airlines hope to target the passengers falling into the same range of
willingness to pay and entice them to buy air travel at the highest possible fare
level. In the presence of "perfect fences", the value differential between the
higher-priced and lower-priced fare products is assumed to be equal to the value
that the passenger places on the higher-priced fare product. In other words, the
lower-priced fare products are intended to be effectively useless to the perfectly
fenced passenger. If not, the passenger might have incentive to "buy down" and
purchase the lower-priced fare product.
Restrictions: Purely Bad or Not?
Under fare product differentiation, any two passengers seated next to each other
on an aircraft are likely to have purchased completely different fare products
with different price levels and purchase restrictions. At first glance, the
restrictions placed on airline fare products targeted to portions of the population
with low values of willingness to pay are unambiguously negative. A closer
examination will reveal, however, that this is not exclusively the case. Even
though all discount fare products are less valuable than the unrestricted (in all
attributes except price level), some of the discount fare products offered by
airlines do provide some degree of added benefit to consumers.
The advance purchase and stay requirements can be viewed as devices used
purely to segment the population by their willingness to pay with no outward
benefits provided to consumers. The airlines are, in fact, making their fare
products less valuable to consumers by artificially reducing the travel flexibility
of all passengers who purchase the more restricted products. In the most
favorable scenario, the advance purchase and minimum stay requirements can be
seen as neutral to the value placed on travel by a consumer. The restrictions
limiting the flexibility of purchase and travel decrease product quality.
The absence of refundability penalties, on the other hand, can be viewed as a
bonus to consumers since most sellers of goods and services do not allow full
refundability for the cancellation of a reservation. Airlines allow full-fare and
most non-excursion (e.g. not requiring a minimum stay) fare product passengers
to arrive after the aircraft has departed and provide them with a full refund
regardless of whether the seat that they reserved resulted in lost revenue or not.
A similar deal is not found for theatrical and sporting events which offer no
refunds whatsoever or for hotels which require, in general, at least several hours
cancellation notice to receive a refund. Complete refundability is quite a
generous offer for a seller with such a highly perishable product. Hence, there is
value added to every refundable ticket issued by an airline demonstrating true
product differentiation rather than just product degradation.
Finally, an attribute of the differentiated airline fare product that can be either
beneficial or detrimental to passengers is availability. Availability limits are
beneficial to the higher-fare passengers to the detriment of discount travelers.
Applying booking limits to the fare products on a high demand flight can ensure
that higher-fare passengers receive a seat instead of having the demand filled by
low fare passengers. In the absence of booking limits, higher-priced fare product0 passengers would have a lower probability of securing a seat on the most
popular flight departures. In addition to providing a superior level of service to
the higher-fare passengers, this use of availability has economically efficient
properties in terms of the resource allocation, which is formalized in the next
chapter of this dissertation.
1.1.3 Pitfalls of Pricing Demand Management
A perfect passenger demand segmentation would be achieved at no cost to the
airline and would have no effect on the demand for air travel in the lower-priced
fare classes. The achievement of perfect fences as they are referred to in the
industry is not an attainable goal for any airline because of the inherent
imperfections in the passenger identification and segmentation process. The
flexibility-based fences that prevail in the industry are imperfect in two main
ways, through their inability to prevent passenger diversion to lower-priced fare
products and in the decreased value of the lower-priced fare products resulting
from the purchase restrictions.
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The most often talked about departure from the perfect fence is the problem of
passenger diversion from the higher-priced fare products to the lower-priced.
Passenger diversion exists when passengers who would be willing to purchase
higher-priced fare products purchase lower-priced fare products because they
are able to meet the restrictions associated with the discount products.
Passengers have incentive to divert from higher-priced fare products to lower-
priced fare products when their value differential becomes less than the price
differential between the two fare products. Fences that are unable to prevent
passengers from diverting to lower-priced fare products are the fear of every
airline and cause revenue dilution. For instance, American Airlines has
estimated that only 6% of all air travelers purchased full-fare tickets in 1991
down from 35.6% ten years previous (WSJ, 1992).
The other problem encountered with the application of travel and purchase
restrictions to the purchase of the discount fare products is the cost imposed by
the segmentation mechanism. If the cost associated with accepting the increased
bundle of purchase restrictions is greater than the utility associated with
traveling on the flight departure at the targeted fare product level, an individual
will opt not to travel. Airlines may circumvent the desired effect of demand
stimulation if the cost perceived by consumers of the applied purchase restriction
is too great. Considering the potential departures from perfect fences, the need
for well designed fare products is apparent.
1.1.4 Fare Product Structure
Although there are countless airline fare products sold in many OD markets, a
relatively small number of fare product types, or "selling fares", make up the
greatest volume of sales. Among the primary selling fares there exists a
hierarchy of airline fare products. In this hierarchy, the purchase restrictions
facing consumers have travel and purchase requirements of increasing severity.
The increasingly restricted fare products have progressively lower price levels, to
avoid the case of a simple dominance of attributes. The more restricted fare
products are also subject to increasingly reduced availability as a result of the
seat inventory control techniques practiced.
The "value pricing" structure proposed by American Airlines in Spring of 1992
offered an example of an inferiority hierarchy of fare products. The only three
types of coach cabin fares available under the value pricing structure were the
unrestricted fare product along with the seven and fourteen day excursion fares
(E7NR and E14NR fare products, respectively). Fare products that require a
minimum stay at the destination are called excursion fares. Today, most
excursion fares are also non-refundable and have an advance purchase
requirement. In this example, the unrestricted fare product clearly dominates
either of the excursion fare products in all attributes except for price level since
there are virtually no additional requirements for its purchase. In a similar
fashion, the seven day advance purchase excursion fare product is preferable to
the fourteen day. All product attributes of the seven and fourteen day excursion
fares are identical except for the advance purchase requirement, fare level, and
availability. The fourteen day excursion fare product is required to be lower in
price level or face domination due to its inherent inferiority in other attributes.
Other non-excursion fares that have been offered in the past have been the three
and seven day advance purchase fare products that require no Saturday night or
other minimum stay. The seven day non-refundable excursion fare product has
been sold previously with a fifty percent refundability penalty attached. The
value pricing initiative sought to remove these fare products from the market to
simplify the purchase and sale of fare products to consumers. The attempt failed,
however, and American no longer attempted to defend the price levels in early
October 1992. Even with the addition of the above fares, an unambiguous
ordering of fare products by attributes can be achieved. The inferiority hierarchy
of attributes and decreasing fare levels can be used to characterize the majority of
fares sold in the market.
An example of the fare product structure existing in the market today is taken
from the Portland, Maine to Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas (PWM-DFW) market. The
selling fares in that market for travel on July 23, 1993, are listed in Table 1.1 as
they appeared in the computer reservation system in early June. The fare
product inferiority hierarchy is maintained in this example since the unrestricted
fare product is the superior product on the market (independent of price level)
followed in descending order of quality by the three, seven, and fourteen day
excursion fares, respectively.
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Fare Product Price
Unrestricted $1,120
E3NR $600
E7NR $530
E14NR $470
Table 1.1: PWM - DFW Summer Fare Product Structure - Early June, 1993
Table 1.2 shows the changes in the fare product structure with the introduction of
a 30% off sale by Northwest Airlines in mid-June. The new seven day advance
purchase fare made the earlier fourteen day and seven day excursion fares
obsolete. The old $530 and $470 dollar fares are no longer selling fares in the
PWM-DFW market because they are dominated by the new seven day excursion
fare product. The new fourteen day advance purchase off-peak fare, valid for
travel only on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Saturday, offers the new most highly
restricted fare product on the market. It should be noted that the inferiority
hierarchy is still maintained with the products ranking in descending order of
non-price attribute quality from the unrestricted product to the three, seven, and
fourteen day excursion fares, respectively.
Fare Product Price
Unrestricted $1,120
E3NR $600
E7NR $530
E14NR $470
New E7NR $353
Off-Peak E14N $329
Table 1.2: PWM - DFW Summer Fare Product Structure - Mid-June, 1993
The availability of fare product purchases reinforces the fare product inferiority hierarchy.
To demonstrate the increasing benefit of booking limits to the higher-priced fare products,
the concept of a nested seat allocation is presented. A nested allocation scheme appears in
Figure 1.1 for a three fare product example.
Nested Seat Allocation
R12
BL1
I BL2 I
BL3
Cap
Seats
Figure 1.1 - Nested Seat Allocation
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The fare products are decreasing in fare level and increasing in restrictions from
fare product 1 to fare product 3. In the example, fare product 1 passengers have
access to the entire aircraft capacity as their booking limits or BL1 = CAP. Since
fare product 1 passengers are paying the top price of anyone on the aircraft, the
effect on revenue would be negative if a fare product 1 passenger requesting a
seat were rejected (if one was available).
There are R1 seats protected for fare product 1 passengers and the rest of the
seats (CAP - R1) are available to fare product 2 passengers. R12 seats are
protected for the use of either fare product 1 or fare product 2 passengers.
Finally, fare product 3 passengers have BL 3 = (CAP - R1 - R12) seats which they
are eligible to purchase. The seats reserved for fare product 3 passengers,
however, can always be purchased by passengers from fare products 1 and 2
who value the service more (and are willing to pay for it). The nesting ensures
that any unfilled seat is more likely to be available to the less-restricted fare
products than the more-restricted thus reinforcing the inferiority hierarchy. The
implementation of seat allocations that draw from a nested inventory dominate
industry seat allocation structures.
1.2 Airline Revenue Management
The revenue management function within an airline controls much of the
marketing of individual airline seats to consumers. The two major functions of
the revenue management responsibility within an airline are pricing and seat
inventory control (or yield management). The pricing department controls the
airline fare product offerings and price levels in the market. The seat inventory
control department allocates the seats given the fare levels and purchase
restrictions set by the pricing department. All revenue management functions
are undertaken assuming a fixed schedule and capacity provision in each market.
The primary goal of revenue management is to manage the airline demand and
revenue given the fixed provision decisions. A brief description of the revenue
management functions appears in this section.
1.2.1 Airline Pricing
Pricing departments at airlines seek to provide airline fare products that
stimulate demand where it is needed without unnecessarily diluting revenue
from passengers placing greater value on air travel. In addition, the price levels
and restriction bundles offered on the market must enable the seat inventory
control department to best manage revenues given the fixed fare product
structure. The published fare product structure for any airline must be flexible
enough to manage demand under varying conditions, yet simple enough to be
understood by travelers and ticketing agents. All of this must be achieved while
remaining competitive with the fare product structures of rival carriers. In most
cases, airlines offer identical fare product structures to their competitors as a
result of the underlying market forces.
Other areas involved in the pricing function are the negotiated group pricing
division and the negotiated contracts pricing division. The negotiated group
pricing division bargains with tour contractors and representatives of large travel
groups. The group negotiations are, in general, for a single flight or short term
event. The negotiated contracts pricing function attempts to secure the exclusive
business of a large client by offering a special deal for all employees or business
trips on a long term contractual basis. The contract guarantees that allbusiness
from the single large client comes to the airline rather than going to other
carriers. The contract, in general, fixes a corporate rate for a large purchaser of
air travel that is guaranteed for the duration of the agreement. It should be noted
that the negotiated group and contract pricing decisions must both be made
while competing for seat availability with passengers traveling on published
fares.
The focus of this dissertation is the establishment of price levels and fare
products that enable an airline to maximize revenues. It is therefore logical that
the focus of the discussion of an airline pricing department be the published fares
and fare products. A detailed description of the daily published pricing function
appears later in the chapter.
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1.2.2 Airline Seat Inventory Control
The airline seat inventory control function within an airline seeks to maximize
revenue given the fixed capacity flying between city pairs, the fixed price levels
and restrictions facing them (set by the pricing department) by forecasting
passenger demand and correctly allocating the available seats. To this end,
airline seat inventory management seeks to reduce revenue dilution and prevent
unnecessary decreases in revenue and yield. Analysts control the availability of
seats using the inventory controls available to them in the computer reservation
system (CRS).
Computer reservations systems allow airlines to control their seat inventories
virtually in real-time by recording and communicating passenger bookings on
the large computer network. The inventory control ability has enabled the
airlines to increase their revenues given the prevailing fare levels and demand
forecasts using the techniques of yield management. The three main areas of
yield management are demand forecasting to predict traffic volumes, booking
limit applications that attempt to maximize expected revenues, and flight
overbooking to correct for the problem of passenger "no shows". The
sophistication of airline yield management modeling has been implementable
because of the CRS network.
The seat inventory management department applies booking limits to the
available fare products to maximize the expected revenue of the airline. The
application of booking limits is the function most closely associated with the seat
inventory management department. To maximize expected revenues on the
flight departures, booking limits are set using the techniques of yield
management such as the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) heuristic
(Belobaba, 1987). Yield management systems use demand forecasts as inputs to
maximize expected revenues.
Demand forecasts must be made by the seat inventory management department
to predict the number of passengers that are expected to make fare product
bookings on a given flight departure. The passenger traffic predictions are a
primary input to the yield management systems which enable the airline to best
allocate the available seat inventory to maximize expected revenues. Without
knowledge of the number of passengers expected to book on a given flight
departure, the airline would have no idea how many seats to protect for the high
revenue passengers. Thus, the ability to apply sophisticated demand
management techniques hinges upon the ability to correctly forecast demand.
Finally, not all passengers who make bookings on a flight departure actually
show up and depart on the flight. The result of the passengers who do not show
up is the departure of the aircraft with empty seats. If there is excess demand on
a given flight, allowing a passenger to book a flight and then cancel results in lost
revenue for the airline as well as a wasted resource. The seat inventory control
department overbooks flights, accepts more bookings than the aircraft capacity,
to prevent seats from departing unfilled. Setting overbooking factors for flights
is another primary function of the seat inventory management department. The
overbooking factors set for a flight also impact the seat allocation decisions
returned by the yield management system.
1.2.3 Cooperation Between Seat Inventory Control and Pricing
Although there is a dependency relationship between pricing and seat inventory
control, the policies set by pricing must be made first. The pricing department
C sets price levels and the accompanying restrictions to the fares offered in eachOD market. Seat inventory control takes the fare levels and restrictions
established by pricing and attempts to maximize revenue. All actions taken by
seat inventory control are contingent upon the price levels and fare restrictions
dictated by pricing. It is the responsibility of pricing to provide the price levels
and fare products required by seat inventory control to correctly manage
demand and revenue.
Within the pricing department, the correct price levels and fare restrictions must
be combined to offer a competitive mix of fare products. Seat inventory control
is responsible for managing revenue and does so by protecting seats for higher-
fare passengers booking near departure and limiting availability of discount
seats. When pricing must issue a competitive price filing to match a newly
introduced lower fare, seat inventory control is responsible for applying booking
limits to the number of fare products that may be reserved by consumers at the
published price. A miscommunication between pricing and seat inventory
control could result in too many discount fares to be sold on a given flight
leaving the profitability of the flight diluted. Proper communication between
pricing and seat inventory control can help to prevent unnecessary revenue loss
for the airline.
Drastic changes in price levels may impact the seat inventory control function in
predictable ways. The demand forecasts may become biased with large shifts in
price levels. For example, during a fare war, the number of bookings in the
lowest discount class are expected to balloon as a result of the low fares being
published. The seat inventory control analyst would be better equipped to
anticipate demand spikes with proper communication with pricing. Any
decisions made by pricing and inventory management should consider the
possible effects that the pending decision might have on the revenue dilution
encountered when high-revenue passengers are displaced by low-revenue
passengers. Although generally regarded as separate within airlines, the pricing
and seat inventory control functions work to achieve the same goals of demand
and revenue management. The ultimate aim of the revenue management
function within an airline would be a complete integration of the pricing and seat
inventory control functions.
1.3 Current Practice: Airline Pricing Departments
The primary functions of airline pricing departments are to develop the
differentiated fare products, set their price levels, and report this information to
the relevant systems. This section seeks to characterize the daily functions and
requirements of the published fares portion of an airline pricing department. A
description of the communication of price levels between airlines begins the
discussion.
1.3.1 Airline Tariff Publishing Corporation
In the U.S. airline industry, each airline knows the complete fare structure of all
other carriers in every OD market. Domestically, the fare product information is
contained in a data base published by the Airline Tariff Publishing Corporation
(ATPCO). Airline fare product changes are sent at least daily from the individual
carriers to the ATPCO. The Airline Tariff Publishing Corporation serves as a
clearinghouse for the fare product changes that are posted by the carriers.
The information concerning fare products available in any OD market that is
held by the ATPCO data base includes:
1) Fare level
2) Fare basis (a code representing restrictions)
3) Effective dates
4) Acceptable routings
5) Special footnotes
6) Specific rules applicable
7) Airline quoting the fare
The fare level posted with the ATPCO is simply the cost to consumers of
purchasing the fare product. The fare basis is a code representing the restrictions
associated with a fare product and the fare class in which it is published. For
example, a QE14NR fare basis code identifies a fare product booked in Q class for
an Excursion fare that must be purchased at least 14 days in advance of
departure and is Non-Refundable. The effective dates comprise the first and last
dates that the fare is available for purchase by the traveling public. Any specific
restrictions on the flights for which a given fare product is valid are contained in
the acceptable routings category. Special footnotes and rules clarify any non-
standard restrictions placed on the fare product or its sale not evident in the fare
basis code or the routing restrictions. Changes can be posted with the ATPCO by
the carriers to any of the above information fields, not just price level. From the
ATPCO data base, the current airline fare product structure for all carriers in all
markets is known for the present and near future to all subscribing carriers.
The fare levels and products listed with ATPCO that are currently valid
(effective) are also listed in the computer reservations systems that provide
information about the inventory of seats for sale to the public. The fare level
changes are also reported to the CRS network on a frequent (at least daily) basis.
The fares listed are the only ones that can be sold through the CRS. As
previously stated, the unpublished negotiated and contract fares must be
handled separately by the airline and do not appear within the ATPCO data base
or any CRS. The primary differences between the CRS and ATPCO data bases
are that the CRS contains seat availability information while the ATPCO contains
a greater volume of information about fares not currently available for sale to
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The fare changes that have been registered with the ATPCO data base in the last
24 hours are published daily in a report made available to all subscribing airlines.
Using the data base, responses to price and fare product changes can be
registered and disseminated within 24 hours. In this framework, discontent with
a fare change can be made known to another airline within one day. As would
be expected, the ATPCO data base has been used by the airlines as a method to
engage in potentially collusive pricing practices, most notably price signaling.
1.3.2 Price Signaling
The practice of price signaling using the ATPCO published fares data base is one
technique available to the airline pricing analyst. Price signaling is the method
by which airlines show discontent with the price changes of other carriers. The
airlines test the competitive reaction to proposed fare initiatives before they go
on the market using the ATPCO clearinghouse. Carriers "signal" their intention
to introduce a fare product change or price reduction onto the market in advance,
to see the competitive response of the rival carriers before actually putting the
fare product on sale. When price signaling is used, consumers need not receive
the benefits of low fare quotes that are not accepted by the other carriers since the
changes need never reach the market. The acceptability to the competing carriers
is often the force that drives the actual introduction onto (or withdrawal from)
the market of a fare initiative.
For exposition, consider the example of a fare decrease in the Chicago to Dallas-
Fort Worth market posted by United Airlines to take effect in one week. If
American Airlines disapproved of the pricing action by United, American might
propose a fare increase in the same market identifying United in the fare basis
code with effective dates for the fare identical to United's proposed fare
reduction. From this signal, United would understand that American
disapproved of the price reduction in the market. A more severe reaction to
United's fare cut by American might be to publish an extremely low fare in the
Chicago to Denver market (which is very important to United) effective for only
one day. This would indicated extreme displeasure to the fare change by
American. It would be up to the discretion of United whether or not to withdraw
the initial fare decrease, but that decision would be aided by the information
about the competitive reaction of American as shown through its price signals.
The message sent by a carrier can vary in severity from a minor fare modification
in a low revenue market to a large fare cut in an important hub market. If a
carrier views the price level in a certain market to be below a level at which a
profit can be made, the carrier may send pricing signals in an attempt to raise the
prices up to an acceptable level. To be most effective, this process must be done
gradually and in systematically timed increments so that the signals can be
clearly interpreted by the competitors (Elkins, 1986). To effectively price signal,
the other carriers must know your intentions. Regardless of the method of
implementation, however, the practice of price signaling pervades the industry.
Legal and ethical issues surround the current practice of pricing in the airline
industry. Among the volatile issues facing airline management is the legality of
the practice of price signaling. One of the major concerns facing the United
States Department of Justice regarding the commercial airline industry is the
legality of price signaling and when signaling becomes a violation of anti-trust
legislation. The U.S. government has disagreed with the testing of fares before
they go to market. A lawsuit has been filed by the U.S. government against eight
major U.S. carriers in an attempt to curb price signaling. The carriers were found
guilty of anti-trust violations and ordered to desist from the practice of price
signaling. As a result of a settlement, two major carriers, United and USAir, have
signed an affidavit preventing them from practicing fare testing using the
ATPCO clearinghouse for the period of ten years (WSJ, 1993).
1.3.3 Functions of an Airline Pricing Department
Airline pricing departments are made up of analysts who make the daily pricing
decisions and managers who approve the decisions and handle more far-
reaching pricing issues. Analysts are assigned several OD markets for which
they are responsible. Primary in the duties of the analyst is addressing the fare
actions of other carriers in their markets. Fare initiatives also must be registered
by the analysts at the request of pricing management. Figure 1.2 represents the
flow of information within the pricing department and out to the ATPCO that
occurs daily in all OD markets where fare change actions take place. Changes to
restrictions and other fare product attributes also take place in the ATPCO
clearinghouse. These changes are quite similar in nature, however, and thus, the
discussion will focus on fare changes.
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Overview of an Automated Airline Pricing System
Figure 1.2 - Overview of an Automated Airline Pricing System
Each day the ATPCO returns a list of the fare changes that were posted the
previous day by all of the participating carriers. In Figure 1.2, the cross-hatched
box represents the information provided to the analyst about his OD markets.
The lists of changes are processed by the carriers and provided to pricing
analysts in the form of market reports. In the past, the reports had been
distributed to analysts in the form of computer printouts on their markets. Many
major carriers now process this information and provide it to analysts on menu-
driven screens. An efficient information processing function can expedite a
thorough market analysis for the pricing analyst.
Analysts access fare changes in the markets for which they are responsible to
monitor the activity that has taken place over the past day. The shaded boxes in
Figure 1.2 represent the changes made by the analysts for submission to the
ATPCO clearinghouse. It is the responsibility of each analyst to respond to the
fare changes posted by rival carriers in his markets. The fare change responses or
initiatives that are proposed by analysts are then transferred to pricing
management for approval or revisions. Upon approval, the pricing decisions
that have been made in all markets are sent to the ATPCO data base for listing in
the fare change report provided to all carriers the following day. It should be
noted that communication between the airline pricing departments and ATPCO
may take place more often than once per day but for ease of exposition, a daily
interaction has been assumed.
1.3.4 Competitive Pricing Strategies
When a fare change is registered by an airline, a competitive response is expected
from the other airlines offering service in the OD market. This is true whether or
not price signaling is permissible. The discussion of competitive responses to
fare changes is presented here with respect to a decrease in fare level although
the result can be generalized to any change in fare levels or purchase restrictions.
Three main types of price quoting strategies are used to respond to a fare change
when registered by a competing carrier:
1) matching strategy
2) non-matching strategy
3) partial matching strategy
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If the responding carrier agrees with the price change or is unwilling or unable to
combat the fare change, a matching strategy can be adopted. A matching
strategy consists of matching the price level offered by the carrier posting the fare
change under the same conditions on all flights in that market. The expected
results of a matching strategy are the retention of market share and
competitiveness in the market. A negative effect resulting from a matching
strategy (in this case) is a loss in the average revenue paid per passenger in the
market because of the reduced price levels.
In contrast to the matching strategy, a carrier can adopt a non-matching strategy
in which the carrier retains his current price levels on all flights. This strategy
would result in the maintenance of yield but risk the adverse effects of a possible
loss in market share and competitiveness in the market. In addition, customer
goodwill may be lowered in the market if the carrier is perceived as being
insensitive to the traveling population by not matching, for example, a heavily
advertised fare cut. When both the matching and non-matching strategies offer
unacceptable alternatives, any of several partial matching strategies which call
for selective matching of fare changes can be employed.
A spectrum of partial matching strategies lie between the matching and non-
matching strategies which may help in retaining market share and reducing the
loss of yield. A partial matching strategy may result in a price match on certain
off-peak flights or on flights with a specific routing. For example, one partial
matching strategy calls for the matching of fares on the less popular, off-peak
flights while maintaining current fare levels on the more popular peak flights.
Another partial matching strategy calls for routing restrictions on the discount
fare products in an attempt to reduce the pressure put on high load factor flight
legs entering and leaving hubs burdened with too much rejected demand.
The exact form of the strategy adopted by the carrier should depend on the
nature of the OD market and the relative strength of the carrier in that market as
well as the size of the fare change. The ramifications of adopting a partial
matching strategy must be considered when choosing the best fare-matching
response strategy. The competitor offering the lower fare is likely to offer that
fare on all flights (peak and off-peak) in that OD market. The pricing analyst
must be confident enough in the market demand level at peak hours to become
non-competitive on price level for the peak flights. The experience and judgment
of the analyst is at a premium when evaluating partial matching strategies.
The carrier instituting fare changes must carefully monitor the pricing reactions
of the other carriers to gauge their relative agreement or disagreement with the
price level change. While the primary method of fare change response is
registered in the affected market, competing carriers disapproving of a fare
initiative may display their discontent in other markets. Competitive responses
to fare changes are often a system-wide phenomenon. Thus, communication of
price changes between pricing analysts is another important function of the
pricing department.
1.3.5 Monitoring Fare Changes Properly: Practical Considerations
The direct and indirect effects of having discrepancies between prices of like fare
products must be examined when fare differentials result from strategies other
than direct matching. When price differentials are enacted in a given market, the
effects should be monitored closely to gauge the impact on revenue, traffic, and
yield. Yield is the revenue per passenger-mile earned by a carrier. If the number
of bookings in the affected market is substantially lower than before the
activation of the fare differential, it is likely that the differential should be
removed from the fare listings. It is important to monitor both load factor and
yield when price level changes are being instituted to gauge the resulting effect
on revenue.
When a fare differential is listed in a market among the ATPCO published fares,
it is the responsibility of the pricing analyst to verify that the fare level is actually
available to consumers. Not all fares appearing in the ATPCO data base are
actually available to consumers as a result of, for example, no service provision
by a carrier posting a fare. Or, there may be no authorized seat availability at a
certain fare level appearing in the ATPCO data base. It would not be logical, for
instance, for a dominant carrier to match a lower fare quote by a carrier offering
virtually no seats in a market if the dominant carrier did not approve of the
lower fare.
Another particularly detrimental effect of fare differentials is the removal of the
quoted fare from the first page of the CRS screen display of like fare products.
For instance, when a potential customer calls a travel agent and asks for the
lowest fare available in the market, the agent is likely to view the lowest priced
fare listing on the first page of the price-stratified menu display. Entries
appearing on the following pages are less likely to attract the attention of the
travel agent and are thus, booked less frequently. Publishing a fare differential
on the lowest fare in a market may result in the removal of that fare from the first
page of the CRS display. Even if the higher fare is not removed from the initial
page, it will appear after the lower priced ones on the display. The convenient
availability of the fares to travel agents via the CRS display is a critical
consideration for the pricing department that is not outwardly apparent.
Finally, carriers choosing to follow non-matching or partial matching strategies
must be aware that many passengers choose an airline and a specific flight on the
basis of price alone. Such increases, if unmatched, would potentially result in a
decrease in load factor and revenue because of the many passengers who are so
highly price sensitive. As a result, unilateral fare increases in a single market are
not a common practice at most airlines.
1.4 The Nature of Airline Pricing Decisions
The price levels facing consumers in major U.S. markets rarely differ by carrier.
The fear of "fare wars" prevents the major carriers from competing on price level.
Moreover, the rapid communication of pricing information results in identical
fare products being posted in a market at almost all times. The method by which
the "equilibrium" of fare products is reached, however, merits discussion. Many
different factors influence the pricing decisions that are made in a market.
Among the most important are the level of service offered by the competing
carriers and the relative strength of the carriers in the market. Perhaps the most
important level of service considerations are the existence and frequency of non-
stop service in the market. To the price-insensitive traveler, the existence of non-
stop service is an extremely important level of service consideration. This section
seeks to address price level equilibria and the factors that influence them.
1.4.1 Fare Product Equilibria: Price Levels and Restrictions
The prevailing prices in any OD market have most likely been arrived at through
some sort of competitive equilibrium pricing mechanism. The equilibrium
achieved is not, in general, the one or two price level type assumed to exist in
many models of airline competition. The price levels and fare product types are
generally matched across all carriers and all fare products based on market
conditions. Price levels tend to reach a level of competitive equilibrium where
the fare and restriction combinations offered by every carrier are almost
identical. The competitive price level equilibrium forces competition to take
place primarily on the non-price level. The equilibrium prices of fare products
arrived at in the market will most likely depend upon the number and relative
strengths of the competitors in the market. Other important factors include the
level of service offered, the demand for service in the market and, to a certain
extent, the cost of providing service.
Carriers offering non-stop service or greater departure frequency can exercise
more influence over the prevailing market price levels than other carriers as a
result of their greater market power. In terms of fare product types, the basic
industry structure (or a close variant) is likely to rule the market structure.
Variations from this may be driven by the peaking behavior of the market. For
example, large day of week or time of day differentials in demand may lead to
the introduction of a peak/off-peak pricing structure in certain markets.
The rule of thumb concerning fare products existing in the market is usually that
carriers tend to match fare structures by market. The incidence of non-matching
and partial matching strategies is quite limited. A competitive equilibrium of
price levels and fare product restrictions is the rule rather than the exception in
day-to-day airline pricing decisions. A single fare level associated with each fare
product is thus a reasonable assumption when modeling airline pricing practice
with its resulting fare product structure. In general, the competing airlines
appear to act as one entity when the final price levels prevail on the market.
Thus, although the prevailing price levels have resulted from an equilibrium
process, the result appears to consumers as a single price level for each of the
different fare products.
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Unlike most industries, when airline pricing analysts price fare products in a
given market, operating costs are not considered explicitly. Instead, pricing
analysts look at the prices that currently prevail in the market. Despite their
absence from daily pricing decisions, however, the operating costs for the flights
may be referenced to determine whether a profit can be made at the established
price levels. If after analyzing the profitability of a given market there is found to
be an operating loss, a change in the type of service offered is considered or an
attempt is made using price signaling to raise the fares. In the long run, service is
likely to be discontinued in that market if the operating loss persists. Such
decisions are not within the standard operating jurisdiction of the pricing
department and are addressed by the scheduling department or top level
management.
1.4.2 Hub and Spoke Network Effects on Pricing Decisions
Since the enactment of the Federal Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, there has
been a trend by U. S. airlines to tailor their route structures into a series of hub
and spoke networks. The hub and spoke structure takes advantage of the
"network effects" gained by routing many flights into a single hub and allowing
passengers to connect to any of the other destinations served by the hub. A
connection between almost any OD market pair can be accomplished by making
no more than two connecting flights when a hub and spoke network structure as
vast as that in the U.S. domestic air transportation system exists.
A hub and spoke structure allows the airline to serve far more OD pairs than
would be possible by providing point-to-point service between the OD pairs. In
the context of total markets served, the hub and spoke network configuration
used by all major airlines today is clearly a more efficient use of resources than
would be the case if the same amount of resources were deployed to run a point-
to-point network system. Consider the example of a five city point-to-point route
network shown in Figure 1.3 which requires twenty flights per day to offer non-
stop service between the five cities. Next, consider the five city hub and spoke
network shown in Figure 1.4 requiring only eight flights per day to offer direct
one-stop service between all OD pairs.
Point-to-Point Airline Route Network
C
Point-to-point airline route network serving 5 cities with 20 links
which are presented as 10 bidirectional flight legs
Figure 1.3 - Point-to-point Airline Route Network
C
Hub and Spoke Airline Route Network
Hub and spoke airline route network configuration
serving 5 cities using only 8 flight legs
Figure 1.4 - Hub and Spoke Airline Route Network
The simple example demonstrates the benefits in resource allocation offered by a
hub-spoke system which increase with network size. The number of flight legs
required to serve a point-to-point network amplifies factorially with increases in
the number of cities served by the network while in a hub-spoke network it
increases by only two. Thus, the larger the size of the network (e.g. the larger the
scope of operations of an airline), the greater the number of services that can be
offered to a larger number of people. Each new spoke added to an existing hub-
spoke network can generate an array of destinations available to all locations
served in the network requiring only a single stop at the hub. Therefore, despite
the slight decrease in the level of service offered by the hub-spoke configuration,
the ability of the hub-spoke system to capitalize on network effects makes it cost-
effective compared to a point-to-point network.
The result of the economies of scope prevailing in the industry has been a move
by most of the major airlines to offer their services as competing hub and spoke
networks. Airlines not using the hub and spoke may be forced out of the market
by the relative inefficiencies encountered when offering a point-to-point service.
This view is based solely on cost, however, and the influence of demand levels
and passenger preference cannot be ignored. Since virtually all passengers prefer
non-stop service to direct or connecting service, the carriers offering the non-
stops have an advantage on the demand side, both in passenger attraction as well
as market pricing.
Any airline operating a point-to-point service system would be unable to
compete with the established hub-spoke systems all things being equal unless
that airline can operate under an extremely low cost structure. Factors other than
cost, however, often influence the ability of a carrier to compete more greatly.
The example of Southwest Airlines deserves mention since they operate a
primarily point-to-point route network quite profitably in the United States. The
ability of Southwest to compete stems from low operating costs, a monopoly at
Love Field in Dallas, high employee productivity, and passenger preference for
non-stop service. The markets served by Southwest are, in general, short
distances in which non-stop service is all but required. Thus, although cost-
effective, the efficiencies offered by a hub and spoke are by no means a necessary
ingredient for success.
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In any case, the type of competition occurring in the airline industry is influenced
by the hub and spoke route structure that prevails at almost every major North
American carrier. Because of the hub and spoke network configuration, many
carriers are able to provide service in the largest OD markets. In turn, the
increased number of GD markets that can be served by carriers increases the
level of competition in most medium to long haul markets.
The competition invites attempts at price competition by the weaker carriers. For
instance, carriers in need of cash to sustain their operations often attempt to
increase market share and loads by offering price reductions to passengers. Since
stronger carriers are adverse to allowing fare differentials in most markets, the
result is lower fare levels across the board due to matching. The discounts may
even be below levels at which a profitable return on revenue can be achieved.
The desire of carriers to offer a full range of air travel services along with the
costs of entering and exiting markets frequently forces carriers to accept
unprofitable price levels in the short term. The wide range of GD markets that
are served by weaker carriers produces a downward influence on price level
since, in most cases, all carriers match the lowest available fares.
The existence of the hub and spoke air transportation network also allows
carriers to offer increased frequency of connecting service compared to what can
be offered in a point-to-point route network with an identical aircraft fleet. An
important consideration to the price-insensitive traveler is the number of flights
offered per day by each of the airlines in the OD market. Because the fare
products purchased by price-insensitive travelers generally allow itinerary
changes, it benefits these travelers to choose the airline that offers the most
frequency of service for the OD market in which they are traveling. Carriers
offering the most frequency in a market (and particularly the most non-stop
frequency) are often the most powerful carriers in the market. The dominant
carriers are able to exercise a degree of market power when faced with fare
changes. In this way, greater frequency of service affords carriers influence in
market pricing decisions.
The variability in level of service across OD markets between the carriers with
competing hubs changes the nature of competition. The level of service offered
in markets varies widely by market and by carrier within the market. One result
of the hub and spoke system is the difference in level of service offered in the hub
markets as compared to the non-hub markets. For instance, consider the Boston
to Atlanta OD market. Only Delta and Trans World Airlines offer non-stop
service. While other carriers offer service in the market, USAir through Charlotte
for example, the pricing decisions are dominated by the non-stop carriers,
particularly Delta which offers significantly more frequent non-stop service than
TWA. USAir, on the other hand, dominates the Boston to Charlotte market as a
result of its large hub in Charlotte and strong presence in Boston. Clearly, the
competitive stance of every airline differs from market to market as a result of
route structure. From the perspective of the individual airline, the nature of
competition differs in every market served and must be evaluated individually.
The position of each competing airline is different in every market. Market
power weighs heavily in the determination of the prevailing price level of fare
products in an OD market. Price levels in an OD market are generally most
heavily influenced by the carrier offering the most non-stop frequency in the
market. The most effective competitive measures are the existence of non-stop
service and frequency of service. The perception of reliability of service remains
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for competing in the market on the non-
price level. If a carrier is not perceived as reliable by price-insensitive consumers,
all other non-price level competitive moves are irrelevant. The level of service
and perceived level of service offered by every carrier operating in the market
must be examined when characterizing the factors influencing pricing power.
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation
The dissertation begins by formalizing the similarities and differences between
airline fare product differentiation and price discrimination in airline markets in
Chapter Two. The question of the economic efficiency of airline pricing is
addressed in the context of the current environment of fare product
differentiation and seat inventory control. The existing work done on airline
price discrimination and fare product differentiation in both the economics and
airline yield management literature is reviewed.
Chapter Three looks at the passenger arrival and booking process in detail. A
model is proposed that addresses the shortcomings of the existing
characterization of passenger demand in all yield management seat allocation
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models. The independence of the demand for the individual fare products is
relaxed in the model to more correctly characterize the situation facing airlines.
The data requirements for such a model are, however, prohibitive and thus a
more tractable model is sought.
Chapter Four introduces the generalized cost model for airline fare product
differentiation, an operational static model that provides a more correct
treatment of airline fare product demand. The model incorporates the
dependence of fare product demand levels to more realistically characterize
passenger demand. The model explicitly considers the decrease in product
quality associated with accepting a more-restricted fare product by imposing a
cost on each consumer purchasing a discount fare product. Functional
specifications of the model are then presented.
Chapter Four continues by reviewing the modeling of passenger "buy down" or
diversion to lower-priced fare products as it has been addressed in the literature.
Passenger diversion is then incorporated into the generalized cost modeling
framework. Finally, booking limits are applied to the static model to
approximate the effects of yield management on the airline fare product
differentiation model.
Chapter Five demonstrates the uses of the generalized cost model under the
assumption of two types of functional forms of passenger demand. Both linear
and constant elasticity demand specifications are incorporated into the modeling
framework. The optimality conditions and limiting cases are highlighted to
demonstrate the effects of the model. Practical applications of the generalized
cost model are then presented. Finally, Chapter Six presents the conclusions and
contributions of the research and provides a discussion of the future research
directions.
1.6 Chapter Summary
The chapter began by reviewing the historical view of airline pricing and its
evolution to the current structure. Airline pricing was discussed in the context of
the fully deregulated environment. The revenue management function of
airlines was then presented. Current practice within an airline pricing
department was detailed. The nature of airline pricing decisions was then
discussed. Finally, an outline of the dissertation was presented. The context of
airline fare product differentiation has thus been set so that a discussion of the
methodologies used to interpret pricing decisions can now be undertaken. The
next chapter discusses the view of airline fare product differentiation in the
literature and in society.
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Chapter Two
Airline Fare Product Differentiation Literature Review
Airlines might choose to describe the offering of selected air transportation and
restriction bundles as product differentiation rather than price discrimination.
Airline travel consumer advocates, on the other hand, might choose the opposite
characterization. The two terms have been used almost interchangeably in the
airline yield management literature leading to confusion about these two closely
related, but distinctly different, concepts. Distinguishing between product
differentiation and price discrimination is necessary in order to begin a proper
review of the airline fare product differentiation literature.
Product differentiation is the practice of offering products with differing
attributes for sale to consumers. The varied airline fare product offerings
available on the market today are a clear example of product differentiation.
Although the level of in-flight service offered to passengers in the coach cabin is
identical, the travel flexibility associated with the individual tickets often varies
widely. Each fare product offered by the airlines represents a unique collection
of travel attributes.
In contrast, price discrimination is the practice of charging consumers differential
mark-ups over the marginal cost of serving them. Price discrimination occurs if
the price differential between higher- and lower-priced fare products differs from
the marginal cost differential of serving the higher- and lower-priced fare
product passengers. Thus, if it is no more expensive to serve the higher priced
fare product passengers than those purchasing the lower priced, price
discrimination exists. Such differentials indicate the existence of price
discrimination, according to the strict definition found in the economics
literature.
Under these definitions, product differentiation and price discrimination can
occur simultaneously or separately. An airline need not offer differentiated fare
products in order to price discriminate. Conversely, by offering differentiated
fare products, an airline is not obligated to price discriminate. Since it is evident
that airlines practice product differentiation in virtually every OD market that
they serve, it remains to establish the extent to which price discrimination is
practiced.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of airline price discrimination
and fare product differentiation in airline markets. Airline fare product
differentiation is then explained within the context of the economics price
discrimination literature. Efficiency considerations are then addressed with
respect to airline realities. Next, the existing models of airline price
discrimination and fare product differentiation that have appeared in both the
economics and airline yield management literature are reviewed. The
assumptions and findings of the existing models are documented and the needs
for future research are motivated.
2.1 The Nature of Price Discrimination in Airline Markets
Price discrimination occurs when consumers are charged different price levels
with no differences in the marginal production costs of serving them. Most costs
incurred by the airline do not differ between consumers, or consumer types,
since it costs the airline nothing to add restrictions to the fare products. One
notable exception is the opportunity cost incurred by allowing passenger to
unconditionally return unused unrestricted tickets. If marginal costs with
respect to passengers are constant, as is often assumed, the existence of fare
differentials between different consumer groups results in discriminatory
pricing. In this case, airlines unquestionably practice price discrimination since
the price level mark-up over marginal cost is greater for one population than
another.
In the economics literature, price discrimination has been characterized as
occurring in three forms, first, second, and third degree, based upon the seminal
work of Pigou (1920). A brief description of each type of price discrimination
follows with its specific application to airline fare product differentiation
discussed thereafter. Only a cursory treatment of price discrimination techniques
is presented here in order to classify airline fare product differentiation and price
discrimination within the framework of the economics literature. For a more
detailed discussion of the different types of price discrimination consult Tirole,
1988.
2.1.1 First Degree Price Discrimination
The practically unrealistic case of first degree price discrimination assumes that
the airline is able to perfectly identify and segment each potential consumer and
force him to pay a value equal to his maximum willingness to pay for the
product. Such a segmentation would result in the maximum profit for the airline
with no consumer surplus. Even with the ability to achieve such a perfect
segmentation of passengers, the airline would need to charge all passengers a
different rate. This would be operationally infeasible. The case of first degree
price discrimination is instructive, however, in that it represents an upper bound
on the revenue achievable by an airline. Though not an attainable goal, this type
of price discrimination provides a limiting case against which valuable
comparisons can be made.
2.1.2 Second Degree Price Discrimination
Second degree price discrimination, also called self-selecting, seeks to identify the
willingness to pay of passengers through their purchasing behavior. For
example, those passengers having the greatest willingness to pay will
demonstrate this by purchasing the least restricted fare product as a result of
their preference for travel flexibility. Consumer self-selection is contingent upon
a high degree of correlation between passenger sensitivity to fare product
attributes (travel flexibility) and willingness to pay.
The array of fare products offered by airlines in each OD market can be seen as
attempt to use second degree price discrimination to segment the demand
population using their assumed sensitivity to travel flexibility. The most
common devices used by airlines to achieve these segmentations are advance
purchase, non-refundability, Saturday night stay, and round trip purchase
itinerary requirements, in addition to availability limits.
Consider a simple example in which passengers must choose between the
unrestricted product and a single discount fare product requiring a Saturday
night stay at the destination city. Passengers with the highest values of
willingness to pay are assumed to prefer the unrestricted product because they
are extremely sensitive to travel flexibility and unwilling to stay over the
Saturday night. They are willing to pay a premium to ensure travel convenience.
Conversely, passengers with values of willingness to pay lower than the
unrestricted fare product price level (but above the discount fare product price
level) are expected to be less sensitive to travel flexibility and thus, willing to stay
over the Saturday night in order to secure the discount. If the self-selection
scheme works, the two groups of consumers will identify their willingness to pay
through their purchase decisions and be perfectly segmented.
The effectiveness of second degree price discrimination relies upon the ability of
the airline to design and implement a differentiated fare product structure that
capitalizes on the relative sensitivities of passengers and forces their
segmentation by willingness to pay. Among the three types of price
discrimination, the techniques of second degree dominate the industry. The
basic fare product inferiority hierarchy that proliferates in most U.S. airline
markets is the result of an attempt at self-selective passenger segmentation.
Chapter One provided a detailed description of the types of fare products
airlines use to segment passengers by their willingness to pay for air travel. All
of these fare products can be modeled within the second degree price
discrimination framework.
2.1.3 Third Degree Price Discrimination
Third degree price discrimination, also called index sorting, assumes the ability
of the producer to segment the market a priori based on exogenous passenger
characteristics. The exogenous sorting mechanism is expected to identify groups
of the population who have similar levels of willingness to pay. Unfortunately,
sorting passengers in this fashion is often difficult. Additionally, it may create
two types of problems for the airline, lost revenue opportunities and revenue
dilution.
Only a limited number of passengers within a given range of willingness to pay
may be identified by the screening. Passengers not identified in the screening
process may result in lost revenue opportunities for the airline. On the other
hand, the screening may falsely identify passengers who have values of
willingness to pay significantly higher than expected. These passengers would
have been willing to pay substantially more for air travel. As a result of meeting
the screening criteria, however, they are able to purchase the discounted fare
product thus diluting the revenue of the airline. An airline must be careful to
avoid the potential pitfalls associated with third degree price discrimination
when selecting screening devices.
Airlines have, in fact, made use of a priori screening techniques, as the following
example illustrates. In the airline business, senior citizens and students are often
identified as groups of potential passengers with low levels of willingness to pay.
Thus, offering senior or student discounts allows the airline to serve these
sections of the population at a price they are willing to pay without diluting the
revenues paid by the non-senior/non-student segments of the population. The
optimistic airline manager believes that the initial a priori segmentation of
students and seniors results not only in identifying a group of passengers by
their low values of willingness to pay but also in identifying a group possessing a
higher degree of travel flexibility.
Not all students and senior citizens, however, have low values of willingness to
pay. Depending upon their trip purpose and income levels, members of both the
student and senior populations may possess some of the highest values of
willingness to pay. Recall that Lee Iaccoca is a senior citizen. In addition, the
populations of seniors and students represent only a fraction of the total
population with relatively low values of willingness to pay. This example
illustrates both the potential for revenue dilution and the lost revenue
opportunities that often accompany the pure application of third degree price
discrimination techniques to air travel populations.
To minimize revenue dilution and lost revenue opportunities, the promotions
that are offered by the airline marketing department must be carefully designed.
Their purpose is to stimulate travel from passengers with greater sensitivity to
price level in order to increase load factors while not lowering yields as a result
of dilution from passengers with higher levels of willingness to pay. Appealing
to portions of the population who are willing to meet the inconvenient travel
restrictions in order to secure a lower price level who would not travel otherwise
is the goal of airline marketing managers. The fear of revenue dilution from
passengers of all kinds who have high levels of willingness to pay, however, is
the primary one of these managers and thus, drives the fare product designs of
airline marketers. Accordingly, it is common for airline fare product promotions
to excessively limit the screening device and lose some revenue potential rather
than risk diluting revenues.
Using the techniques of segmenting the market with an a priori signal about
willingness to pay does not prevent the airline from applying self-selection
techniques as well. The exogenous screening techniques used by airline
marketers are invariably accompanied by restrictions on the flexibility of the
passenger itineraries in accordance with the preferred tradeoff of airline
management. The self-selection devices are applied to the discount fare products
offered to the exogenously segmented populations using different product
restrictions such as specific flight availability, booking limits, service guarantees,
purchase restrictions, or combinations of these techniques. In other words, more
heavily restricted fare products are offered to the segmented populations.
2.1.4 Second and Third Degree Price Discrimination Techniques in Practice
The combination of second and third degree price discrimination techniques is
commonplace in the airline industry. In fact, the application of sophisticated
yield management techniques his virtually eliminated all forms of pure third
degree price discrimination. A closer look at the some of the latest available
airline promotions provides insight into the forms of price discrimination
practiced that have previously been assumed to be third degree price
discrimination but, in fact, are combinations of second and third degree price
discrimination. Student discounts are the first topic addressed.
At present, the most widespread student discounts offered are on Continental
Airlines in conjunction with American Express. A similar offer between Chase
Visa and USAir also exists. All who qualify for the discounted travel are
students who hold American Express charge cards. This attempt at exogenously
identifying a percentage of the population expected to have low values of
willingness to pay for air travel and high travel flexibility offers a clear example
of one current application of third degree price discrimination.
In addition to the initial screening, however, passengers using the discounts are
required to purchase a round trip itinerary, to stay at their destination over a
Saturday night and to complete the trip within a seven day/six night period.
The credit card-holding students are also subject to availability limits identical to
those imposed on the lowest priced leisure travelers. The value of the students'
travel itineraries may be reduced since the most convenient flights may not be
available to them.
Another common third degree price discrimination technique is segmenting
passengers traveling with children, most recently employed by Northwest
Airlines last summer prior to the large scale fare war. In the case of "kids fly
free" promotions, the accompanying child is subject to purchase restrictions and
availability constraints based on the adult traveler's itinerary and fare product
choice. Thus, in order to qualify for the free ticket, the child may be required to
stay over a Saturday night, purchase a round trip ticket, and possibly be denied
the first choice of travel itinerary because of availability limits depending upon
the fare product purchased by the adult. In this respect, both adult and child
exhibit the self-selection behavior intended by the airline as indicated by the fare
product that they purchase.
The example closest to pure third degree price discrimination pertains to price
reductions for young people. People under 25 years of age are offered a discount
on the Delta and USAir Northeast (BOS-NYC-WAS) shuttles with no apparent
restrictions other than proof of age. Differentiated fare products are generally
not offered for sale on the Northeast shuttle routes. One fare product with one
price level faces all. Differentiated fare products are not introduced for the youth
travel population since they do not exist for the population-at-large. Even
availability constraints do not readily apply to the flights due to the extreme
overcapacity serving these markets. Outwardly, this scenario would seem to
describe pure third degree price discrimination. Upon closer inspection,
however, the youth fares are only available on the off-peak flight departures
causing young people desiring the lower fares to self-select in terms of flight
availability.
In practice, self-selection is never removed from the process of price
discrimination in airline markets. Even the passengers initially screened using
third-degree price discrimination techniques are subject to some self-selection
criteria. Overall, in the airline industry, the scope of index sorting is quite
limited. Promotions such as "kids fly free", student discounts, and other
attempts to identify portions of the population with low values of willingness to
pay affect only a small segment of the population when compared to the
techniques of identifying passengers exclusively by their sensitivities to fare
product attributes. Pure self-selection is, by far, the most widespread method of
identifying and segmenting the consumer populations.
2.2 Previous Justifications of Price Discrimination in Airline Markets
On the surface, it is not clear to what extent the price discrimination that airlines
practice is justified. The existence of price discrimination has direct implications
on efficiency. Questions of equity, however, are not so obvious. Closer scrutiny
of the factors underlying both airline supply and demand at the OD market level
will provide some insight into the equity of airline price discrimination. The
previous work focusing on the justifiability of airline price discrimination is
explored in this section. A discussion of the economic efficiency ramifications of
price discrimination is postponed until the following section.
The first justification of airline price discrimination is contingent upon the
existence of scale economies in the industry. In a decreasing cost industry, price
discrimination may be necessary in order to meet total costs. There may be no
single price at which an airline can operate at a profit. In this case, a system of
price discrimination may in fact be an equitable method for the product to be
made available on the market while allowing the producer to meet costs. The
existing airline fare product structure and the price discrimination that prevails
simply may be a response to the presence of decreasing costs in the industry.
If airlines are not a decreasing cost industry, however, price discrimination may
still provide some benefit to society. A higher level of service may be available to
passengers from the practice of price discrimination. The increased frequency
that may result from the addition of capacity enabled by the contributions to
overhead made by discount passengers benefits the passengers paying higher
prices if they are sensitive to service frequency, as has been hypothesized. There
are, in fact, potentially positive impacts of airline price discrimination even in the
absence of scale economies.
Belobaba (1987) argues that the differential fare levels that are offered by airlines
can, in fact, result in a Pareto optimal situation in which no consumers are worse
off than they would have been in the absence of differential pricing. A detailed
discussion of the existence or absence of Pareto optimality has not been
presented in the literature. The generalized cost model developed in this
research addresses the question of Pareto optimality in airline fare product
differentiation within the current airline industry environment. Later in the
dissertation, the conditions required for Pareto optimality are shown to be quite
restrictive and unlikely to exist in the market.
Although Pareto optimality has not been fully addressed in the existing
literature, several studies have shown reductions in average industry fare levels
during deregulation. Schwieterman (1985) demonstrated that the price levels for
similar fare products decreased during the early years of U.S. airline
deregulation. The nature of the deregufated environment has changed since
then, however. The GAO (1990) has demonstrated that average fare levels have
decreased since deregulation although they have increased since 1985. Morrison
and Winston (1990) have predicted that the fare levels paid by travelers in the
deregulated environment are, on average, below what they might have been had
the CAB fare formula been applied in the current environment. Some of these
benefits may be attributable to other results of deregulation, however, and not
exclusively the ability of airlines to product differentiate.
Frank (1983) contends that price-insensitive buyers stand in the way of the
consolidation of airline flights into more economical (from a cost point of view)
services. His hypothesis is also based upon the assumption that economies of
scale exist in airline operations. Among the examples cited by Frank were the
benefits of cost efficiencies resulting from demand consolidation. For instance, it
is less expensive to operate a large aircraft fewer times than a small aircraft more
frequently when providing an identical number of seats in an OD market. On a
0t per passenger basis, such demand consolidation clearly results in operational
cost efficiencies. Intuition such as that offered by the example of demand
consolidation strongly suggests that scale economies exist in the provision of
airline services.
Contrary to the claims of Frank and intuition, several empirical studies have
concluded that there are no economies of scale in providing airline service
(Keeler, 1972, Douglas and Miller, 1974, and Christensen, Caves, and Tretheway,
1984). These models use standard unit-times-distance (UTD) measures, such as
passenger-miles, to characterize transportation output. UTD output models
implicitly assume proportional traffic flows across the network (Winston, 1985).
This proportionality is highly questionable in airline markets as a result of the
superior quality of service that is offered by non-stop carriers. Flight legs
routinely carry a disproportionate number of non-stop passengers compared to
connecting passengers. The conclusions made in these studies should be viewed
skeptically since all have based their analyses upon the assumption that a generic
measure of output correctly characterizes demand levels. The questionable
proportionality assumption coupled with the counterintuitive findings make it
difficult to place confidence in the studies showing no economies of scale.
Multi-product output models which model transportation product as flows over
specific OD markets would provide a more accurate representation of reality.
The definition of transportation product as a vector of flows offers a more
intuitive characterization. Such models have been successfully applied to motor
carriers and rail (Wang and Friedlaender, 1981, and Jara-Diaz and Winston,
1981). Unfortunately, no application of multi-product output models for airlines
has been performed. Although it is beyond the scope of this research, it is hoped
that the techniques of multi-product output can be used to arrive at a more
robust measure of economies of scale in scheduled airline service. Perhaps then,
a believable assessment of scale economies existing in airline markets can be
made.
If economies of scale do, in fact, exist in the industry, it benefits airlines to
consolidate their operations and offer fewer flights of larger aircraft from a cost
standpoint. Price-insensitive consumers, however, are inflexible when faced
with frequency reductions. According to Frank:
Certain buyers have strong preferences for special features and will
readily abandon sellers that do not offer such features in favor of those
who do, even if it means paying higher prices.
In this context, frequency of service is the special feature for which the price-
insensitive passengers are prepared to abandon specific airlines (sellers). The
aversion of price-insensitive travelers to frequency reductions forces the airline to
offer, at a minimum, daily service in markets in which they hope to effectively
compete. Daily, or even twice daily, service frequency is widely thought to be
the absolute minimum requirement for competition in most U.S. domestic
markets. Depending on the market, the frequency requirement may be even
greater. Passengers that are sensitive to frequency of service impede the ability
of airlines to consolidate their operations and thus, their ability to exploit the
economies of scale available to them through flying larger aircraft less often.
This renders the scale economies of demand consolidation unachievable, adding
unnecessarily to system-wide costs.
Frank contends that differential pricing is not the result of market imperfections
as has been stated in the economics literature but rather, a response to theC economies of scale in OD market service that are foregone in order to provide the
level of service that is desired, if not demanded, by price-insensitive consumers.
Thus, it is plausible to view airline differential pricing as an attempt to distribute
the burden of overhead recovery more equitably among different passengers. In
this light, airline fare product differentiation may be viewed as a device forcing
passengers to pay for the overall costs that they impose on the system.
The requirements of the passengers who travel most frequently and value the
frequency of service the most dictate the long run aircraft procurement decisions.
Thus, the price-insensitive passengers who make frequent service a requirement
to garner their business drive up fixed airline costs in the long run. More
efficient fleet acquisitions are foregone to provide service at the desired
frequency of the price-insensitive passengers. This would imply that price-
insensitive passengers should, in fact, pay more because of the larger long run
costs that they impose on the system.
The conclusion of Frank that inefficiencies exist in the market as a result of by-
passed economies of scale rather than market imperfections have been shown to
be incorrect in the economics literature (Borenstein, 1992). Frank claims that
there exists no price discrimination since price-insensitive passengers drive up
the fixed costs of the carrier by forcing them to forgo available scale economies.
Simple microeconomics tells us that long term costs do not figure into the
marginal cost calculation. Since the strict definition of price discrimination is
differential markups over marginal costs, the fixed costs of the airline have no
effect on price discrimination which considers only price level and short run
marginal cost.
For a fixed aircraft schedule, the differential markups over marginal cost facing
consumers are clear and cannot contradict the findings of exchange inefficiencies
by economists who have studied the problem (Borenstein, 1992). However, the
societal impacts and the equitable distribution of total overhead cost distribution
remain indeterminate. An improved model of cost distribution is required to
correctly allocate the actual costs placed on the system by different passenger
types. It is beyond the scope of this research to develop such a model, although
it is clear that a tradeoff exists between the efficient level of production and the
level of service desires of certain empowered consumer segments. Suffice it to
say that these segments place upward pressure on costs and attempts to force
them to pay a larger share of the overhead burden are not entirely misguided.
2.3 Efficiency, Yield Management, and Airline Fare Products
The question of efficiency in pricing in airline markets is now examined. It is the
intention of this section to demonstrate that airline fare product differentiation
and yield management techniques are not simply a necessary evil for airline
survival but actually the tools for an efficient and desirable allocation of
resources. First, the most common type of efficiency cited by economists,
efficiency in exchange, is discussed as it relates to airlines. The ability of airlines
to achieve exchange efficiency is then addressed. Next, the topic of efficiency in
the allocation of a fixed provision of airline seats is presented. The combination
of the existing differentiated fare product structure with airline yield
management techniques provides a clearer look at the efficiency that currently
exists in airline markets. Finally, it is shown that allocative efficiency can only
realistically be achieved when differential (and likely discriminatory) price levels
exist in the market.
2.3.1 Exchange Efficiency
In neoclassical microeconomic terms, to obtain the best (most efficient) allocation
of resources in the market, the production of goods must achieve exchange
efficiency for all goods in all markets. If exchange efficiency were to exist then no
one in the market could be made better off by producing or consuming any more
or less of any particular good given a fixed amount of resources. Such a situation
results in the optimal allocation of resources: using the least amount of resources
to achieve the greatest amount of utility. In the case of airlines, attaining
exchange efficiency is not, however, a feasible alternative as this section will
demonstrate.
Setting P = SRMC
Economists routinely express concerns about departures from marginal cost
pricing. This is because, in order to have a pricing system that is economically -
efficient in exchange, price level (P) must be set equal to the short run marginal
costs (SRMC) of production for all goods and services in the market. Overall
market exchange efficiency can be achieved only if all goods and services are
sold at price levels equal to their marginal costs. Hence, existence of exchange
efficiency is contingent upon airlines, as well as all other industries, practicing
marginal cost pricing. This section describes why marginal cost pricing is not
achievable in airline practice.
It is convenient to think of the SRMC faced by an airline in terms of the short run
variable costs of carrying an additional passenger on the aircraft. Constant
SRMC are often assumed to exist for airlines since the extra fuel, baggage
handling, ticketing, and meal service that the airline must provide to serve each
additional customer should be approximately equal on any given flight
departure. With an aircraft type preassigned and no possibility of a change, the
fixed marginal cost assumption for the flight departure is defensible, provided
0w the flight only serves a single OD market. Unfortunately, the nature of airline
operations is far more complex in reality and the more complexity that is
introduced, the more likely a departure from constant SRMC becomes.
The constant SRMC assumption is valid if a fixed and unalterable capacity exists
in the isolated OD market. The ability of an airline to vary the capacity on a
selected route makes the calculation of the marginal cost of carrying an
incremental consumer far less straightforward. Short run aircraft capacity can be
varied in two ways, either by flying an additional aircraft or by changing the size
of the aircraft, both of which have impacts on the SRMC calculation.
First, the incremental cost of additional capacity resulting from flying an
additional aircraft, or adding an "extra section", is considered. The incremental
unit of production in the airline industry is the assignment of an additional
aircraft to a route in order to carry more passengers. The incremental unit of
sale, on the other hand, is an individual seat on an aircraft. With an aircraft of
100 seats, the incremental cost of the 100th passenger requesting service will be
quite small, ignoring opportunity costs. Previous studies have estimated the
incremental cost of serving an additional passenger provided that a seat is
available at less than $25 (Air Transport World, 1986). The incremental cost of
the 101st passenger, on the other hand, can be as much as the cost of flying the
additional aircraft which, by any calculation, is quite large. This cost is likely to
be greatly in excess of what any single passenger is willing to pay for service.
Provided that the second aircraft is going to fly, however, the incremental cost of
the 102nd passenger drops to near zero again (provided, of course, that the extra
section is at least a two-seater).
The ability to switch aircraft further complicates the calculation of the marginal
costs associated with a given flight departure. For instance, while the marginal
cost of the 101st passenger is nominal on a 120 seat aircraft, it becomes quite large
when the route is served by a 100 seat aircraft. The aircraft scheduling decision
greatly impacts the marginal cost calculations for a given passenger. The
opportunity costs associated with the allocation of aircraft capacity to a given
route adds additional complexity to the marginal cost calculation. In the absence
of the fabled "rubber aircraft" whose operating costs decrease proportionately
with the number of passengers carried, marginal cost pricing is quite difficult
when faced with the possibility of switching aircraft.
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When expanding the marginal cost calculation for a single aircraft departure inC an isolated OD market to multiple origin to destination markets, the calculation
becomes even less clear. The hub and spoke network systems that pervade the
U.S. domestic market require such considerations for realism. The marginal cost
of providing service to a non-stop passenger, for instance, must incorporate the
opportunity cost of not serving any of the potential passengers using the flight
departure to connect to another flight.
While the marginal service provision for airlines appears to be the additional
flight, the addition is somewhat deceptive. In reality, the true marginal service
provision is the flight cycle. Flight cycles are required to provide a continuous,
repeating schedule of airline services. Thus, an airline can increase its service
provision by a minimum of two flights (the simplest cycle). In addition to
network continuity considerations, the aircraft are required to cycle at some
point in their round of flights for scheduled maintenance at a maintenance base.
It is clear from the above examples that the capacity provision decision in terms
of both the size and number of aircraft in service strongly influences the marginal
cost calculation. Network and multiple OD market service effects complicate the-
SRMC calculation further. Suffice it to say, the marginal cost calculation for any
OD market is quite a complicated and unstable process. Kahn (1970) points out
that, in reality, pricing at marginal cost may not be efficient if the calculation of
marginal cost consumes more resources than could be saved by pricing at
marginal cost. This is clearly the case for airlines.
Equilibration of Supply and Demand: Techniques for Narrowing the Gap
Another requirement of exchange efficiency is the equilibration of supply and
demand. Supply-demand equilibration faces two seemingly insurmountable
problems : the need for a perfectly competitive marketplace so that equilibrium
can be reached and the ability to control incremental transportation output to
perfectly match prevailing market demand levels. With U.S. industry-wide load
factors at levels below sixty-five percent in 1989 and 1990 with no major carrier
exceeding seventy percent in either year, achieving equilibrium appears to be
unattainable for airlines in practice (Aviation Daily, 1991). Moreover, the limited
number of carriers that operate in most domestic markets makes achieving
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perfect competition unlikely. Some techniques which attempt to narrow the gap
between air transportation supply and demand are available. The usefulness of
these techniques is widely varied, however, and subject to numerous practical
constraints when implemented. This section gives a detailed discussion of the
methods used which attempt to reconcile supply and demand.
Since the equilibration of supply and demand in air transportation is very rare
because of the marginal service provision requirements detailed above, airlines
are put in the unenviable position of stimulating or turning away potential
business almost continuously. Airlines employ various techniques to narrow the
gap between supply and demand. On the supply side, improvements to the
flight schedule through departure changes and aircraft switching may help to
better match supply and demand on flights by increasing traveler convenience.
Turning to the demand side, pricing policy can be used to manage demand given
a fixed supply. Higher prices may serve to direct demand away from the most
popular flights. These techniques may be attempted before the booking process
begins for a given flight which is beneficial since practical constraints prevent
any large scale changes in either the flight schedule or the published price levels
close to flight departure.
Offering departure times that are convenient for more travelers may help to
stimulate demand and generate incremental revenues for the carrier. Flights that
are shown to be among the least popular may be switched to more convenient
times by the scheduling department. The scheduling flexibility of an airline is
limited in the short term, however, for many reasons. Airlines must attempt to
adhere to their published schedules to allow their passengers adequate time to
plan their travel. Reality dictates that airlines must operate with a flight schedule
that is fixed in the short run, although it may change approximately monthly.
The available seats are sold to passengers based upon the fixed capacity
provision in each OD market as published in the current flight schedule. These
considerations cannot be ignored when attempting to equilibrate supply and
demand using aircraft schedules.
In addition, the generation of convenient departure times to stimulate demand is
complicated by the physical constraints of aircraft operations. While consumers
may unambiguously prefer 9:00 AM and 5:00 PM departures, not all aircraft may
fly at these times. Departure and landing capacity at peak times often impedes
the most convenient departure times for all flights. As a result, only certain
flights may receive peak departure and arrival times. Passengers have also been
shown to prefer Friday and Sunday departures to Wednesday and Tuesday.
Given a fixed aircraft allocation, however, it is quite expensive to maintain many
extra aircraft to fly on these specific days.
Finally, airlines are unable to pick and choose the best departure times without
considering the network effects. For instance, if a 9:00 AM EST departure from
Boston to Detroit departs, an aircraft becomes available for service in Detroit at
approximately noon. The cost of flying another aircraft empty to another
location, or "deadheading", is generally quite large and not frequently done. In
order for an aircraft to make sufficient contributions to justify its acquisition, it
must maintaining a reasonable utilization rate. In this example, the aircraft
should be put into use at Detroit sometime in the early afternoon, even though it
may not be the most desirable departure time.
A system of peak-utilization pricing may be employed in order to direct price-
sensitive passengers from high demand flights to less popular ones. The ability
to equilibrate supply and demand using pricing, however, is limited in practice.
Operational rules for the application of peak-utilization pricing are constrained
by the ability of the airline to identify the high demand flights and apply higher
fare levels to them. An airline might prefer to set a different fare for each flight
in order to best direct (equilibrate) demand in this fashion. However, added
complexity entailed may prove too great for the customers and ticketing agents
alike.
In deference to practical constraints, simple day of week or time of day rules are
often applied to peak/off-peak price differentials. This scheme may be counter-
productive in certain markets which have different peaking behaviors. Careful
attention must be paid to market-specific peaking characteristics. Since a
plethora of fares are available to consumers which already include crude
attempts at peak/off-peak pricing, a more complicated fare structure is probably
not a feasible method for managing demand further. "Night coach" fares and
other off-peak demand stimulating fares have been used in the past to direct
passengers with low values of willingness to pay off of high demand flights and
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onto lower demand flights. Even flight specific fares have been known to exist in
airline markets. Lower flight specific fares are generally only offered at the most
inconvenient times thus providing limited benefit for passengers competing for
space on the most popular departures.
Even the most sophisticated attempts at demand direction are doomed to fall
short of matching supply with demand. After the flight schedule and price levels
have been fixed, popular flights will still experience excess demand while
unpopular ones will depart with empty seats. After all of the attempts at
equilibration of supply and demand have been made, the available seats on
excess demand flights must still be rationed according to some allocative scheme.
Unable to engage in marginal cost pricing or obtain a supply-demand
equilibrium that is efficient in exchange, another more operational method must
be found for setting airline price levels and allocating the available resource.
Hopefully, one that possesses desirable efficiency properties. In the next section,
the allocative scheme prevailing in the deregulated U.S. airline environment is
shown to possess such qualities.
2.3.2 Allocative Efficiency: Perhaps What is Really Desired
In the absence of an allocative scheme that is efficient in exchange, an alternative
must be found. One such possibility is allocating the fixed aircraft capacity based
upon the value that individual passengers place upon travel. In that case, an
appropriate goal is allocative efficiency which is defined as making sure that a
scarce resource is provided to the members of the population who intrinsically
value it most. Allocative efficiency can be viewed as making the best possible
use of a resource.
As would be expected, available seats on the most demand intensive (or
valuable) flights are scarce and must be rationed out to passengers according to
some allocative scheme. When a flight is near capacity it is likely that the
purchase requests of some passengers have been denied. The denied requests
result in lost revenue for the airline and decreased convenience for the rejected
passengers. Consequently, the scarce resource must be allocated according to
some decision rule on flights with excess demand.
If a first come first serve (FCFS) allocation process is employed, the passengers
who have obtained seats on the flight may not, in fact, have valued the seat most.
In this way, the situation facing air transportation consumers differs from that
facing the producers of other goods and services. Under perfect information,
passengers valuing the service more would make bookings earlier relative to
passengers valuing the service less. Unfortunately, the value of air
transportation may not be known to the consumer until close to the flight
departure, making an early booking impossible.
While advanced planning and the ability to book a seat early may be highly
valued by some, many of the consumers can be unsure of their exact travel
itineraries until close to departure and still value air travel highly. Thus,
although a FCFS discipline might drive many passengers valuing service highly
to book earlier, the scheduling and planning uncertainty of others makes the
allocation of the limited number of airline seats on excess demand flights to those
who value them most doubtful. As a result, the nature of passenger air
transportation demand makes a rationing of airlines seats in a market employing
a FCFS allocation unlikely to achieve allocative efficiency.
Employing the techniques of revenue management offers an alternative to a
FCFS discipline. Revenue management uses differentiated fare products priced
at varying levels and booking limits to provide a flexible, flight-specific method
of seat inventory allocation. A beneficial result of the revenue management
function is directing demand to lower load factor flights making the best use of
available capacity. In this way, the allocative efficiency of the system can be
preserved or enhanced. Attention must be paid, however, to the tradeoff
between demand direction and passenger service rejections. This section
highlights the methods currently used for achieving an allocatively efficient
process. The use of price discrimination and revenue management techniques in
this context are discussed.
Identifying Passengers by Willingness to Pay: Price Discrimination
When a resource is limited, a loss of efficiency would result if that resource were
allocated to passengers placing a lower value on it than other passengers to
whom it was denied. The best use of the resource would be to provide it to those
consumers who value it most highly. For airlines, heavily demanded aircraft
seats should be allocated to the passengers who value the seats most highly (up
to capacity). Unfortunately for the airline and allocative efficiency, passengers
do not willingly identify themselves by the value they place on securing a seat
for a given flight departure. Moreover, consumers do not identify their
willingness to pay through the arrival process because of the uncertainty
associated with travel itineraries (in contrast to most other goods and services).
Airlines must thus employ screening procedures to identify passengers
according to their willingness to pay. This enables the airlines to most efficiently
allocate their resources given a fixed flight schedule. The techniques of price
discrimination can be employed to identify passengers in the desired manner.
To enable an efficient allocation of the scarce resource, the important function of
price discrimination is the identification of passengers by their willingness to
pay. The limiting case of first degree price discrimination, in which each
passenger is charged an amount equal to his willingness to pay, would guarantee
an efficient resource allocation since the identification occurs at the unit of sale in
the airline industry, the incremental seat. In this case, the airline would accept
only the number of passengers equal to the capacity of the aircraft having the
highest values of willingness to pay (provided that demand exceeded supply).
For a static application, the airline would be able to choose the people with the
greatest value of willingness to pay and let them on the aircraft while turning the
others away. Of course, first degree price discrimination is unachievable in
practice since, even if passengers could be exactly identified by their willingness
to pay, people must know in advance of departure whether or not to expect a
seat on the aircraft.
In practice, the identification of passengers by the value that they place on a
specific air transportation service must be achieved by using an effective
screening procedure which groups passengers by their willingness to pay. Both
second and third degree price discrimination help the airline to identify the
passengers who value the product most. Techniques of pure third degree price
discrimination, such as identifying members of the population through their
membership in a "gold" or "preferred" frequent flyer club, are quite fallible since
consumers have different values for flights at different times. For example, it is
not guaranteed that the passenger with the highest value of willingness to pay on
this week's Friday PM departure will not be among the passengers with the
lowest values for next Friday's PM departure. Similarly, business travelers
among the most price-insensitive when the company is paying may become
highly price-sensitive when traveling on leisure trips for which they are paying.
The limited scope of third degree price discrimination techniques limits their
usefulness in creating an efficient allocation.
As previously motivated, the screening procedure that has been found most
effective in airline practice is that of second degree price discrimination, or self-
selection. Self-selection techniques are the most far reaching and effective
method to achieve a passenger value identification. The array of differentiated
fare products offered to consumers allows passengers to identify their value of
willingness to pay for every airline ticket purchase. Moreover, the fare product
structure allows passengers to secure their desired priority level each time that
they purchase air transportation fare products. The self-selection enables a
resource allocation based on the current trip requirements of the individual, thus,
promoting efficiency through an accurate value identification screening.
C Fare Product Structure Contribution to the Efficient Allocation: A Closer Look
The underlying structure of fare products required to facilitate an efficient
allocation of the limited resource of available seats is now addressed. The
required fare structure for allocative efficiency is one that identifies and segments
passengers by their willingness to pay thus allowing the airline to fill the capacity
with the passengers having the greatest intrinsic willingness to pay. Issues of
price levels and purchase restrictions must be addressed to identify a fare
product structure conducive to allocative efficiency. First, the properties
beneficial to effective second degree price discrimination are outlined. The
potential pitfalls of the self-selection techniques are then addressed. Finally, the
impacts on allocative efficiency of identification and segmentation policies (and
failures) are highlighted.
The techniques of self-selection attempt to stimulate demand from passengers
with low values of willingness to pay while not diluting the revenues received by
passengers valuing the product more. To stimulate traffic using the techniques
of second degree price discrimination, the cost incurred by a passenger
associated with accepting the purchase restrictions plus the price level must not
exceed the intrinsic value of travel on that flight. On the lower demand flights,
the costs to passengers targeted to a self-selection stratum should be as low as
possible to stimulate as much demand as possible. The ability to stimulate
incremental traffic is less important on higher demand flights. To stimulate the
most traffic, the costs associated with the imposed restrictions should be
minimized for the target population.
To prevent revenue dilution, the purchase restrictions on the lower priced fare
products must discourage passengers with higher values of willingness to pay
from "buying down". The fare differentials should be kept low to limit the
incentive for passengers to divert to lower-priced fare products. In other words,
the cost associated with additional restrictions for the passengers targeted to any
stratum must exceed the price differential between the target fare product and all
more-restricted fare products. If this is not the case, passengers will purchase
one of the lower-priced fare products. To minimize revenue dilution, the costs
associated with accepting the purchase restrictions on a discount fare product
should be very high for passengers willing to purchase higher-priced fare
products in the absence of discounts.
When setting fares, the price levels must be strictly decreasing with increasing
purchase restrictions. Any departures from pricing the fare products in this
fashion would result in a case of simple domination. Price levels allow
passengers to self-select on the basis of their sensitivity to fare level. In this way,
price level can be thought of in the same way as other purchase restrictions.
Attention must be paid, however, not to drop the price low enough to make the
fare product attractive to portions of the population valuing travel significantly
more.
The restrictions associated with lower-priced fare products should be designed to
prevent passengers with higher than targeted values of willingness to pay from
diverting down while imposing the smallest possible cost on passengers in the
target range. Since it is commonly assumed that passengers with greater values
of willingness to pay also have greater sensitivity to travel flexibility, most
discount fare products currently available on the market strictly limit travel
itinerary flexibility in their restrictions. A judicious selection of purchase
restrictions along with the correct price levels helps to prevent improper self-
selection and revenue dilution for the airline. A balance between highly
effective/low cost fences, however, may be difficult to achieve. As a result,
airline managers may be required to make tradeoffs between discouraging
demand and diluting revenue. The need for effective self-selection techniques
and price levels is apparent.
Fencing techniques are quite fallible due to demand variability and changing
passenger characteristics. When the sorting techniques used by second degree
price discrimination are not perfectly effective, departures from allocative
efficiency may occur. Discouraged demand may result when the self-selection
criteria used imposes too great a cost on passengers who ordinarily would
choose to travel using one of the less restricted fare products. For instance, if a
passenger was willing to pay $750 provided that he was not required to stay over
a Saturday night but the lowest published non-excursion fare was $800, he may
choose not to travel even though there were many excursion fare products
available for significantly less than $750. The lack of acceptable fare products in
the price range of passengers like the one above would result in an inefficient
allocation of the available resource from the failure of self-selection.
If passengers beat restrictions and divert to lower-priced fare products, allocative
efficiency is unaffected. Not surprisingly, the ability to divert to lower-priced
fare products can only benefit the passengers having the highest values of
willingness to pay. Even if certain price-insensitive consumers can beat
restrictions and purchase lower-priced fare products, the current seat allocation
discipline still guarantees them a seat if there is one available provided that they
have the highest value for it among the remaining unserved passengers. Thus,
allocative efficiency is upheld even with passenger diversion to lower-priced fare..
products.
The self-selection techniques must be equated with the passenger demands to
preserve the scarce capacity for consumers who value it most. The fare product
prices, in turn, cannot be so high as to discourage passengers who would have
traveled and contributed to fixed costs had prices been lower. The demand
levels for individual flights often vary by season or even by week necessitating a
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flexible fare product structure. Thus, airlines seeking to efficiently allocate scarce
seats must match fare levels with travel values to the best of their ability.
Offering a wide range of fare products with different price levels and appropriate
purchase restrictions would help to account for flight and seasonality variations.
Such a fare structure, if achievable, can better simulate first degree price
discrimination. A fare product structure that is too complex, however, may lead
to consumer or travel agent confusion. Practical constraints also require that the
same basic fare products be offered on all flights to limit consumer confusion.
Thus, what is theoretically best for allocative efficiency may not be completely
feasible in practice.
Because the airlines have nearly complete control over their seat inventory,
offering a wide range of fare products is desirable since sales can be controlled
using booking limits. A proper application of yield management techniques
allows the airline to protect seats for higher valued passengers when demand is
high and to not discourage (or prevent) lower valued passengers from filling less
demanded departures. The next section demonstrates how booking limits help
the airline to preserve an efficient allocation when available seats are scarce.
2.3.3 Using Yield Management Techniques to Achieve Allocative Efficiency
Self-selection alone would approximate an efficient allocation for the static case.
Airlines, however, face a dynamic booking process in the presence of which they
need to protect scarce inventory for passengers with higher values of willingness
to pay. Also, the nature of the self-selection devices employed by airlines, in
particular advance purchase requirements, require a dynamic seat allocation.
The practical constraints of the dynamic booking process require the seat
inventory control capabilities offered by computer reservations systems to be
used to preserve an efficient resource allocation. With proper reservations
control, the application of nested booking limits ensures that increasingly less
restricted fare products have increasingly greater availability reinforcing the
airline fare product inferiority hierarchy.
A perfect (hindsight) application of yield management techniques to a nested
seat allocation approximates an efficient allocation of the available seats on full,
or near full, flights. In the limiting case of first degree price discrimination, the
efficient allocation is guaranteed with optimal booking limits. Recalling the yield
management techniques described in Chapter One, the important elements of
controlling the airline seat allocation on a given flight departure are the booking
limits set for the individual fare products and the overbooking factors set to
prevent seat spoilage from passengers who do not show up for the flight
departure.
Booking Limits
Self-selection helps to identify strata of passengers with like values of willingness
to pay for a seat on the aircraft. Instead of being able to identify every passenger
by the value that they place on travel, the airline assumes that passengers are
grouped into ranges of willingness to pay. The identification is limited, however,
by the effectiveness of the self-selection devices. Airlines may only have a vague
idea about the size of the strata into which passengers are grouped. Thus, proper
demand forecasting and booking limits are required due to the high variability of
passenger demand and the imprecision of self-selection techniques.
Booking limits take on great importance in the efficient allocation of aircraft seats
when demand exceeds supply. If passengers are segmented into mutually
exclusive groups by willingness to pay, the resource allocation is efficient if the
price levels and booking limits are set correctly. Unfortunately, departures from
efficiency may happen due to the imprecision associated with price
discrimination and the inability to set prices that will equilibrate supply and
demand.
Assume for the sake of exposition that an airline has determined the demand for
travel on a given flight departure as exactly 150 passengers. The passengers have
been perfectly identified in three fare product strata each having 50 members.
The members of the fare product 1 stratum are assumed to have the highest
values of willingness to pay while those in the fare product 3 stratum have the
lowest. The passengers within the same fare product stratum have values of
willingness to pay in the same range although they are not identical. Price levels
are strictly decreasing from fare product 1 to fare product 3.
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For a 100 seat aircraft, if no booking limits were applied, there would be a risk
that the aircraft would not serve the passengers valuing travel most highly. The
optimal allocation of seats to fare products would be 50 to fare product 1 and 50
to fare product 2 with no fare product 3 passengers being served. To prevent the
possibility of an inefficient allocation, booking limits can be applied to the flight.
If the airline were to apply a booking limit of zero to the fare product 3
population, for example, the efficient allocation would be preserved regardless of
the arrival process. This simple example illustrates that the application of
booking limits to the fare products is required to ensure allocative efficiency for
the aircraft on excess demand flights.
Any aircraft having over 150 seats would provide excess supply given the
demand levels in the example. No booking limits are required to obtain an
efficient seat allocation since all passengers are served on excess supply flights.
For a 150 seat aircraft, the price levels for the differentiated fare products have
been set optimally for the single flight example. As a result, supply and demand
have been equilibrated and there is no need to apply booking limits to the aircraft
seat allocation. The case of supply/demand equilibrium is the exception rather
than the rule in the airline industry which is characterized by heavy peaking and
seasonality.
When the route is served by a 120 seat aircraft, allocative efficiency is no longer
guaranteed even with the application of optimal booking limits because of the
imprecision within the fare product 3 stratum. Under optimal booking limits, 50
fare product 1, 50 fare product 2, and 20 fare product 3 passengers are taken and
revenue is maximized for the airline. Allocative efficiency, however, is
contingent upon the arrival of the first 20 fare product 3 passengers being those
with the greatest levels of willingness to pay among all fare product 3
passengers. Although possible, such an arrival process is unlikely. This
demonstrates the departure from allocative efficiency that may occur in the flight
resulting from the imprecision of self-selection techniques even under optimal
booking limits. It is interesting to note that the departure from efficiency occurs
only for the lowest-priced fare product having non-zero booking limits in the
deterministic case and varies inversely with stratum size.
If the price level is set below a value which translates into demand exceeding
0 capacity, then more passengers will arrive than can be accommodated. There is
the potential for the loss of efficiency for the lowest priced fare product. In the
deterministic case, it is clear that no loss of efficiency can occur for any fare
product other than the lowest with optimal booking limits (greater than zero).
The loss of efficiency, however, can be mitigated as the lowest fare product
stratum size decreases.
Consider next a second flight in the market, having a demand level of 45
passengers split evenly between the same three fare products. Assume that both
flights are served by 100 seat aircraft and the demand level for the first flight is
the same as before. The demand levels for the flight departures appear in Table
2.1. It is assumed that all passengers initially requesting travel on the first flight
prefer it to the second and vice versa. All passengers wishing to travel, however,
prefer to do so on either flight over the option of not traveling. After optimal
booking limits have been set for the first flight, 50 fare product 3 passengers will
have been denied seats. The fare product 3 passengers from the first flight will
secure passage, however, on the second flight since there are only 95 passenger
requests for the 100 seat aircraft. The passengers on the first flight will be the 100
with the highest levels of willingness to pay for that flight. Similarly, the 95
passengers on the second flight will have the highest values for that flight. This
example illustrates the efficiency associated with demand direction using yield
management techniques.
Flight #1
Fare Product 1 Fare Product 2 Fare Product 3 Total
Demand 50 50 50 150
Bkg Limits 100 50 0
On Board 50 50 0 100
Flight #2
Demand 15 15 15 45
Flt 1 Demand 0 0 50 50
Bkg Limits 100 85 70
On Board 15 15 65 95
Table 2.1
Seats may be reserved for the highest value passengers on flights that are
expected to be at, or near, capacity by applying booking limits to the discount
fare product strata. The use of booking limits on the discount fare products
allows passengers with higher values of willingness to pay to have a better
chance of securing a seat on the highest demand flights. The limits prevent early-
arriving passengers with low values of willingness to pay from displacing
passengers valuing the seats more who arrive later in the booking process. The
availability limits also minimize revenue dilution for the airline, in addition to
increasing seat availability for price-insensitive passengers.
The application of booking limits to the discount fare products allows the airline
to sell fewer discount seats on the higher demand flights while offering virtually
unlimited discount seats on the most unpopular flights. With a correct
application of airline booking limits, the passengers valuing the product less will
be redirected to other lower demand flights which are below capacity and on
which they are likely to be among the passengers valuing the service most. This
provides for an efficient allocation of the resource on both types of flights. Thus,
under the same fare product price and restriction structure, the available seats
can be efficiently allocated on both full and empty flights. An imperfect
application of booking limits might result in a denial of service to the high
fare/value passengers since not enough seats were protected for them.
To this point, the self-selection techniques used in the example have been
assumed to identify and segment the strata without error. As previously stated,
when passengers divert to lower-priced fare products than expected and no
booking limits are applied, an efficient allocation can be achieved. The
application of booking limits, however, can impede an efficient allocation of the
available resource. Passengers who self-select at a lower level of willingness to
pay than targeted may displace passengers who would only be willing to
purchase at the lower level, in the presence of booking limits. The application of
booking limits to the flights may introduce negative effects on efficiency by
discouraging some passengers who are extremely sensitive to travel flexibility if
the seats targeted to them have already been purchased by passengers with
higher values than targeted. This becomes increasingly problematic on higher
demand flights with the application of booking limits to the self-selected strata if
passengers with higher values of willingness to pay arrive first.
Overbooking
The airline refundability policy increases the variance associated with demand
and increases the probability of seats flying empty or "spoilage". Seat spoilage is
primarily the product of the airline allowing refunds to passengers who neither
show up for the flight nor cancel their reservations (although unforeseen no-
shows also affect the spoilage). In this way, the absence of a refundability
penalty for the less-restricted fare products may actually reduce the efficiency of
the seat allocation. The problem of "no-shows," as they are called, is best
addressed using overbooking techniques.
When setting the overbooking factors for a given flight departure, the airline is
trading off the costs associated with a denied boarding with those incurred by
allowing a seat to fly empty. A seat flying empty when a request for service has
been denied is clearly not an efficient resource allocation provided that there is
an additional passenger willing to pay at least the SRMC of providing service to
him. A denied boarding presents less of a problem for allocative efficiency than
for the passenger. From a practical standpoint, however, an airline must be
concerned about the effect of denied boardings in terms of goodwill and required
compensation. In other words, the airline can use overbooking factors to
maximize the probability of an efficient allocation by minimizing spoilage.
Operationally, however, the airline must realize that more aggressive
overbooking policies may lead to increased denied boardings and, potentially,
passenger complaints.
Bumping Procedure: Efficient Auction
It is clear that the yield management techniques of overbooking and booking
limits and the pricing functions of setting fare levels and fare product design are
of vital importance to the efficient allocation of airline seats when they are scarce.
Through an integrated effort of the revenue management function, an efficient
allocation can be achieved with high probability. Departures from efficiency are
inevitable, however, because of the high level of variability occurring in
passenger demand. The corrective technique of auctioning off the seats on an
aircraft can help to achieve an efficient seat allocation when the number of seats
sold exceeds capacity (as the result of an incorrect overbooking factor
oniolilillillii
application). In this way, gate agents can contribute to the revenue management
process and correct any inefficiencies introduced by the revenue management
function.
Flights having sold too many seats, or "oversold" flights, require certain
passengers not to board the aircraft since all passengers must be seated by law.
U.S. law also requires airlines to offer compensation to passengers who are
deplaned, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. In terms of efficiency, it is
preferable for the passengers who surrender their seats first to be those with the
lowest values of willingness to pay. To better identify passengers by their
willingness to pay, airlines have used a system of volunteering in which certain
passengers are offered the opportunity to surrender their seats to passengers
without seat assignments.
In exchange for the use of their seat, the volunteers forgo travel on the oversold
flight and are offered compensation. In lieu of offering cash, airlines most often
offer free travel as an incentive. Since compensation is required for bumping,
minimizing the cost of the compensation is of interest to the airline. If no
passengers volunteer, the reward level is increased up to a certain level as in an
auction. As departure time approaches and no volunteers have come forward
when the maximum reward has been offered, then passengers are involuntarily
deplaned so that the aircraft can depart.
Compensatory travel is restricted using some of the self-selection techniques
described previously as well as being availability limited. The high level of
restrictions placed on the "free" tickets used in the auction prevent their
substitution with unrestricted fare products. This helps to mitigate the revenue
dilution effects of offering the compensation. The level of priority given to the
tickets offered in the auction is at the level of the frequent flyer reward fare
products (possibly lower than the lowest booking class) or they can be used on a
space available basis 24 hours before departure. Again, the revenue management
system ensures the self-selection of the passengers regarding their choice to use
the free ticket. It is the hope of the airline that the compensatory ticket
encourages passengers to take a trip that they would not normally have made, or
to travel with a paying companion and actually generate revenue for the airline.
Under certain conditions, the efficient auction of tickets to remove passengers
from oversold flights can actually enable the airline to-achieve revenues in excess
of those obtained from an efficient allocation of the aircraft capacity. This, of
course, depends upon the assumptions surrounding the reward offered in the
auction. If the opportunity costs are near zero and only surplus capacity is
allocated to the tickets, the auction can be a win-win situation. The passengers
denied boarding are switched to lower demand flight departures and the airline
receives the revenue for their passage with little additional cost. The offer of
compensation has even been known to engender goodwill among certain
passengers like the author.
While yield management techniques such as overbooking and booking limits are
often criticized in the popular press, they serve a valuable function in terms of
preserving allocative efficiency. In fact, it is only the failure of yield management
techniques (i.e., booking limits, overbooking) and fare product differentiation
that impedes an allocatively efficient use of the scarce airline resource. Even the
fallibility of the yield management can be mitigated using techniques such as the
efficient bumping procedure. In this way, the application of airline revenue
management techniques preserve the efficient allocation of the scarce resource.
2.3.4 Equity Considerations for Allocative Efficiency
It should be noted that the efficiencies achieved through the allocative procedure
do not extend to the maximum value of consumer surplus among those traveling
on the flight. The passengers aboard the aircraft will be those with the highest
intrinsic value for being on the flight, or, those who possess the highest
opportunity costs associated with not being on the flight. The efficient allocation
only guarantees that the resource is provided to those passengers intrinsically
valuing it most. Measures of consumer and societal welfare are not optimized in
this allocation scheme. This shortcoming may be of concern to policy makers.
There are other considerations about product differentiation and yield
management techniques, however, which may increase equity.
Frank (1983) claims that the greater frequency provision is the reason that price-
insensitive passengers are paying differential mark-ups over marginal cost. This
is not entirely true. The increased frequency alone would not satisfy the price-
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insensitive consumer if he were not able to secure a seat on the aircraft at his
most preferred times. An uncontrolled seat allocation would likely result in
leisure passengers securing passage on the most popular flight departures in a
given market. This would be to the detriment of the price-insensitive passengers
who would not be allocated the resource that they value so much more than
other travelers.
The differential mark-up over marginal cost that is paid by the price-insensitive
passenger can be thought of as the premium paid in order to ensure an efficient
allocation of the scarce resource, if'one is needed. Since the passengers who
place the highest value on availability are often those with the least advanced
travel notice, the efficient allocation of the resource is most important to them
when faced with the alternative of a FCFS, or similar, allocative discipline. Price-
insensitive passengers want discount passengers to contribute to fixed costs in
order to keep fare levels lower but do not want to be displaced by the discount
passengers when seat availability is scarce. For this, the price-insensitive
passengers must pay a premium. The overall fares that they pay, however, may
be reduced in the long run by the contributions made to fixed (and joint) costs
paid by the discount passengers. Or, alternatively, their level of service may
increase due to greater frequency of service offered.
2.3.5 Efficiency Summary
Exchange efficiency is not attainable in the deregulated U.S. passenger air travel
market. Failing exchange efficiency, a system providing allocative efficiency
given the fixed provision of output is likely the preferred recourse. The effect of
yield management systems on the allocation of the fare products possesses
efficiency properties. It helps to ensure that those passengers who value service
the most are reserved space on the aircraft. The value of this efficient allocation
is less persuasive when low demand flights are considered. As a result of the
overcapacity that plagues the U.S. deregulated airline market, the benefit of this
seat allocation may be questioned. However, due to the variability of demand
that dominates the industry, and the extremely high value that price-insensitive
passengers place on their travel itineraries, an efficient allocation clearly has
value to them.
2.4 Monopolistic Competition Models of Price Discrimination
Models of third degree price discrimination are widespread in the literature both
in monopoly and oligopoly markets. For example, in monopoly markets,
Schmalensee (1981) has discussed the effects of third degree price discrimination
on price differentials, welfare, and passenger demand. Borenstein (1985) and
Holmes (1989) have independently addressed price discrimination in
oligopolistic markets using spatial models of monopolistic competition based
upon the framework developed by Salop (1979). Since airline markets are more
oligopolistic in nature, the review of the literature presented here focuses on the
oligopolistic models.
Holmes limits his study to an analytical discussion of duopoly for pure third
degree price discrimination which is not appropriate in the context of airline
price discrimination. Borenstein, on the other hand, allows for a general number
of competitors (with a case study on up to four) and considers both third and
second degree price discrimination using simulation methods. As motivated
above, the case of second degree price discrimination is most appropriate to the
airline case. Thus, the work of Borenstein holds the highest level of interest to
this research.
Borenstein assumes the ability to identify passengers by their willingness to pay
(reservation prices) and their brand preferences. The impacts of sorting by
reservation prices and brand preferences are quantified using simulation
methods under different market structures. The paper claims that sorting by
brand preference will result in greater market price differentials than sorting
according to willingness to pay in monopolistically competitive markets. This
hypothesis makes a great deal of sense when thought of in the context of the hub
and spoke networks prevailing in the deregulated U.S. airline industry.
The hub and spoke system will inevitably lead to markets in which some carriers
offer non-stop service while others can only provide connecting service. In
addition, the peaking behavior in airline markets shows certain departure times
to be more attractive than others. The underlying correlation between
willingness to pay for air travel and sensitivity to service attributes tells us that
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the level of service differential between non-stop and connecting service heavily
influences passenger air carrier choice.
Heterogeneous product offerings or brands are allowed in the model which can
be thought of in terms of different flight departures, and frequencies, and can be
used to model product loyalties. These factors are quite important when
considering demand for air travel services. For an airline to affect their brand
perception, however, it may involve large costs in terms of marketing,
scheduling, aircraft type and capacity. The ability of an airline to improve its
brand preference rating is quite a difficult task that may involve large capital
outlays and also adversely affect the operations and brand perceptions of the
carrier in other OD markets resulting from level of service changes with fixed
resources.
If airlines are able to effectively sort passengers using their reservation prices, on
the other hand, profits can be improved without the large costs associated with
attracting passengers away from other airlines. Thus, in the view of the airline
manager, the identification and sorting of passengers by their willingness to pay
is a more cost-effective method to identify the overwhelming majority of
passengers. Clearly, neither sorting ability is available to an airline without
significant error. The model does, however, indicate the effect on the cited
factors if the airline were, in fact, able to sort without error.
Borenstein discusses the concept of value differential vs. price differential in his
model of monopolistic competition when sorting by self-selection is introduced.
The cost associated with accepting an inferior fare product was written as a
function of brand preference and passenger reservation price. According to the
notation of the paper, the cost, K, associated with accepting an inferior product is
written as K = K(A,c) where A is the reservation price of the consumer, and c is a
measure of brand preference. Passengers are assumed to choose the low price
fare product when K(A,c) < PH -PL where PH and PL are the price levels for the
full and discount fare products, respectively. The full fare product is chosen by
those consumers having K(A,c) > PH -PL or a value differential greater than or
equal to the cost differential. The inclusion of the cost of travel inconvenience is
important to the correct modeling of the airline consumer decision process.
In the paper, the calculation of a profit maximizing sorting mechanism is
ignored. The reason cited being that the number of ways that a producer can
segment the market is limited. This leads to a binary grouping of passengers that
was exogenously determined. Thus, only the two fare class case was explored.
As a result, the model does not provide airlines with any directly operational
suggestions for improved price setting practices since airlines offer far greater
than two fare products in most OD markets.
Borenstein correctly indicates that the demand for the two fare products is not, in
fact, independent of the price differential between them. The discount and full
fare products are not assumed to be independent in his modeling framework in
contrast to most of the work done in airline yield management modeling. The
sorting of passengers done in the paper is based on parameters such as the cost
associated with accepting a discount product and its associated inconvenience as
well as upon knowing their reservation price levels and brand preferences. This
accurately models the type of self-selective sorting done by airlines.
The results of the analysis provided information on the effects of different
segmentation and sorting strategies on passenger demand, welfare, entry, and
the size of the price differentials existing in the market. The paper provides
information that is more useful toward formulating regulatory policy than
helping airlines concerned with setting price levels in their OD markets. The
results of the analysis do not reflect the structure of airline fare products and
market segmentation techniques. Rather, they provide a simple description of
the interrelationships of brand preference, reservation price, demand and
industrial organization.
In the theoretical research done by Borenstein and Holmes, the price levels that
prevail in the market are not set by an airline exogenously, but rather, are the
result of a Bertrand equilibrium between the producers of the different brands.
These equilibrium price levels may offer an indication of the nature of price
levels that will result from a specific market organizational structure, but offer
little aid in the exogenous setting of price levels practiced by the individual
airlines. As previously motivated, equilibration of supply and demand is not in
keeping with the realities of the airlines limiting further the applicability of the
modeling framework.
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Borenstein and Rose (1992) have addressed the issue of price dispersion as an
indicator of price discrimination using a spatial model of monopolistic
competition similar to that used by Borenstein (1985). The aim of the analysis
was to describe the reasons behind the discrepancies between price levels paid
by consumers on the same carriers in the same markets. The analysis used
factors of service, frequency, and market dominance to explain the reasons
behind the discrepancy in fare levels. Again, the structure of airline fare
products and the setting of their price levels were not explicitly considered in the
analysis. The study is of limited use to airline managers who are more interested
in influencing factors under their own control.
Borenstein and Rose also conclude that the level of price dispersion increases as
the competition increases in the OD market. Although many reasons were cited,
increased dispersion with more competition may be explained best by the
reaction of airline yield management systems to overcapacity. When the level of
competition increases in a market, an increase in OD market capacity generally
occurs with it. The yield management system, in general, responds to large
amounts of overcapacity with increased seat availability in the discount classes.
If increased discount seat availability does not increase load factors given the
current fare product structure, the pricing department may drop the market fare
levels, leading to even greater price dispersion in the market.
None of the attempts to model price discrimination have explicitly considered
the structure of airline fare products offered in the OD market. Rather, they have
focused on the departures from marginal cost pricing and whether or not they
exist in the market and what is their basis. At the level of the individual airline,
such studies of industry organization are of limited relevance. Airline managers
are more interested in determining the effects of the decisions over which they
exercise control. Previous research has offered some insights into the effects of
setting profit maximizing price levels in OD markets for the individual fare
products. This research is introduced in the next section along with a critique of
the assumptions that underlie the models, which provides a motivation for the
research undertaken in this dissertation.
2.5 Monopoly Models of Airline Fare Product Differentiation
Previous attempts to provide profit-maximizing price levels under fare product
differentiation have been attempted in the literature using a model of third
degree price discrimination (Kahn, 1970, Belobaba, 1987, and Cross, 1989). The
model used to describe airline fare product differentiation in these models is
based upon a single flight in a single OD market. The model appears graphically
in Figure 2.1. The demand is static and comes from a single population. Thus,
airline passengers are only concerned with obtaining a space on the aircraft as
indicated by their willingness to pay for air travel.
Passenger willingness to pay is unambiguously described using the single
demand function appearing in the figure. The short run marginal cost of serving
an additional passenger has been assumed to be constant in the model. The
average total cost curve is above the demand function at all points. Because of
high average costs, the airline is unable to cover costs at any single price level.
Thus, in order to offer the flight over the long term, the airline is forced to price
discriminate.
The airline is assumed to possess the ability to price discriminate using an
infallible screening technique. Using the sorting mechanism, passengers are
grouped by their willingness to pay into mutually exclusive groups. It is
assumed that passengers grouped into a stratum are prevented from purchasing
any other fare products because they are subject to a perfect fencing mechanism.
Additionally, the strata are decided by the setting of the price levels for the
market. This assumption about the ability of the airline to identify and segment
passengers is greatly unrealistic.
The model presented in the example is a third degree price discrimination model
for a monopoly which relies upon the ability of the airline to perfectly identify
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and segment the consumer population by their willingness to pay. Thus, the
segmentation has been assumed to occur with no cost to the consumer of
accepting the additional purchase restrictions. In other words, a seat on the
aircraft is viewed as identical no matter what level of inconvenience was endured
by the passenger to get that seat at that price level. This assumption also goes
against the structure of airline fare products currently offered in the market since
advance purchase requirements and Saturday night stay requirements are bound
to inconvenience certain low willingness to pay passengers. In reality, the
purchase restrictions that are attached to the fare products in the lower classes do
not, in fact, perfectly identify and segment passengers by their willingness to pay
with no cost. A non-negative cost is imposed on each passenger that is forced to
accept an additional purchase restriction.
One of the underlying assumptions of the above price discrimination model is
that passengers are all demanding seats on the same aircraft and view that
products that are offered to them as commodities. In other words, the
passengers do not care about the restrictions that are attached to their fare
products as long as they have a seat aboard the departing aircraft. The fact is
that airline fare products are not viewed as perfect substitutes, but rather as
separate products with common characteristics. Thus, index sorting is not a
correct characterization of the majority of price discrimination practiced by
airlines.
The characterization of demand found in the price discrimination model
presented here would be appropriate if the airline was able to perfectly identify
and segment subgroups of the passenger population by their willingness to pay
for air travel. Unfortunately for the airline, this ability is unachievable in
addition to being in violation of U.S. law (Robinson-Patman Act of 1964). To
approximate the desired segmentation of demand, airlines have imposed
purchase restrictions and other devices to act as "fences" to prevent passengers
willing to pay large amounts for air travel from purchasing discount tickets.
While the assumption about a monopoly market is not true in general, the nature
of pricing decisions makes the results of the model presented here instructive to
airline managers. Different price levels for the different fare products will be set
C only at one level in most markets. The matching behavior of carriers that is
enabled through their contact via the computer reservations systems and the
Airline Tariff Publishing Corporation makes the result of airline fare products
and price levels appear like a monopoly decision at most times. The output of
the monopoly market model presented here would not provide an exact
representation of the firms and their interactions but rather an indication of the
direction in which airlines should move price levels.
2.6 Review of Product Differentiation in the Yield Management Literature
The view of airline fare products, price levels, and passenger demand in the
airline yield management literature has been focused on the belief that the
separate products appeal to different demand populations and, as such, do not
interrelate in a systematic way. Currently, all operational models of airline yield
management rely upon the assumption that airlines have the ability to segment
their demand populations into homogeneous and independent subgroups. For a
taxonomy of the airline yield management and related literature consult
Weatherford (1991).
Airlines would like to believe that the self-selection criteria that they employ
result in the segmentation of passenger demand into homogeneous and
independent subgroups for the differentiated fare products. That is, the effect on
the demand for the full fare product of a change in the discount product price
level may be viewed as no different from a change in the price of a loaf of bread.
The fare product inferiority hierarchy described in Chapter One demonstrates
that only under very specific conditions does this independence occur. The view
of airline fare products as independent is clearly untrue based upon what is
known about air transportation passenger demand.
The fare war that occurred in the Summer of 1992 demonstrates that the demand
for fare products is far from independent. Fourteen day excursion fare products
were available for sale on the market during the fare war. The price level for the
less restricted seven day advanced purchase excursion fare products dropped
below that of the fourteen day advanced purchase product. Needless to say, the
fourteen day advanced purchase excursion product was not purchased while
there was a rush on the seven day excursion fare products. The inter-
relationships between airline fare products and consumer demand for them must
be explicitly considered in any framework attempting to model airline fare
product differentiation.
In the literature, some of the models used are (third degree) price discrimination
models while others are product differentiation models. The price discrimination
models assume no cost to passengers associated with their inconvenience. The
product differentiation models assume that the demand populations are
independent and the demand for each of the fare products is independent of the
price levels associated with all other fare products. The appropriateness of the
assumptions remains to be addressed in the following chapters of the
dissertation.
2.7 Chapter Summary
The chapter has highlighted the modeling of airline fare product differentiation
in the context of the economics price discrimination literature. It is apparent that
the models that have been used to describe airline markets either have faulty
assumptions or do not correctly model the situation. This motivates the need to
develop a model of airline fare product differentiation that considers the true
problem. In the next chapter, a model is motivated that addresses the
shortcomings of the literature and provides useful information to airline
management.
Chapter Three
Incorporating Price Levels and Restrictions into the Current Framework of
Airline Yield Management
Airline yield management models attempt to maximize expected revenues given
fixed price levels and purchase restrictions. The demand level inputs to the
models correct for certain systematic trends such as seasonality in the data but do
not explicitly consider the effect of fare product attributes on demand levels.
This chapter addresses the important factors influencing demand and their
treatment within the current framework of airline yield management. The
inclusion of fare product attributes in the demand characterization would enable
the airline to measure the effects of price levels and purchase restrictions on
revenue and passenger demand with the goal of improving revenue
enhancement. Provided with information about passenger sensitivity to price
levels and product restrictions, an airline could more effectively increase
profitability by modifying its fare product offerings.
The chapter begins by addressing the major effects on the demand for airline fare
products. Next, the theoretical airline yield management models of demand are
examined in the context of their application to a dynamic seat allocation. The
effects of data constraints on the application of the theoretical models are then
examined. The techniques for correcting demand inputs are reviewed and their
shortcomings highlighted. More correct dynamically applicable models of
passenger demand are then formulated and the computational and data
requirements for their calculation are examined. Finally, the requirements for
implementation of the improved demand characterizations are shown to be
overwhelming under the current state of practice. An alternative solution is
motivated for treatment in the following chapter.
3.1 Major Factors Influencing Air Travel Demand
Many factors affect the level of demand for air travel. Airlines can control some
of the factors while being unable to influence others. Even among the factors
seemingly controllable by the airline, the nature of airline competition may make
direct influence by a single carrier difficult. In this section, the major effects on
air travel demand as well as the ability of the airline to influence them are
addressed.
3.1.1 Factors Affecting Demand for Air Travel Overall
Many of the factors influencing the overall level of passenger demand for air
travel are beyond the control of airlines. OD market demand levels often exhibit
structural shifts as a result of national or international events, particularly when
consumers harbor fears about airline safety. For instance, safety concerns
lowered consumer demand during the recent war in the Persian Gulf. Traffic
levels plunged to record lows in the quarters surrounding the war, most likely as
a result of passenger fears of terrorist attacks. Terrorism is often directed at
airlines because of the high visibility coverage that airline disasters generally
receive in the world media. The media attention fuels passenger safety concerns
thus amplifying the downward influence on traffic levels.
Maintenance related problems can cause airplane safety incidents even with the
strict standards imposed by safety regulatory agencies like the Federal Aviation
Administration. Adverse weather conditions and air traffic control mishaps can
cause airplane accidents as well. Regardless of their cause, strings of airplane
crashes can produce a downward effect on traffic levels. The effect of airplane
incidents takes on importance in the measurement of air travel demand when
safety concerns influence the travel decisions of the (discretionary) travel
population. As with terrorism, media coverage only heightens the concerns of
the population.
Increased modal competition can influence air travel demand levels quite
significantly. For instance, if high-speed rail were introduced into a short haul
air travel market, demand levels would be expected to drop if rail service levels
became competitive with air. The extent of competition considered by the airline
must be expanded to account for multiple modes, provided that an acceptable
non-airline alternative exists and takes OD market share. An airline must be
concerned with the degree to which the new modal competition captures
intercity travel market share compared to simply stimulating new demand.
Fortunately for the airlines, the effects of modal competition are confined to
shorter haul markets. In the U.S., for instance, the short haul markets
experiencing intermodal competition are quite limited.
Traffic growth (or contraction) resulting from changing habits or demographic
trends may cause changes in the level of demand for air travel in an OD market.
Areas of the country with high population growth, for example, may experience
increases in air travel resulting from the larger population. OD market traffic
growth may also occur from a shift away from manufacturing industries to
professional services at the origin or destination city. Although airlines may
respond to the increased demand with higher levels of service in the area, a
growth trend itself cannot be influenced by airlines. Demographic changes are a
relatively long term phenomenon.
The economic conditions prevailing at the origin or destination city can affect the
demand for air travel in an OD market in the short term. Clearly, an area that is
conducting less business in general is likely to have less need for air travel. Thus,
during periods of local recession demand for air travel may drop. The effects on
demand of the economy are not limited to local business cycle fluctuations. Poor
performance of the economy on the national or international level can also result
in reduced levels of air travel. Cyclic variations in the economy whether local,
national, or international, can have a major impact on the demand for air travel.
Finally, the demand for all fare products is influenced by the season of the year.
Different OD markets display different peaking behaviors depending upon the
nature of the travel occurring between them. For example, the traffic between
the Northeast and Florida is high during the winter months, particularly during
the Christmas and New Years holidays. Traffic drops significantly in Northeast
to Florida markets during the summer months as the weather improves in the
North. The seasonal demand differences result from the attractiveness of Florida
as a leisure travel destination during the winter months and its decreased
attractiveness as a leisure spot during the hot and humid summer months. As
the above example suggests, the seasonality of the market often is a major factor
in the prediction of travel demand, especially in leisure travel markets.
3.1.2 Factors Affecting the Market Share Between Carriers
Other factors influence the overall level of air traffic for the individual carriers.
The influences addressed here affect all fare products but have little to do with
the individual fare product attributes. Preferences concerning frequency share,
spacing of departures, and carrier attributes influence passenger travel choices
and thus demand levels. In any OD market, the itineraries that are available to a
consumer on an airline also help to determine the level of demand for that
carrier. The discussion begins, however, with perhaps the greatest determinants
of carrier market share, non-stop service.
Carriers offering non-stop service in a market offer a superior product to
passengers purchasing all types of fare products. Non-stop itineraries are subject
to shorter travel times and provide a lower potential for delay than connections.
The superior level of service offered by non-stop flight itineraries benefits
passengers by increasing the value of service. Moreover, since overall level of
service can influence travel/no travel choices, an abundance of non-stop flights
may result in higher OD market demand. At a minimum, increased demand
levels result for carriers providing non-stop service based primarily on travel
time improvements.
Demand levels for air travel are also influenced by passenger perceptions about
the different airlines. The carrier perceptions revolve around such factors as
reliability, safety, level of in-flight service, and frequent traveler bonuses. For
each individual airline, the impact of passenger perceptions can weigh heavily on
the overall demand for service. For instance, a carrier that is perceived as
unreliable or in danger of the service interruptions caused by a strike or
impending bankruptcy may experience reduced demand levels on all flights.
Passengers have been known to avoid carriers perceived to have reliability
problems. In addition, some passengers simply prefer flying on their "favorite"
airline and often go to lengths to ensure passage on that carrier especially since
the introduction of frequent flyer programs. Carrier perceptions can result in
increased or decreased levels of demand for all fare products depending upon
their favorability.
Carriers having a high frequency share often carry a disproportionate number of
passengers since the number of inbound-outbound itinerary combinations
available to a consumer depends on the square of frequency share (Simpson,
1982). Passenger gain resulting from high frequency share is expected to happen
in two main ways - increasing passenger itinerary flexibility and providing more
attractive departure times. First, passengers traveling on fully refundable fare
products are offered more departure choices from carriers possessing greater
frequency share. If a traveler arrives at the airport well in advance of his
expected flight departure as the result of finishing a business meeting early, for
instance, traveling on a carrier with frequent departures at his origin may enable
that passenger to travel on an earlier flight than expected. Carriers offering only
a single daily flight itinerary in an OD market can offer no such flexibility to
passengers desiring itinerary changes. Thus, increased itinerary flexibility is
expected to increase demand for a carrier.
Passengers also have preferred departure times when considering air travel. The
matching of the flight schedule with the preferred departure times of travelers is
an important factor influencing overall demand for a carrier. A carrier offering a
large frequency share clearly has the greatest possibility of offering travel
itineraries that most closely meet the needs of the travel population. In other
words, high frequency share (with proper departure spacing) increases the
probability that a given carrier offers a flight departure that coincides most
closely with the preferred departure time of the greatest number of passengers.
Moreover, actually matching capacity with preferred passenger departure times
enables the airline to serve the maximum number of consumers desiring air
travel with service coinciding most closely with their preferred departure times
and may increase demand levels further. Both individual carrier and OD market
demand levels should increase with increased frequency.
The fixed schedule under which an airline must operate in the short term
coupled with the physical constraints of the aircraft cycle prevent the airline from
matching preferred departure times with passenger preferences in all markets at
all times. Carriers can influence their frequency share in any market simply by
increasing the number of flights that they offer. Cost constraints, however, limit
the extent to which the frequency of service in any market can be augmented.
The advent of frequent traveler programs has increased the effect on the demand
levels of carrier perception, favoritism, and departure share at the origin. There
is now increased incentive for passengers to choose a single carrier with which to
accumulate frequent flyer mileage points to obtain rewards. The incentive to
focus on a single carrier results from the non-linear reward structure that
characterizes frequent traveler programs. A non-linear reward structure
provides increasingly attractive awards for greater mileage point accumulation.
Increased market power is afforded to carriers who possess a larger percentage
of enplanements at any origin resulting from perceived frequent flyer program
captivity. In fact, the preferred carrier of many passengers often becomes the
carrier for which that passenger is closest to earning a frequent flyer travel
bonus. In the extreme, passengers near a bonus award may even travel more to
obtain free travel more quickly and stimulate demand further.
3.1.3 Factors Affecting the Demand for Individual Fare Products
Under deregulation, U.S. airlines have been given complete freedom for the
pricing and supply of domestic air transportation services. The freedom entails
the setting of price levels as well as the application of restrictions. The demand
for air travel is influenced by these fare product attributes. Significant changes to
the fare product attributes often influence demand extensively.
Airlines attempt to manage the demand for air travel using price level. It is likely
that price levels have the greatest influence on passenger demand of any fare
product attribute since the extreme sensitivity of many passengers to price drives
many air travel decisions. Airlines lower excursion fares to stimulate leisure
demand during periods of historically (or systematically) low travel demand
when significant adjustments to the flight schedule are infeasible. For instance,
airlines offer discounts to discretionary travelers to stimulate demand during low
travel periods at yearly intervals. Special deals on travel to Florida and other
warm winter weather locations appear each January and February to stimulate
demand after the holiday season.
Since airlines have historically acquired aircraft to meet travel needs during peak
seasons, excess capacity has resulted when demand is low. Marketing
promotions which offer reduced price travel have been used to fill the excess
capacity during the low seasons. Airlines often reduce fare levels to stimulate
demand during high travel periods as well. Thirty to forty percent fare
reductions on the lowest priced excursion tickets are often offered in late spring
to stimulate demand during the summer. Although greater demand stimulation
is needed during the low seasons, less popular flight departures during the
summer months can be filled with discretionary travelers who help contribute to
fixed costs.
Purchase restrictions also have a large influence on the demand for the
individual fare products. Similar to price levels, the individual carriers exercise
complete control over the level of restrictions that accompany the fare products
that they sell. Changes to existing restriction levels can be made within a day in
all domestic markets through the ATPCO clearinghouse. Passenger demand can
be managed through a tightening or relaxation of fare product restriction levels.
Unfortunately for the airlines, changes to the fare product restrictions are
generally viewed as complicated and undesirable by the traveling public.
Popular confusion about restrictions limits the freedom of carriers to frequently
adjust purchase restrictions. Nonetheless, purchase restrictions and their effects
can influence traffic levels for the individual fare products.
Supply effects can influence the amount of traffic carried by the airlines. The
availability of any fare product can be limited either by the physical capacity of
the aircraft or service class cabin. In addition, booking limits applied to the
different fare classes or products can prevent passengers from purchasing a fare
product which shows no availability in the computer reservations system for a
given flight departure.
The availability of seats for a given fare product has no direct effect on the level
of demand for air travel. Passengers desiring air travel who know the fare
product structure have preferences that are unaffected by availability. The sole
way in which availability influences the actual demand for air travel on any of
the individual fare products is passenger discouragement resulting from
assumptions about availability limits. For example, a passenger who has
previously been denied a booking for his preferred fare product may be
discouraged from purchasing air travel. This effect, however, is likely to be very
minor. Whether or not the individual fare products are available for purchase by
the consumer is another story. The realization of demand, or the actual number
of passengers flown, is strongly influenced by availability. Availability or supply
constraints cause realized and actual demand to diverge.
The effect of availability on realized demand becomes important when realized
demand data are used as a proxy for actual demand data. The flight loads and
passenger counts do reflect the effects of availability on the realization of
demand. Binding availability constraints lower the realized demand for all fare
products because of the fixed capacity that is provided by any aircraft. When a
flight reaches its maximum authorized booking level, for example, all future
passenger requests are denied. On the highest demand flights, it is likely that at
least some passengers desiring service have been denied because of the capacity
constraint and the timing of their reservation requests. The rejected bookings can
occur for any fare product. The only way that a rejected consumer appears in the
realized demand is through the purchase of an alternative fare product. Thus,
although not directly affecting actual demand, the realized demand levels are
strongly influenced by availability.
3.1.4 Limitations of Airline Control Over Price Levels and Restrictions
Although airlines as a whole are ultimately responsible for airline fares as well as
purchase restrictions, each individual airline exercises far less control over these
matters. While any carrier has the power to unilaterally change the price levels
and fare products that it offers, the nature of competition prevents carriers from
actually pursuing such renegade strategies. Operating in oligopolistic markets,
competitive pressures drive carriers to pursue matching strategies for the
majority of fare products sold. The mutual dependence among carriers and fears
of price wars that characterize the oligopolistic airline industry drive carriers to
pursue matching strategies (Wells, 1984).
Strategies aimed at maintaining market share are practiced by the airlines further
reinforce matching strategies as the default reaction to change. Moreover, the
information contained within the computer reservations systems of airlines make
undertaking clandestine strategies in markets nearly impossible. Actions not
approved by the other carriers do not often go unnoticed and invite competitive
reaction if not reprisal. In the end, the fare product changes that a carrier may
defend in any market depends upon the market strength of the carrier as well as
the nature of the change. It is likely that a carrier instituting a fare change that is
not matched by the other carriers will withdraw that action.
The ability of an individual airline to unilaterally influence the price levels is
generally limited to price decreases. Virtually all airlines will match a lower fare
posted by any carrier (at least a major carrier). Carriers are generally unwilling
to sacrifice market share to another carrier by allowing a lower published price
level in the market. Thus, a carrier can post a lower fare and expect the other
carriers to match for fear of being uncompetitive and losing market share. Only
in markets where a single carrier exercises considerable market power are fare
differentials likely to remain. Unilateral fare increases, on the other hand, are not
always matched by the other carriers. Carriers are generally willing to allow
other airlines to post a higher fare without responding competitively because of
the increased market share expected to result.
Changing purchase restrictions faces resistance from other carriers as well as
from consumers. Consumers generally resent the complexity of the airline fare
product structure and, as a result, changes to the format with which passengers
are accustomed are not often made. Fare product complexities can cause
discontent with airlines and adversely affect demand and, thus, are avoided.
Most carriers are aware of the passenger sensitivity to fare product complexity
and discourage fare product changes through the ATPCO fare product
clearinghouse. Competitive forces generally prevent fare product restriction
changes. As a result, differences in the airline fare product structure are not
widespread with the exception of special fare offerings.
In summary, carriers can influence the pricing and restrictions prevailing in the
market. The influence a single carrier has upon fare product prices and
restrictions is limited to suggestions to the other carriers sent through ATPCO.
Carrier fare product suggestions can be input in the form of either price level or
restriction changes. The absolute control that any one carrier can exercise over a
market depends upon the level of competition and the willingness of other
carriers offering service in that market to match the decisions suggested by the
influencing carrier. The importance of remaining competitive drives final airline
( fare product attribute decisions. The extent to which a single carrier can
influence the prevailing conditions in the market is not outwardly clear and
varies by market.
3.1.5 Passengers Book at Different Times Prior to Departure
In addition to information about the factors affecting demand levels, airlines also
have interest in the factors influencing passenger booking behavior. This
subsection identifies the major factors influencing the incidence of passenger
service requests. Flight schedules and associated fare products are posted in the
computer reservations systems of airlines over 300 days prior to departure in
most cases. As a result, the booking process can begin far in advance of
departure and prior to the majority of passenger inquiries. Passengers inquire
about travel at different times throughout the booking process. The arrival times
of passenger inquiries depend upon several factors including purchase
restrictions, ability to plan travel in advance, perceived and actual seat
availability to name just a few. The three main areas that affect the passenger
booking choice are fare product attributes, trip specific considerations, and
passenger attributes.
The attributes of a given fare product can directly influence passenger booking
behavior. Fare product restrictions may force a passenger to arrange travel
before a certain date. For example, passengers purchasing 14 day advance
purchase, non-refundable excursion fare products must book at least 14 days
prior to flight departure. Conversely, passengers who purchase non-excursion
fare products as a result of travel itinerary constraints may delay booking until
just prior to departure if they know that no advance purchase is required.
Certainly, the booking behaviors of passengers purchasing unrestricted fare
products differs from those purchasing excursion fare products.
Another fare product attribute that affects booking behavior is seat availability
since the computer reservations system inventory control structure ensures that
each increasingly restricted fare product has less availability than every less
restricted fare product. Availability influences the timing of booking decisions
based upon the situational considerations of the trip as well as the experiences
and characteristics of the individual passenger. For instance, concerns about
future fare product availability may induce passengers to secure their
C reservations early.
Concerns about fare product availability increase when a trip has particular
importance to an individual. More-restricted fare products are allocated lower
levels of availability resulting from the nested seat allocations practiced by
airlines. The reduced availability of lower-priced fare products may encourage
passengers to book earlier when planning an important trip. Conversely, a trip
that is surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty may not be booked early as a
result of the fixed plans not being known until late in the booking process. In
this case, the passenger may be more willing to compromise fare product choices
in lieu of availability considerations.
Passenger characteristics may influence the booking behavior of an individual.
For instance, highly risk averse passengers may book earlier to ensure
availability. Risk taking passengers, on the other hand, may delay booking on a
particular flight until near departure. The experience of a particular traveler may
also influence booking decisions. A passenger who knows that a flight is quite
popular as a result of traveling on that flight frequently may book earlier to help
ensure a seat on the aircraft. Earlier bookings are expected from passengers who
have been denied availability of a preferred fare product recently. The less
seasoned traveler, on the other hand, may not know to worry about flight
availability considerations and may book later as a result. Passengers not
arriving early ddfing the booking process may be denied their preferred fare
product or travel itinerary on high demand flights.
In conclusion, the passenger arrival process must be modeled in addition to the
other factors that influence passenger demand levels to correctly characterize
airline passenger demand. Passenger characteristics, fare product attributes, and
trip-specific considerations affect both fare product demand as well as passenger
inquiry times. Having highlighted many of the major influences on demand
levels and passenger bookings, a look is now taken at the current practice of
demand calculation by airlines. The next section focuses on the treatment of
demand levels in airline yield management theory and practice.
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3.2 Current Practice of Airline Yield Management Demand Models
This dissertation seeks to incorporate the price levels of the fare products in the
calculation of the passenger demand levels. The expansion of the demand
forecasts to include price level would allow the airline to test the impact of price
on demand and revenue. Understanding the relationship between price and
demand may help the carrier to better increase revenues. An improvement of the
inputs to the airline yield management models resulting from better demand
forecasts may improve the results of the revenue enhancement techniques. In
fact, it has been estimated that a 10% improvement in the yield management
system demand forecasting ability will improve expected revenues between 0.5%
and 3.0% on high demand flights (Lee, 1990). Clearly, increasing revenue
potential holds great interest to all carriers.
3.2.1 Yield Management Model Theoretical Assumptions
In the standard airline yield management calculation methodology, three main
inputs are made to the model - the overbooking calculation, the revenue level
calculation, and the demand forecast. The yield management system returns the
suggested fare class (product) booking limits that are thought to best maximize
revenues. The focus of this section is on the demand forecasting portion of the
yield management system inputs. The section begins with a brief description of
what is theoretically calculated by the yield management model demand inputs.
Then, it is shown that many of the assumptions advanced in the theory of yield
management models are violated by the practical applications.
Review of Airline YM Demand Calculations
The calculation of booking limits made by airline yield management models
requires the distribution of demands by fare class to be provided as an input.
The demand forecast is assumed to represent a correct snapshot of the actual
distribution of passenger demand expected to face a carrier for a particular flight
departure in the future. In theory, the demand levels used as inputs to yield
management models are assumed to be known with error. To account for the
random error component of demand, instead of providing a single estimate, a
probability distribution is calculated for each fare class. The incorporation of
random error into the demand estimates is expected to make the results of the
yield management revenue enhancement techniques more robust.
Since the models used in practice are probabilistic, some error not captured by
correcting for systematic variations in demand levels is assumed to exist.
Unfortunately, the more systematic factors that are omitted from the demand
calculation, the more likely that the random error component will be large. In
this way, the omission of important systematic factors from the calculation of
demand biases the results. Thus, it is important to remove the systematic
variations such as those described in the previous section when deriving demand
distributions.
A specific distributional form of demand is assumed as input to all airline yield
management models. The exact form of the distribution depends upon the
preferences of the airline employing the yield management system. Both
Gaussian and gamma distributions have been suggested in the literature
(Belobaba, 1987 and Smith and Penn, 1988). The choice of distribution depends
upon the assumptions made about4he true form of demand. With a flexible
demand distribution, however, the bottleneck operation remains good quality
data inputs for estimation. Favorable revenue improvements have been obtained
with both gamma and Gaussian distributed demands.
For a static application of yield management techniques, historical demand levels
are assumed to be available from the moment bookings begin until flight
departure. The level of demand that occurs for each flight is kept as data for use
in the calculation of future demand levels. Using the historical demand data, a
distribution of future demand is fitted based upon the distributional assumptions
made. The fitted distribution is used as input to the airline yield management
model. Demand is characterized by the distribution calculated using the
historical data having corrected, of course, for the systematic factors influencing
demand level. A more complete discussion of the corrections made to the
demand figures is postponed until later in the chapter.
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Independence Assumption and Evaluation
Theoretically, the demand forecasts used in airline yield management revenue
enhancement models assume the independence of all fare products. In other
words, the expected demand level for an individual fare product is uncorrelated
with the demand levels for any other fare product. What is known about the
hierarchy of fare products leaves the assumption of independence of price level
and demand tenuous at best. A more detailed look at the independence
assumptions reveals their fallibility in modeling the problem.
The standard independence assumptions surrounding airline fare product
demand require that the demand populations for the individual fare products be
distinct and separable (Belobaba, 1987). First, distinct and separable populations
require consumers to view the fare products as truly differentiated. Since the
underlying attributes of each fare product are identical (e.g. air travel between an
origin and destination at a specific time), the price differential between any two
fare products must be representative of the restrictions accompanying them. In
other words, the more-restricted fare products must be priced above the less-
restricted. In addition, the increased restrictions placed on the lower-priced fare
products must be effective (e.g. impose a cost on the more price-insensitive
consumers). Clearly, no logical consumer would purchase a more costly fare
product if the attached purchase restrictions did not adversely affect him.
As with any demand calculation, the attributes of the differentiated fare products
must remain stable in the perceptions of the consumers so that no unexpected
shifts in passenger preferences occur. The independence of fare product demand
distributions is likely if the product remains stable over time. Stability is
required, however, in both price level and fences. The relative price levels
between the fare products should be stable over time to ensure no shifting of
demand over time. This is required since the fare product price levels are not
used in the calculation of demand forecasts.
Two of the fundamental components of demand predictions have been omitted
from consideration in the current framework - own price and cross price
elasticities. In other words, the yield management model demand forecasts
assume that the price levels of the fare products have no more effect on
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passenger demand than the price of bread, for instance. The effect on the fare
product of a price level change in another fare product is limited to the income
effect. Given the nature of airline fare levels and their large fluctuations, the zero
own price elasticity assumption is rather heroic. In an attempt to correct the
demand forecasts, ad hoc adjustments are made by yield management analysts
before the forecasts are input to the models if large errors in the predicted levels
are expected.
Unfortunately for accurate demand forecasting, air travel price levels lack
stability and often reason. Carriers do not always set prices at levels that can
cover costs under normal circumstances. The price levels that carriers set may be
lowered, for instance, to increase short term cash flow by stimulating additional
demand. The wide range of fare product price levels that occur based on
competitive positioning make forecasting demand independent of price level
difficult. The constant posturing by carriers in an attempt to publish favorable
price levels in the market results in fluctuations in price levels.
An illustrative example of price level instability is the recurrent industry "fare
war" in which a series of discount fare offerings flood the market, usually with
little warning. Each fare war significantly drops the price of the lowest cost fare
products and results in a lower average revenue per passenger for all carriers.
The public response to the drastically lowered fares occurring during an industry
fare war is increased demand, demand that is not anticipated by forecasts based
entirely upon uncorrected historical data. The surge in demand, however, often
greatly exceeds prior expectations and represents a temporary shift in demand.
As a result of the wide fluctuations in price level routinely occurring in the air
transportation industry, measurements of demands are not always accurate.
In neoclassical microeconomic terms, the stability of fences is required to prevent
shifting of the cross elasticities of demand between the fare products. Fence
stability ensures that the fare product attributes do not change either outright or
in the perceptions of the consumers. In this way, stable purchase restrictions do
not necessarily guarantee stable fences if the ability of passengers to meet
purchase restrictions changes over time. Thus, the stability of fences is required
to the extent that it preserves (reinforces) the independence of the fare product
demand distributions.
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The demand distribution inputs to the yield management model would need to
be recalculated if the restrictions or their effectiveness to segment demand were
to change. Fortunately for the airlines, the purchase restrictions accompanying
the fare products offered on the market are relatively stable over time. Passenger
aversion to complicated fare structures and changes in the service offerings help
to force airlines to maintain a relatively stable fare product mix. It is not as clear
whether passengers are more able to meet the purchase restrictions over time.
However, since the basic fare product structure has remained relatively stable
over the past several years, it would appear that airlines perceive no significant
shifts in passenger ability to meet restrictions.
The inferiority hierarchy tends to cast doubt on the zero cross price elasticity
assumption because of the inherent similarity of the fare products. It is quite
likely there is a more significant effect on the demand for E14NR fare products
for a change in the price of an E7NR fare product on the same flight itinerary
than for a change in the price of bread especially in the presence of booking
limits which may close off the E14NR fare product to sales prior to the E7NR,
bringing the assumption into question. In the absence of effective fences, for
instance, the fare products are identical in all ways except price level. The
inappropriateness of the zero cross elasticity assumption can be mitigated,
however, with stable, large price differentials that mirror fence effectiveness.
The validity of the independence assumption need not rely upon the belief that
passengers have no utility for any product other than the one that they purchase.
On the contrary, passengers may prefer different fare products depending upon
price levels. The prevailing price levels and interrelationships of the price levels
must be stable and constant to justify independence. Unfortunately, there are
often wide variations in price level due to competitive pressures and recurrent
industry fare wars making the assumption of stable price levels highly
questionable. Clearly, assuming the independence of demand levels is not
realistic. Under certain conditions, however, the fare product independence
assumption has validity. For this to occur, however, the fences between fare
products must be effective, the price levels must be significantly differentiated,
and passengers must exhibit stable purchasing behavior.
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It is interesting to note that the demands used in airline yield management
models do not assume knowledge about the willingness to pay of passengers. In
other words, no demand function is incorporated in the models. The
assumptions about demand levels are made entirely independent of price level.
Since the majority of passengers are sensitive to price level, the models implicitly
assume an existing and constant price level for the fare product since a stable
distribution of demand is assumed to be available. It would be virtually
impossible to calculate the demand for a product without either knowing or
making assumptions about the product attributes. Thus, at a minimum, the
assumption of price level stability has been made about each of the fare products
prior to the calculation of demand.
Modeling the Dynamic Process
A dynamic application of the airline yield management revenue enhancement
module can lead to an improved solution for the carrier. The state of the art in
the modeling of the passenger arrival process used in airline yield management
assumes arrival distributions for each fare product between the current time
period and flight departure. For example, a demand distribution is calculated for
passengers in each fare class expected to arrive during the period between seven
days prior to departure and departure itself. In this case, day seven represents a
yield management system checkpoint. The bookings to come between each
checkpoint and departure are the basis for the calculation of the demand
distributions.
The booking limit calculations are updated at the different checkpoints before
departure. The demand inputs take account of both the bookings on-hand
(already in the reservations system) as well as the forecasts of future expected
demand. To calculate the updated booking limits, the yield management
revenue optimization model is reapplied to the problem given the bookings on
hand and the demand forecasts of bookings to come in every fare class. The seat
allocation optimization is run at each of the selected revision checkpoints and
new, updated booking limits are imposed The distribution of bookings to come
in the period prior to departure, as in the static case, are assumed to be calculated
directly from the historical demand data. For a more detailed description of the
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dynamic application of a seat inventory control booking limit model consult
Belobaba, 1987.
3.2.2 Yield Management Input Data Available: Practical Considerations
The data constraints facing airlines implementing yield management systems
force some concessions to the theory. In this subsection, the ramifications of the
departures from yield management theory are explored. Attention is focused on
the passenger demand and booking level data currently used in most yield
management models. While the methods are quite effective in practice, a clearer
understanding of the assumptions of yield management models and what is
actually provided by the demand data may lead to an improved demand
characterization. This, in turn, may result in yield management model
performance improvements.
The demand forecasting modules currently employed by most airline yield
management systems use historical estimates of passenger traffic levels to predict
future departure loads. The demand inputs to the airline yield management
models are taken from the data stored in the computer reservations systems. The
CRS keeps information about the number of passengers who have booked in a
fare class and when the bookings occurred. Both sets of information are used as
inputs to the dynamic application of the airline yield management models. The
demand levels are calculated for the entire booking period of the flight and
broken down into the demand arriving between the prespecified checkpoints at
the level of detail required for modeling the dynamic process. Unfortunately,
there is a discrepancy between the number of bookings on the computer
reservations system and the actual flight demand.
Passenger requests for service are often rejected as a result of capacity constraints
and booking limits. As a result, the information stored in the computer
reservation systems by the carriers only represents realized demand levels not
actual demand levels. Thus, the data required by the yield management systems
is not actually provided to it. Rather, a proxy measure, the realized demand, is
statistically unconstrained and used as the actual input to the yield management
model. The extent of the problems associated with using realized demand data
in place of actual demand data are addressed next.
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The airlines are currently limited to the booking and ticket count data which
contains the realization of demand subject to supply effects (availability at both
the fare product and aircraft capacity level). The demand data collected from
ticket counts taken by the airlines and the Department of Transportation
represent an estimate of demand constrained by the fixed capacity levels
occurring in the OD markets. Only those passengers who found a fare product
available appear in the realized demand. There is no guarantee, however, that
those passengers received passage on their preferred itinerary or with their
preferred fare product. The historical ticket count data simply provides a head
count of the passengers and the price that they paid for air travel.
Oftentimes, passengers purchase fare products that are not their preferred ones
as a result of availability constraints. When a passenger is denied a request for a
fare product on a given flight itinerary, the possibility exists for that passenger to
be reaccommodated. The passenger may find a different fare product on his
preferred flight itinerary or, conversely, his preferred fare product on a different
flight itinerary. For instance, passengers finding no availability for their
preferred fare product may purchase a less-restricted fare product, or "sell-up"
to a higher fare class. The incidence of passengers being forced to purchase a
higher-priced, less-restricted fare product as the result of booking limits placed
on their preferred fare product demonstrates the interdependence of the realized
demand.
The interaction of supply and demand is ignored when the realized demand is
assumed to represent actual demand. Limited supply and the application of
booking limits may artificially force passengers to consider the purchase of fare
products that are not their preferred ones. The realized demand levels do not
reflect the choice process engaged in by passengers, but rather, only the
incidence of their final travel decisions. Thus, although a passenger may have
wished to have been a member of the demand population for one fare product,
availability may have directed him to purchase another.
Passengers who have been denied their preferred fare products do not appear in
the realized demand, except perhaps if they decided to purchase another type of
air travel service instead. This type of passenger reincorporation violates the fare
product independence assumptions that have been made in the theoretical
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models. Without binding capacity or booking limits, the realized demand should
closely approximate the true demand. However, although there does exist
significant overcapacity in the airline industry, the strong peaking behavior of
flight departures makes the assumption of no capacity constraint quite dubious.
In fact, the number of passengers purchasing a product is always less than (or
equal to) the actual demand level for a flight. Thus, realized demand data
systematically underestimates the level of demand for air travel with a binding
capacity constraint or lower class booking limits since only those passengers
finding availability appear.
Passenger bookings on flight itineraries are often canceled prior to departure and
prior to purchase. Thus, the booking data that exists in the system is not
necessarily an accurate representation of even realized demand but rather
realized bookings at a point in time. Because of the refundability of purchased
tickets and the non-binding nature of reservations, airlines use passenger "no
show" estimates to more correctly characterize expected realized demand levels.
Passenger no shows may be the result of a passenger with a fully refundable
ticket who did not cancel his booking prior to departure or passengers making
bookings may simply not purchase the ticket associated with the booking that
they made. Reservations systems often place purchasing deadlines which
attempt to remove some of the bookings that do not result in traveling
passengers. Even with a paid ticket, passengers may simply decide not to travel
and absorb the monetary loss.
The revenue recovered by any passenger is not a measure of his maximum
willingness to pay as would be assumed in a standard demand function but
rather the result of how much was actually paid considering discounting, ability
to meet purchase restrictions, and supply-demand interactions. Although we
know that each passenger was willing to pay the amount of his purchased fare
product, it is unclear what the maximum willingness to pay (or reservation price)
of that passenger was. Thus, the demand distributions simply represent
expected passenger counts rather than indications of passenger characteristics.
The demand forecasts used by most airlines use recent historical data for use as
input on a rolling horizon basis. In other words, the demand data used for the
current forecast is taken from the most recently available data on the system.
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Thus, if a structural change occurs in the market the data accessed by the system
does not reflect the change. Over time, however, the historical data change to
more accurately reflect the current environment provided that a new level of
structural stability is reached.
The forecasting of passenger demand is commonly done by flight leg at the fare
class level. One underlying assumption affecting demand forecasts is the
matching of the fare level with the fare class. For instance, if an E14NR fare
product were sold in Q class over the historical demand data period, the
accuracy of the future demand forecasts for Q class should depend upon whether
E14NR fare products continue to be sold in that class. In the absence of a perfect
match between a single fare product being sold in each fare class, there must be
some stability of fare products within each fare class to accurately measure the
demand populations in each fare class.
Any change to the fare product or mix of fare products being sold in a fare class
may bias the forecasting estimates. Since passenger have different sensitivities to
fare product attributes, a change in the price level or restrictions associated with
the fare products sold in Q class may cause demand forecast inaccuracy. The
performance of the yield management system is expected to improve with
increased stability in the matching of fare products with fare classes.
The true demand can only be known from actually interviewing the consumers
requesting service at the point of sale. A more accurate representation of actual
passenger demand might be achieved conducting a telephone survey of
passengers who called a travel agent, for instance, to reserve airline travel. Such
data collection would require conducting an interview of passengers during the
purchase process, something than no airline can do on a large scale basis. In fact,
airlines cannot easily conduct such surveys independently since the only truly
relevant tests could be performed at travel agencies where passengers are able to
choose all available air travel alternatives.
The passenger service requests would represent actual demand if the passenger
were given a selection of fare products and flight itineraries and required to
choose among them. The data requirements for conducting such a test would be
large for even a single origin to destination market. The cost of conducting a
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survey for individual markets would be prohibitive. Clearly, aggregation
techniques could be used if such a survey were conducted on a representative
sample of markets to obtain estimates of demand for similar markets. However,
privacy issues as well as travel agent aversion to the administration of such
surveys to their customers prevent this type of passenger inquiry from being
readily performed. As a result, the true demand levels existing for flight levels
are never uncovered and the airlines must rely on proxy measures to predict
demand levels using historical realized demand data. There are, however,
correction techniques used by airlines that attempt to improve the forecasting
results obtained from the realized demand data.
Many of the factors affecting passenger demand levels should be corrected to
place more confidence in the demand forecasts used in the yield management
systems. The problem with the correction of the factors is the non-quantifiability
of many factor influences as well as the large data requirements of the more
appropriate demand formulations. The different techniques available to correct
the major factors influencing demand are explored next. Suggestions for
additional improvements of the demand measures follow.
3.2.3 Correction of Factors Affecting Demand to Improve Forecasts
The many exogenous factors that influence travel behavior are assumed not to
directly affect demand levels by most (if not all) airline yield management
forecasting systems. External data correction techniques are available provided
that data on the exogenous factors affecting traffic levels can be quantified.
Currently, airline yield management system forecasts are directly calculated from
historical data with only a few corrections. The airlines deseasonalize the data as
well as unconstraining it before making the demand predictions. These
techniques are explained in this section.
To deseasonalize the data, seasonal indices are calculated for each period of
analysis based on the historical demand data. The level of detail of the
seasonality indices varies by airline based upon data base capabilities, extent of
seasonal demand variations, and technical expertise. The demand data used as
input to airline yield management models are normalized to an average measure
of seasonality so that improved comparisons can be made. The demand for a
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given flight departure is then reseasonalized to more accurately represent the
expected traffic level.
Passenger demand forecasts also account for the constrained nature of airline
demand data. The supply-demand interaction which appears in the ticket count
data is partially corrected using data unconstraining techniques. Airlines rely
upon the technique of unconstraining estimates of demand to simulate the
expected level of true demand based on when the booking class for a particular
fare product was closed to further sales.
When a booking class is closed to further sales in the computer reservations
system, the point at which the sale closure occurs is maintained by the yield
management system data base. A reference table is kept for which the airline
predicts the percentage of bookings in the fare class that are expected by each
checkpoint. Using the closure date and the reference table, the expected demand
level at departure is calculated using an extrapolation technique. Unfortunately,
the technique of unconstraining demand levels is merely a stopgap measure.
Many of the supply-demand interactions that occur cannot be accounted for by
the simple methods currently used since the unconstrained demand estimate still
represents an expectation of the realized demand as opposed to the actual
demand. Clearly, airlines would prefer to have actual demand data available to
them but, as previously detailed, this is not currently possible.
3.2.4 Major Factors Influencing Demand Not Corrected
After the corrections that are currently made to the data have been completed,
several of the most important factors influencing demand levels remain
uncorrected. Thus, accurate calculation of demand is difficult even after the
seasonal variations and supply-demand interactions are controlled. Structural
shifts in consumer behavior are reflected in the data and require that careful
attention be paid to the period of analysis chosen to ensure that no uncorrected
shifts in OD market traffic demand exist. Impacts such as those previously cited
should be explicitly considered or corrected to place more confidence in the
demand measures. The incorporation (correction) of such measures is often
impractical, however, as a result of the non-quantifiability of the measures.
110
I I III' WINVIIIIIIIII
The effects of international events or maintenance related failures on passenger
demand levels are difficult to quantify and thus difficult to incorporate into
demand forecasts on a systematic basis. The effects of the supply shock resulting
from an employee strike at a major carrier, for instance, face similar difficulties.
The incorporation of this type of exogenous demand influence is quite difficult
except on an ad hoc basis. As a result, these impacts must be omitted from any
systematic measurement of demand until a quantifiable measure is developed
that accurately represents them. In the meantime, the revenue management
department at an airline can attempt to control such demand shocks on an ad hoc
basis.
More importantly, the price levels and restrictions of the fare products are not
explicitly considered when the passenger demand distributions are calculated.
Changes to the fare levels, which are frequent, may greatly influence the demand
for the individual fare products, perhaps more than economic conditions or
safety concerns. Thus, an operational method for including price level and
restrictions in the calculation of demand would increase airlines ability to
maximize revenue.
Ignoring the important impact of price level on demand can lead to biased
forecasts. Consider (again) the example of the fare war of the summer of 1993.
The price level of the E7NR fare product was dropped by 50% to a very low level.
The result was a flood of bookings for the E7NR fare product. Clearly the own
price elasticity of demand played an important role in the influence on demand
levels. Cross price elasticity for the E14NR fare product also was needed to
predict the effect on demand levels that occurred during the period. The price of
the E14NR fare product was also dropped to a level identical to the E7NR fare
product and both services were offered on the market simultaneously.
Recalling the properties of the fare product inferiority hierarchy, the demand for
the E14NR fare product should have dropped to zero since the E7NR fare
product is superior. Clearly, the absence of the cross price elasticity relationship
between the E14NR and E7NR fare products resulted in biased demand forecasts
for the two products during the fare war. A correct demand forecast would
predict that all of the demand for the E14NR (in addition to all stimulated
demand) be absorbed by the E7NR fare product. Admittedly the example
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provided by the fare war is extreme, however, it effectively illustrates the need
for the incorporation of price level into the calculation of the demand
distributions that used as input to the airline yield management models.
3.2.5 Importance of Demand Forecasting Improvements
The independence assumption of the fare products still prevails in airline yield
management forecasting. The incorrect characterization of demand biases the
demand forecasts systematically. The data constraints facing the airlines only
allow calculation of imperfect demand distributions made worse by the wide
fluctuations in the levels of price and traffic demand that characterize air travel.
Correction of the major factors affecting demand for air travel may improve
forecasts significantly.
More complex models that consider a greater number of factors that affect
transportation demand can potentially provide an improved method for
capturing passenger demand levels than the independent calculations currently
performed. Any relaxation of the assumptions made by the current airline yield
management demand forecasting modules can lead to improved measurements
and, in turn, improved airline profitability. In the next section, the factors
influencing demand level are incorporated within the current framework of
airline yield management.
3.3 Formulation of Demand Distributions Conditionally Dependent on Price
The calculation of demand distributions can be extended to incorporate the
important factors influencing passenger traffic levels by formulating them as
conditional distributions. With the proper formulation, the conditional
distributions can more correctly represent the expected demand levels for an
expected state of the system. It is hoped that the improved level of demand
calculation given the current state of the system can be input to the yield
management models to produce superior revenue enhancement results. The
conditional distributions can demonstrate the effect of price levels on passenger
demand. In addition, the ability to input different distributions for different
states of the system can allow measurement of the effects of price levels on
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expected revenue. The formulations conditional on price level appear in this
section.
3.3.1 Demand Distributions Conditional on All Price Levels
An ambitious and improved formulation of demand would incorporate all of the
price levels prevailing in the market during the current period. Provided that
enough observations of demand level were available at the prevailing price level,
the distribution conditional upon all fare product price levels would incorporate
the own price and relevant cross price elasticities explicitly. The following
distributions of demand based upon all fare product price levels could be
calculated as:
P(Di) = P(Di IPi , Pj Vjwi)
where Di is equal to passenger demand for fare product i and Pi is the price level
of fare product i. The calculation of the above probability distributions would
require knowledge of the fare levels of all fare products sold in the market
during the current period.
It should be noted that although the conditional demand distributions include
only price levels and not restrictions, the latter attributes may be incorporated
into the models in a similar fashion. However, the stability of the fare product
attributes is likely to make the explicit consideration of restrictions in demand
calculations unnecessary, especially given the costs associated with maintaining
the additional data. Thus, the incorporation of restrictions does not appear here.
The large number of fare products sold on the market and, equivalently, the large
number of fare classes used by airline yield management systems would require
the measurement of many price levels. Because of the large number of price
measures required, the stability of the price levels would become even more of
an issue so that enough observations of demand at the current fare levels would
exist to calculate the conditional distributions. The odds of securing enough
observations for the calculation of such a distribution are very low. As a result,
there is a need to simplify the conditional distribution to have a better chance at a
feasible estimation.
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3.3.2 Demand Distributions Conditional on Own Price Levels
To simplify the estimation, all but the most important price level calculations are
left out. The price level of the product itself is the sole factor that is conditioned
upon to more correctly formulate demand levels in an attempt to meet the data
constraints. Nonetheless, an improvement in the specification would result from
the introduction of the important characteristic of own price level into the
demand calculation. The influence of a fare product's own price level on
demand can be improved over the independence assumption by calculating the
conditional distribution of incremental demand with respect to a product's own
price level. The distribution conditional on own price level is formulated as
follows:
P(Di) = P(Di I P i)
where Di is equal to passenger demand for fare product i and Pi is the price level
of fare product i. The data requirement and length of the forecast horizon would
be reduced for the calculation of the simpler model based only on the own price
relative to the (all) price level model shown previously. Provided that the data
were collected for demand/price level observations occurring in the market, the
conditional probability distributions could be calculated from the historical data.
Unfortunately, several problems highlighted below still complicate the
calculation of the conditional distributions.
3.3.3 Data Requirements
The data for historical fare levels are not stored at present in the yield
management data bases used by most airlines. The data requirements for
calculation of the probability distributions of demand conditional on price levels
are quite large since the fare product structure that characterizes airline OD
markets generally has, at a minimum, three selling fares for the coach class cabin
alone. Also, the observations of demand levels at the currently prevailing price
levels must have been available during the historical time frame maintained by
the data base which, in general, is not yet true. Moreover, the price level data
must be stored for the different fare classes over a long period.
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Maintaining enough observations on each of the available fare products would
require a long period of analysis and large amounts of storage space. The
tradeoff existing between the number of observations collected and the length of
time over which the data are taken must be assessed. Clearly, a large enough
number of observations are required to calculate a probability distribution for
each state of the system, or prevailing fare product structure and set of price
levels.
The period over which data are collected must be long enough to estimate the
parameters as well as providing for reasonable forecast accuracy. For a given
structural state of the system, the more valid observations the better. The
possibility that some type of structural change has occurred in the market
increases with the historical time frame used. Simply stated, the longer the
period over which the data are taken, the more likely a structural change is to
have occurred in the market. In this way, conducting the data collection over a
long period of time would increase the likelihood of econometric problems
compromising the analysis.
The storage costs associated with retaining historical revenue level data
alongside the historical passenger demand data must also be considered.
Passenger booking behavior is currently retained over an approximate two
month basis. The additional requirements of the price level data acquisition and
storage need also be identified and evaluated. As a result of the larger data
requirements associated with calculating conditional distributions, the period of
historical demand (as well as revenue) data that must be used is likely to
increase. The tradeoff between the benefits of improving the formulation of
demand and the increased costs (along with the ability to perform a high quality
conditional distribution estimation) must be evaluated to assess the benefits of an
implementation of conditional demand distributions.
3.3.4 Price Level Measures
To complicate matters further, the measurement of price levels is not outwardly
clear. Proxy measures for price levels are available in the same form as the
revenue inputs to the yield management models -- average revenue per
passenger by fare class. The average revenue per passenger by fare class
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emanates from a ticket coupon sample taken by the carrier operating the yield
management system. Unfortunately, the revenue per passenger figures do not
correspond directly with the fare products sold on the market (although the
influence of the OD market selling fares on realization cannot be denied). The
revenue per passenger figures represent a realization of the price paid instead of
the actual price levels facing consumers. Moreover, if the revenue per passenger
data are used to calculate the distributions, it may be quite difficult to match the
fare levels that were facing the passengers when they purchased air travel with
the concurrent fare class booking behavior.
The problems associated with matching booking behavior with the prevailing
fare product structure make any effort to estimate demand distributions
conditional on price levels difficult. Clearly, the booking behavior that takes
place under a certain fare product structure may not be the same when the
product mix changes. Large scale changes to the price levels of the fare products
even under the same fare product structure may also change the booking
behavior of consumers. Thus, the matching of booking behavior and price levels
is tantamount to accurately calculating the conditional distributions.
A time lag is introduced in the yield management system resulting from the data
acquisition of the revenue per passenger figures. The time lag makes the
matching of the price levels prevailing in the market and the current demand
levels difficult to obtain for the current period. The average revenue per
passenger numbers are not processed until the coupons have been lifted from the
passengers and the data have been cleaned and processed.
The matching of revenue per passenger numbers and traffic numbers may be
improved with the matching of fare products and fare classes. If a single fare
product were associated with a single fare class, the revenue numbers could be
obtained from the current selling fares on the market. The best demand forecasts
would be constructed if the booking limits were set and the data taken for the
individual fare products. The discrepancies between the fare classes would then
disappear. However, the "odd-ball" fares that are posted in many markets along
with the shifting of fare product offerings would add other difficulties to the
problem not encountered with fare class level data.
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There is difficulty in assigning a single selling fare to a fare class in many OD
markets. The calculation of the distributions would require data provided at the
most detailed level with price level stability over a significant time period.
Stability of price levels would be required to calculate the conditional
distributions of the different fare products. This requirement is clearly
unrealistic given what is known about the fluctuations occurring for the fare
products. Thus, actual implementation of one fare product per fare class would
not likely be feasible without a simplification of the system-wide OD market fare
product structure. Attempts at simplification of the fare product structure do not
appear to be sustainable within the current competitive framework as witnessed
by the failed attempt made by American Airlines in 1992.
In the absence of perfect fare class-fare product matching, a weighting of the fare
products by traffic level would be necessary which requires an assumption about
the distribution of demand within the fare classes. Some sort of weighted
average of the fare products within the fare classes might be constructed. The
weighted average would allow an immediate calculation of the fare products
selling in each fare class. The fares available on the market are available to the
airline through the ATPCO data base. Unfortunately, the weighting of the selling
fares on the market by within the fare classes that they are sold may be a more
difficult problem than estimating the conditional distributions.
The airline would need a distribution of fare product sales by fare class and this
measurement would need to be stable over time to provide for an accurate
weighting. The lack of stability and large estimation requirements of such a
weighting scheme are likely to be prohibitive. Thus, the ability to calculate the
distribution of demand by fare product within the fare classes, however, is
beyond the current capabilities of the airline data bases.
In summary, the calculation of demand levels conditional on price levels would
provide an improvement in the forecasting measures. However, the costs
associated with collecting this information coupled with the lack of stability of
the pricing data make the calculation of such a model questionable. In any case,
the barriers to calculation are too large to enable implementation within the
current framework. Thus, an alternative methodology for calculating the effects
of price levels and restrictions on air travel demand and revenue is necessary.
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3.4 Chapter Summary
The chapter began by discussing the factors affecting passenger demand for fare
products to provide the motivation for more correctly specifying demand. The
assumptions of existing airline fare product demand models were then assessed
to motivate the need for a more correct (detailed) calculation of passenger
demand. Demand distributions that are conditional upon price level were then
formulated. Finally, the data needs and practical requirements for the estimation
of the conditional passenger demand distributions were discussed. As a result of
the difficulty associated with the estimation of the conditional distributions, the
need for a more tractable model for passenger demand was clarified. The static
model of passenger demand appearing in the next chapter addresses the fare
product dependency relations.
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Chapter Four
A Static Generalized Cost Model of Airline Fare Product Differentiation
A model is developed with the intention of gaining insight into questions
concerning airline pricing and fare product differentiation. However, since the
dynamic process is too complex to model the problem has been simplified by
modeling it as a static process. Not only does the static assumption allow for a
tractable model, but also provides the ability to test the sensitivity of the
underlying relationships between passengers, revenues, price levels, and
purchase restrictions.
4.1 Modeling Notation and Scope of the Problem
In order to decrease the complexity of the analysis, the scope of the problem
addressed is at the single carrier, single flight level in an isolated OD market.
Coach class cabin service is assumed to be offered exclusively so that, although
passengers are offered a variety of differentiated airline fare products, the level of
in-flight service that each passenger receives is identical.
Each consumer is offered the choice between N differentiated airline fare
products for the flight departure. The fare products decrease in value as
additional purchase restrictions are added. In the notation, fare product 1
represents the full fare, unrestricted ticket while fare product N represents the
most restricted ticket available to consumers. It is assumed that fare product i is
more restricted than fare product i-1.
4.2 Modeling the Demand for More-Restricted Fare Products in Isolation
Imagine that the days of U.S. domestic airline regulation had returned and the
only fare product available for air travel in the origin to destination (OD) market
was the full fare, unrestricted product (referred to as fare product 1). Prior to the
introduction of the "Supersaver" airline fare products in the mid-seventies, such
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a ticket was the only choice in the coach class cabin for U.S. domestic service. A
single product market demand function can be constructed representing the
price level/demand relationship for all passengers aboard the aircraft. In this
scenario, the number of passengers choosing to travel at any single price level
would be:
Q = f1 (P1 ) (4.1)
where
Q = number of passengers purchasing fare product 1
f1(- = market demand function for fare product 1
P1= price of fare product 1 where Pie [0,oo]
In other words, the single price level Pi set for the unrestricted fare product
would result in Q units of demand according to the price-demand relationship
f1(P) prevailing in the market.
Imagine next that the regulatory body ordered the removal of all unrestricted
fare product sales from the OD market. Instead, all purchases of airline fare
products were required to be made at least three days in advance of the flight
departure. A market demand function similar to that of the unrestricted fare
product would exist for the three day advance purchase (AP3) ticket. The market
demand function for the AP3 ticket, called fare product 2, has the form:
Q = f2(P2) (4.2)
with notation analogous to that of the unrestricted fare product demand
function.
Although the two fare products offer the same level of in-flight service, the AP3
fare product possesses a less desirable attribute when compared to the
unrestricted product since passengers are forced to meet the 3 day advance
purchase requirement. This makes the restricted product less valuable to
consumers than the unrestricted fare product. In fact, the restricted product can
never be more valuable than the unrestricted product. Thus, the market demand
function for the more-restricted, less desirable (AP3) product is everywhere
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lower than the unrestricted product because of the degradation in product
quality resulting from the applied purchase restriction. In fact, for any restricted
fare product, consumers experience "degradation costs" associated with
accepting additional purchase restrictions. Mathematically, the expected
difference in market demand is represented by the relation f2(P) 5 f1(P) which
holds for all values of price level P.
Isolated demand functions for other fare products can be motivated similarly to
the AP3 fare product. A series of fare product market demand functions can be
constructed:
Q = fh(Pi (4.3)
each representing a unique characterization of passenger demand subject to
increasing (in i) levels of restrictions. The demand for air travel is lower for fare
products with more restrictions. Since each fare product i+1 has been defined as
more restricted than each fare product i, the demand function for fare product 1
has the property fi+1(P) fi(P) for all values of P. Simply stated, there are fewer
passengers willing to travel at any price level as the fare product offering
becomes more restrictive.
The demand for the more-restricted products, fi(Pi) for all i>1, over the entire
population is somewhat contrived, however, since no rational airline or
regulatory body would needlessly constrain or restrict a product without
justification. The underlying structure of isolated airline fare product demand is,
however, of interest to airlines. Airline fare products are differentiated using
purchase restrictions in an attempt to segment the consumer population. The
next section introduces a model that combines the passenger segmentation ability
of the airline with the underlying demand structure to more correctly
characterize airline fare product differentiation.
4.3 Basic Airline Fare Product Differentiation Model Framework
Airlines place restrictions on their fare products in order to identify and segment
passengers on the basis of their willingness to pay for air travel. The
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segmentation relies upon the airline's ability to capitalize on the relative
sensitivities of passengers to fare product attributes such as convenience and
flexibility. The fences described in Chapter One gave a detailed look into the
techniques used by airlines to achieve such a market segmentation.
The model proposed in this section assumes that by designing the purchase
restrictions associated with each less-desirable fare product, the airline has the
ability to perfectly segment the consumer population into N subgroups given the
prevailing price levels Pi for the N differentiated fare products. The subgroups
are assumed to be ordered by willingness to pay with their members possessing
similar sensitivities to fare product attributes. Although helpful for a more clear
exposition of the basic model, the ability of the airline to perfectly identify and
segment the demand population is relaxed later in the chapter.
Degradation costs resulting from the passenger segmentation devices are
explicitly considered in the modeling framework. The degradation costs that are
incurred by consumers only serve to lower the demand in the N-1 restricted fare
product subgroups ceteris paribus. Including degradation costs incurred by
passengers resulting from the imposed purchase restrictions represents a more
realistic view of the airline fare product differentiation problem than that
provided by the standard monopoly price discrimination model described in
Chapter Two (e.g. Kahn, 1970). The incorporation of the imperfections associated
with self-selection devices in airline attempts to segment the consumer
population more correctly represents current industry practice. In this way,
explicit consideration of degradation costs extends the airline yield management
literature.
The modeling framework of airline fare product differentiation presented here is
motivated first using a simple example in which passengers must choose
between three fare products. The three fare product example is then extended to
model the general N fare product case. In the first example, the three fare
products must be designed by the airline to identify and segment the population
by their willingness to pay. Fare product 1 (as in all cases) has no attached
purchase restrictions. Assume that fare products 2 and 3 have advance purchase
requirements of three and seven days, respectively, and fare product 3 also
requires a round trip purchase with a Saturday night stay. The assumption of
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specific restrictions for fare products 2 and 3 is solely for the sake of expository
clarity; fare products 2 and 3 may represent any two restricted fare products. In
the three fare product examples presented, fare products 1, 2, and 3 are
sometimes referred to as FP1, FP2, and FP3, respectively.
4.3.1 Three Fare Product Model
The model of the three fare product market uses the isolated fare product
demand functions to build a representation of OD market demand. The
passenger demand populations for the three fare products are determined one
after the other according to an assumed passenger fencing structure. The final
passenger demand resulting for the OD market is then derived using the fare
product differentiation model and a set of fare product price levels.
To correctly specify the model, the isolated market demand functions for the
three fare products must have the property:
f3(P) < f2(P) f1(P) (4.4)
for all values of P. In other words, at any single price level, passengers prefer
fare product 1 to fare product 2 which, in turn, is preferred to fare product 3.
These inequality relations guarantee that the isolated fare product demand
functions never cross (although they may meet).
The model begins by assuming that only the unrestricted fare product (1) is
offered for sale in the OD market. A price level P1 is set and the airline expects
Q1= fi(Pi) passengers to request a seat, as previously motivated. Referring to
the demand function in Figure 4.1, it is clear that the Q1 passengers possessing
the highest willingness to pay for air travel of the entire demand population
purchase the unrestricted fare product.
Passengers purchasing the unrestricted product are believed to be extremely
sensitive to fare product attributes (i.e., having no advance purchase or Saturday
night stay requirement). Historical bookings of unrestricted (high-priced) fare
products support this belief. In the model, the Q1 fare product 1 passengers are
assumed to unconditionally prefer the unrestricted product when it is offered at
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Isolated Demand for the
Unrestricted Fare Product
Pi
Unrestricted
fi(P)
Qi
Q1
Figure 4.1 - Isolated Demand for the Unrestricted Fare Product
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price level P1. The Q1 passengers with the greatest willingness to pay are, in
effect, assumed captive to the unrestricted fare product. Or, they can be thought
of as subject to a perfect fence.
Next, the fare product 2 is made available to passengers wishing to travel in the
OD market and offered alongside the unrestricted fare product. The fare product
2 demand function is equal to the portion of the isolated FP2 demand function
(similar to the AP3 demand function motivated in the previous section) to the
right of the first Q1 passengers, as shown in Figure 4.2. To prevent a double
counting of the individual passengers that make up the fare product 2 market
demand function, there must exist a one to one correspondence between the Q1
passengers captive to the unrestricted fare product and the first Q1 passengers, in
order of willingness to pay, on the isolated fare product 2 demand function. In
other words, the passengers willing to pay the most for the unrestricted fare
product must also be the ones willing to pay the most for fare product 2.
When a price level P2 is set, passenger demand for fare product 2 is calculated
using the formula Q2 = f2(P2) - Q1. For the airline, an additional Q2 passenger
requests result from the introduction of fare product 2 onto the market. The
incremental passengers are willing to travel using fare product 2 at the price level
P2 but were not willing to pay P1 for the unrestricted fare product. Similar to the
Q1 captive fare product 1 passengers, the Q2 fare product 2 passengers are
assumed to prefer that product to any more-restricted fare product based on
their sensitivities to fare product attributes.
Finally, fare product 3 is offered for sale to the remaining passengers in the
market. The portion of the demand population interested in purchasing fare
product 3 has been reduced by Q1 + Q2 passengers as a result of offering the fare
products 1 and 2 to the more flexibility-sensitive consumers. The demand
function for fare product 3 is equal to the portion of the isolated FP3 demand
function to the right of the initial Q1 + Q2 passengers, as shown in Figure 4.3.
Setting the price level P 3 will attract Q3 = f3(P3) - Q1 - Q2 passengers for fare
product 3. Again, a one to one correspondence of individual passengers along
the three demand functions is assumed.
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Demand for Fare Product Two
4-
Unrestricted
fl(P)
FP2
Figure 4.2 - Demand for Fare Product Two
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It should be noted that the case in which fj(Pj) ; fW(Pi), where fare product j is
more restricted than i, is assumed never to occur. Under that scenario, the
demand for the more-restricted fare product j would be less than that of the less-
restricted fare product i This would result in no demand for fare product j under
the assumed passenger segmentation scheme. Since the passenger segmentation
schemes available to airlines are not very fine-grained, however, this case is
unlikely to occur in practice. Thus, little generality is lost by ignoring this
degenerate case.
In summary, given the price levels P1, P2, and P3, the total demand for the flight
departure is simply the sum of the Q1, Q2, and Q3 passengers purchasing fare
products 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A representation of passenger demand for the
market in the three fare product model appears in Figure 4.4. The revenue
contribution from each fare product is represented in the shaded regions of the
figure. Moving from left to right in the figure, the 3 shaded boxes represent the
contributions of the unrestricted fare product (P1Q1), fare product 2 (P2Q2), and
fare product 3 (P3Q3). The Q1 + Q2 + Q3 passengers make a total revenue
contribution of P1Qi + P2Q2 + P3Q3 to the airline.
Welfare and consumer surplus implications can also be calculated directly from
the three fare product model. The consumer surplus associated with each fare
product is simply the area between the fare product demand function and the
horizontal fare product price level line over the range of passengers purchasing
that fare product. Thus, even with a perfect passenger segmentation, some
surplus is returned to consumers.
Figure 4.5 shows the consumer surplus associated with each fare product in a
three fare product example constructed using isolated linear fare product
demand functions (for expository simplicity). The lightly shaded triangle areas
labeled CS1, CS2, and CS3 in the figure represent the consumer surplus
associated with fare products 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Mathematically, the
consumer surplus associated with each of the three fare products is:
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01
Consumer Surplus 1 = fj(q)dq - P1Q1  (4.5)
0
Q1+Q2
Consumer Surplus 2 = f2 (q)dq - P2Q2 (4.6)
Q1
Q1+Q2+Q3
Consumer Surplus 3 = f3 (q)dq - P3Q3 (4.7)
J 1+Q2
where the variables are defined as before. The isolated fare product demand
functions Qi = fi(Pi) are assumed to be invertible.
To demonstrate the inefficiencies caused by the degradation costs resulting from
0 applied purchase restrictions on an OD market, the welfare loss experienced for a
given composition of passenger demand by fare product is analyzed. The price
levels in the case considering degradation costs are set to levels which maintain
the composition of passenger demand for each fare product occurring in the zero
degradation cost case. In other words, price levels are modified to carry the same
number of passengers (by fare product) when degradation costs are imposed as
in the zero degradation cost case. Both revenue and welfare losses result for a
constant passenger mix when degradation costs are introduced to the model.
The lower value of system welfare from the generalized cost model assuming
degradation costs may be subtracted from the welfare value in the zero
degradation cost case to provide the deadweight welfare loss (as defined in this
dissertation). All subsequent discussions of lost welfare examine the losses
incurred by a like passenger mix when degradation costs are incorporated (using
a similar methodology).
At the fare product level, the welfare loss associated with each more-restricted
fare product is equal to the area between the isolated unrestricted fare product
demand function and the more-restricted fare product demand function over the
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Representation of OD Market Demand
Three Fare Product Example
FP1
FP2
FP3
101.1 - *-I
Figure 4.4 - Representation of OD Market Demand - Three Fare Product
Example
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Generalized Cost Model
Three Fare Product Example
Consumer Surplus Calculation
FP1
FP2
FP3
Q1 Q2 Q3
Figure 4.5 - Generalized Cost Model Three Fare Product Example - Consumer
Surplus Calculation
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Pi
range of passengers purchasing that fare product. Mathematically, the welfare
losses resulting from the purchase restrictions accompanying fare products 2 and
3 are:
01+Q2
Welfare Loss2 = Q fi (q) - f2' (q)] dq (4.8)
Q1+Q2+03
Welfare Loss3 = fQ+Q2 if (q) - f3 (q)]dq (4.9)
The welfare loss associated with a single fare product can be calculated since the
composition of passengers by fare product is maintained in the example. Recall
that the ordering of passengers by willingness to pay is maintained from fare
product to fare product. It should also be noted that there is no deadweight
welfare loss associated with fare product 1 since it is without purchase
restrictions.
In the three fare product example with linear demands shown in Figure 4.6, the
price levels P1, P2zdc, and P3zdc represent the price levels that are charged to
obtain the passenger mix Q1, Q2, and Q3 in the model with zero degradation
costs. The price levels P1, P2, and P3 represent the price levels charged in the
market to maintain the identical passenger mix (Q1, Q2, Q3) when degradation
costs are introduced to the model. The welfare loss to the market associated with
the fare product 2 degradation costs is represented by the hatched area labeled
WL22 in Figure 4.6. The loss associated with the fare product 3 degradation
costs, on the other hand, is the sum of the hatched areas labeled WL32 and WL33
in the figure. The area WL32 represents the deadweight welfare loss associated
with the purchase restriction bundle accompanying fare product 2 (as well as
fare product 3) while the area WL33 represents the loss associated with the
purchase restriction bundle accompanying only fare product 3.
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Generalized Cost Model
Three Fare Product Example
Welfare Implications
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Figure 4.6 - Generalized Cost Model Three Fare Product Example - Welfare
Implications
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4.3.2 General N Fare Product Model
Assessing the impacts of the fare product mix on traffic and revenue is
contingent upon the ability to model all available fare products offered for sale
on the market. Since airlines offer seemingly countless fare products in as many
as fifteen different fare classes, the usefulness of the model depends upon the
ability to extend it beyond the trivial cases. The simple three fare product model
is extended to characterize the market demand in the general N fare product case
in this section.
In the general case, N differentiated fare products are offered for sale in the OD
market. The fare products must conform to the inferiority hierarchy motivated
in Chapter One which requires that less-restricted fare products be equivalent or
superior in all attributes except price level. A representation of market demand
for the N fare product case is constructed using the N isolated fare product
demand functions, the perfect passenger segmentation assumption, and a set of
N fare product price levels. The methodology is similar to that used in the three
fare product example.
As previously motivated, the isolated market demand functions for the N
differentiated fare products are progressively lower as the fare products become
increasingly restricted. Mathematically, the N isolated market demand functions
must have the property:
fN(P). - - < fi+1(P) < fi(P) ... 5 f1(P) (4.10)
for all values of P, where N is the most restricted fare product. This assumption
ensures that the isolated demand functions used to build the final N fare product
representation of market demand do not cross at any point resulting from non-
rational consumer preferences.
Using the structure of the isolated demand functions, passenger demand can be
allocated to the N fare products by assuming the ability of the airline to perfectly
identify and segment the total demand population into N fare product
subpopulations. Perfect segmentation assumes that passengers who are willing
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to purchase a fare product are prevented from purchasing all more-restricted fare
products as a result of their sensitivities to fare product attributes.
In the N fare product case, the passenger demand for any fare product i is given
by the equation:
Qi = fi(Pi) - Y Qj V ie N (4.11)
j<i
In other words, the number of passengers requesting fare product i is equal to
the number of passengers that would have purchased fare product i at price level
Pi had it been the only product on the market minus the number of passengers
who are captive to one of the less-restricted fare products.
As before, a one to one correspondence must exist between the Qi passengers
captive to fare product i and the Qi passengers with the related willingness to
pay on the isolated market demand function for each increasingly restricted fare
product (products i+1, . . . , N) to prevent double counting of individual
passenger requests. Simply stated, the difference in the demand function must
be assumed to maintain the order of willingness to pay at the level of the
individual passenger. This requirement ensures that only the segmented
passengers are removed from the more-restricted fare product demand
functions. The remaining passengers are eligible to purchase a more-restricted
fare product.
The N price levels will determine the shape of the representation of market
demand as in the three fare product case. The price levels that are set for the N
fare products must be strictly decreasing with increased restrictions. A case of
simple dominance would result if a higher fare were charged for a more-
restricted fare product. It is logical, assuming perfect information, that a
dominated product will have no demand and can be ignored.
Setting the price levels Pi attracts Qi passengers for each fare product i. The
representation of market demand for the flight in the N fare product case can be
constructed, given the price levels Pi for i = 1, . . . , N. The sum of all passengers
using all fare products is :
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N
Qtotal = Qi
i=1
(4.12)
which gives the total demand for seats on the aircraft Qtotal. A total revenue
contribution to the airline of:
N
Rev total = X PiQi (4.13)
i=1
is made by these Qtotal passengers.
The consumer surplus associated with fare product i is calculated as:
I j
Consumer Surplus i =
j<i
fi (q)dq - PiQi
where each fare product j is less restricted than fare product i. The welfare
associated with each fare product i is :
1Qi
Welfare i = fi' (q)dq
j<i
(4.14)
(4.15)
while the deadweight welfare loss associated with each more-restricted fare
product i equals:
Welfare Lossi = J, Qjf-l@(q) - (il(q)Jdq
j<i
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(4.16)
where all variables and functions are defined as previously. Summing the
consumer surplus associated with each fare product yields the total consumer
surplus for the market. Market totals for welfare and welfare loss can be
calculated analogously.
4.3.3 Review of the Basic Model Assumptions
This section has presented the framework for the model of airline fare product
differentiation developed in this dissertation. Several assumptions have been
made that should be made dear to the reader. To clarify the assumptions made
in the model, they are listed below:
1) Single flight
2) Single carrier (no competition)
3) Single OD market
4) Single cabin of in-flight service
5) N differentiated fare products
6) Each fare product i+1 is more restricted than fare product i
7) Airlines develop fare products to perfectly identify and segment the
population into subgroups by their willingness to pay
8) Subgroups are ordered by the willingness to pay of their members
9) A one to one correspondence exists between passengers on all isolated
fare product demand functions
10) Invertible isolated demand functions
11) Price levels decrease with increased restrictions
12) Passengers incur costs associated with accepting additional purchase
restrictions
13) Demand functions are always non-negative
14) Demand functions are non-increasing in Pi
The assumption that passengers incur costs associated with additional purchase
restrictions (12) and the one to one correspondence existing between passengers
on the invertible isolated demand functions (9 and 10) are the major differences
compared to the assumptions of the standard monopoly price discrimination
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model presented in Chapter Two. The balance of the assumptions are quite
standard and straightforward.
4.4 Differences in Demand Functions: Incorporating Generalized Costs
Having motivated the framework for a static fare product differentiation model,
it remains to make a version of the model operational. Since the motivated
framework relies upon differing demand functions, the form of these differences
must be quantified. But first, the major factors causing the demand function
differences must be uncovered. A closer analysis of the reasons that air travel
demand decreases for the more-restricted fare products will help to determine
the nature of the demand differences.
The impacts of purchase restrictions on demand should be focused upon since,
other than price level, the airline fare products considered here differ only by the
level and severity of their restrictions. Two major effects that cause the demand
functions for the more-restricted fare products to be lower relative to the less-
restricted are 1) the possibility that the restrictions make the fare product
unavailable to certain highly inflexible consumers and 2) the costs incurred by
passengers associated with the inconvenience of the increased restrictions.
Availability effects have been assumed to have no effect on the calculation of the
underlying demand function in the modeling framework. The possibility that
certain fare products are unavailable to some consumers can be addressed
alternatively by applying fences, capacity constraints, and booking limits to the
underlying passenger demand functions. The universal fare product availability
assumption is relaxed later in the chapter using the yield management
techniques previously discussed. At present, however, all passengers are
assumed to be able to purchase all fare products (although certain passengers
have preferences among the fare products).
Unlike availability, the inconvenience associated with accepting an additional
restriction is explicitly considered in the motivated passenger demand
framework. The value that consumers have for air travel is expected to decrease
as the level of restrictions on the fare products they seek to purchase increases.
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The value decrease of the fare products is the primary cause for the demand
functions to be lower for those consumers choosing to travel. Looked at another
way, passengers incur a cost associated with the decreased convenience they
experience due to the increased purchase restrictions facing them.
An example of potential costs incurred by air travelers associated with an
increased level of purchase restrictions involves excursion-type tickets. When a
fare product requires a Saturday night stay, the passenger is likely to incur a cost
associated with spending an additional night in the same city. The cost may be
thought of in terms of an extra night of hotel, day of rental car, and three
additional meals, for example. More detailed measures might include the
opportunity cost associated with a salesman remaining in a city an additional
day versus traveling to another city with greater sales opportunities. Regardless
of the factors considered, such costs drive the relative differences of the more-
restricted fare product demand functions.
If each consumer is assumed to pay a cost associated with accepting an
additional purchase restriction, the demand function for each increasingly
restricted fare product i is lower according to a cost function, ci(-), relative to fare
product i-1. The function ci(e) models the cost, referred to as the degradation
cost, associated with accepting any purchase restrictions attached to fare product
i that do not apply to fare product i-1. From the perspective of the consumer, it is
as though the cost of the fare product has increased by the cost of meeting the
increased purchase restrictions. For the airline, the cost incurred by passengers
for accepting an additional restriction bundle translates into a lower-than-
expected demand level for a given price level (had no cost been imposed on
consumers). In other words, the passenger is paying a higher price for air travel
but the airline is not earning any additional revenue as a result.
In order to construct an operational form of the motivated model, a functional
form must be chosen for the cost function that both adheres to the assumptions of
the modeling framework and accurately reflects the travel inconvenience
experienced by passengers. The form of the cost function must not violate any of
the assumptions of the model to ensure the validity of the motivated demand
function. As with any demand function, the number of passengers requesting
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service is constrained to be no less than zero at any price level. When
incorporating the cost function, the demand function must satisfy the following:
Qi = fi(Pi , ck(- ) Vksi) 2 0 (4.17)
for all fare products i over the relevant ranges of Pi and ci. In addition, the
demand function fi(Pi, ck(e) Vksi) must be strictly non-increasing in Pi for all
fare products iG N that are available in the OD market.
Finally, the ordering of passengers by their willingness to pay must be preserved
for each more-restricted fare product demand function. In order for the
willingness to pay hierarchy in the representation of market demand to remain
intact, the ordering must be preserved at the level of the individual passenger.
To ensure this, the cost differential between any two passengers may not exceed
their differential in willingness to pay. This requirement will guarantee that,
although the willingness to pay of passengers may change, no two passengers
will change places in the willingness to pay hierarchy for the flight departure.
4.4.1 Generalized Cost Model - Joint Price Level Optimization Formulation
The generalized cost model can be used to calculate the optimal price levels for a
given fare product structure. The basic form of the optimization appears below:
N
Max R = I PiQi
i=1
Subject to:
NX Qi Cap
i=1
Qi 20 for i=1,...,N
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where R = total revenue
Qi = number of seats allocated to fare product i
Pi = average fare charged to fare product i
N = total number of fare products
Cap = total aircraft capacity
ck = cost associated with accepting the restriction
bundle accompanying fare product k
The objective seeks to maximize total revenues for all fare products subject to an
aircraft capacity constraint and demand level non-negativity constraints.
The generalized cost modeling framework requires that a passenger demand
specification of the form:
Qi = f(Pi , ck(. ) Vksi) - I f(Pj, ck(- ) Vksj) (4.18)
j<i
be assumed and substituted into the objective function. The joint price level
optimization program can then be solved for the N fare product case using non-
linear optimization techniques. The result would be the optimal price levels for
each fare product and the resulting number of passengers expected to purchase
them.
4.4.2 Limiting Cases of the Generalized Cost Model
The asymptotic limits provide some useful insight to the basic structure
underlying the generalized cost model. Figure 4.7 shows the limit as the costs
associated with accepting the purchase restrictions on the lower-priced fare
products approaches zero in the three fare product case. If the costs associated
with accepting the additional restrictions on all of the N fare products are zero,
the model is identical to the standard monopoly price discrimination model
described in Chapter Two. Thus, the standard monopoly price discrimination
model is simply a special case of the generalized cost model.
A fare product structure having zero degradation costs for all fare products
represents the best case scenario for the airlines since the demand functions do
141
Generalized Cost Model
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Figure 4.7 - Generalized Cost Model With No Degradation Costs - Three Fare
Product Example
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f1(P)
not differ with the increased purchase restrictions. Airlines should strive to
develop fare product restrictions that impose the least cost on consumers (when
passenger segmentation devices are assumed to be perfect) to limit the
magnitude of the demand function reductions of the restricted fare products.
More passengers choose to travel at a given price level, or conversely, the same
number of passengers travel at a higher fare level when degradation costs
decrease.
As the cost associated with accepting the additional bundle of restrictions on a
fare product becomes very large, on the other hand, the demand for the more-
restricted fare products is driven to zero. At the extreme, the model becomes
similar to a single product demand function as the costs associated with all but
the unrestricted fare product are very large (approach infinity). This is
intuitively pleasing since extreme costs to consumers are expected to drive the
demand for any product to zero. Therefore, a single product market model is
also a special case of the generalized cost model. It is interesting to note that
when the number of fare products considered is one, then a single product
demand function exists in the market as well. In any case, airlines should be
aware that large perceived degradation costs prevent them from price
discriminating in a way that maximizes revenue. Development of effective
passenger segmentation devices (e.g. differentiated fare products) that impose
realistic costs on consumers is required to earn incremental revenues through
price discrimination even when optimizing price levels.
4.4.3 Pareto Optimality and the Generalized Cost Model
In the limiting case where the degradation costs are equal to zero for each of the
more-restricted fare products, Pareto optimality can exist. A Pareto optimal
situation occurs when no consumer can be made better off by employing a
different product allocation process. To achieve a Pareto optimal solution in the
case of fare product differentiation, the price level of the unrestricted fare
product must not exceed its price level had no other fare product been offered on
the market. Although Pareto optimality is by no means guaranteed in the case of
zero degradation costs, it is possible.
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In contrast, Pareto optimality cannot exist when passengers incur degradation
costs as a result of the imposed purchase restrictions. The deadweight welfare
loss that occurs from passengers purchasing restricted fare products for which
they experience degradation costs prevents the allocation of the available seats
from being Pareto optimal. This is clear since an airline seat allocation in which
no degradation costs are incurred would unambiguously benefit all consumers
purchasing the restricted fare products.
A limiting case of the generalized cost model can result in a Pareto optimal
situation. As degradation costs approach infinity, demand for the restricted fare
products is driven to zero. In this case, society does not bear the deadweight
welfare loss resulting from degradation costs since no passenger purchases any
of the restricted fare products. The generalized cost model with infinite
degradation costs mirrors the single, unrestricted fare product case and Pareto
optimality exists for the market when only a single fare product is offered since
no passenger can be made better off by a change in the allocation process. Even
one passenger purchasing a restricted fare product with a non-zero degradation
cost, however, would result in a loss of the Pareto optimal solution.
It is unlikely that Pareto optimality exists under the current practice of airline
fare product differentiation. Lower-priced, more-restricted fare products are
sold to passengers and passengers do incur costs associated with accepting the
attached purchase restrictions. Since many passengers incur degradation costs as
the result of the purchase restrictions introduced into the allocation process by
the fare product differentiating airlines, societal welfare is reduced and thus, the
Pareto optimal solution is lost. Simply stated, price discrimination techniques
that impose costs upon consumers in order to segment them can never result in a
Pareto optimal situation.
Previous works have hypothesized that Pareto optimality can exist with airline
fare product differentiation (e.g. Belobaba, 1987) based upon analysis using the
standard monopoly price discrimination model as a market characterization.
The standard monopoly price discrimination model does not, however, take into
account the costs incurred by passengers as a result of the imposed purchase
restrictions. The generalized cost model takes into account these degradation
costs which, in turn, prevent Pareto optimality from being achieved. Thus, the
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only versions of the generalized cost model under which Pareto optimality can
be achieved are those that impose no degradation costs on the consumer
population.
From a Pareto optimality standpoint, airline fare product differentiation is not
completely justified unless a segmentation technique which imposes no
degradation costs on consumers can be developed. The result of its application
would, of course, need to be shown to be Pareto optimal. Airlines do, however,
have incentive to develop fare products which minimize degradation costs since
any improvement towards achieving Pareto optimality translates directly into
increased revenue. The revenue incentive provides the mechanism for change
and, potentially, the achievement of a Pareto optimal situation through
improvements in the fare product structure. The reader is reminded that Pareto
optimality is not the sole measure of efficiency that benefits society. The benefits
provided by allocative efficiency (as discussed in Chapter Two of this
dissertation) are achievable under the current structure of airline fare product
differentiation and revenue management.
4.5 Specifying a Form for the Generalized Costs
To make the generalized cost model operational, a specific functional form must
be assumed for the degradation costs facing consumers. In this section, three
different functional forms are proposed. The three models presented incorporate
the costs associated with consumer inconvenience while satisfying the
assumptions of the motivated framework. Each form can be used to characterize
the impact of purchase restrictions on passenger demand making different
assumptions about the nature of the degradation costs facing consumers. Not
only does the generalized cost model contribute the first explicit consideration of
the costs incurred by passengers that result from applied purchase restrictions to
appear in the airline yield management literature, it also allows for the flexible
specification of those degradation costs.
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4.5.1 Constant Cost Model
Many of the out-of-pocket costs incurred by consumers faced with an additional
purchase restriction are similar. For instance, the cost associated with an extra
night in a hotel, an extra day of the rental car, and three additional meals can be
assumed approximately equal for all consumers. The constant cost model
assumes that each consumer pays an identical and constant fixed cost associated
with accepting each additional purchase restriction. In other words, the form of
the cost function (or demand difference) for each of the isolated restricted fare
product demand functions is a constant. The constant cost, of course, can be
varied to represent different levels of consumer inconvenience.
The relationships between the isolated restricted fare product demand functions
can be specified using an assumption about cost and the fare product inferiority
hierarchy. In the constant cost model, the demand function for a more-restricted
fare product is lower by a constant amount for any given price level when
compared to the next-less-restricted fare product. In other words, the price that
passengers are willing to pay for the more-restricted fare product i is reduced by
a constant, ci, when compared to the less-restricted fare product i-1:
fi(P) = fi1 (Pi + ci) (4.19)
where ci is the cost to all consumers of accepting the additional restrictions
placed on fare product i not found in the less-restricted fare product i-1.
Returning to the three fare product example, the relative positions of the isolated
demand functions are presented in Figure 4.8. In the figure, the demand function
for fare product 2 is lower by the value c2 when compared to the unrestricted
product while the demand function for fare product 3 is lower by c3 relative to
fare product 2. The degradation cost c2 would be incurred by passengers as a
result of being required to meet the 3 day advance purchase restriction if, for
example, fare product 2 were an AP3 fare product. The cost c3 would measure
the added burden to passengers of extending the advance purchase requirement
an extra 4 days, requiring a round trip purchase, and imposing a Saturday night
stay at the destination if fare product 3 were an E7NR fare product.
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In the isolated demand functions for the more-restricted fare products, it is clear
that the ordering of individual passengers by their willingness to pay is not
altered since the cost incurred by each individual consumer is identical. Simple
mathematics tells us that the subtraction of a constant from all members of a
strictly ordered set (of integers) will not change the rankings of its members.
Thus, the identical passenger ordering assumption required in the modeling
framework is preserved in the constant cost model.
Once the constant cost associated with accepting each additional purchase
restriction has been identified, the demand functions for all fare products can be
determined from any single fare product demand function. Since all passengers
receive the same in-flight amenities and the fare products differ only in the
applied purchase restrictions, it is convenient to think of the more-restricted fare
products as being derived from the unrestricted fare product. In this framework,
the demand function for the unrestricted fare product provides an upper bound
on the number of passengers wishing to travel on the single flight offered in the
isolated OD market at any price level P because the unrestricted product
represents the best possible service option.
The only two sets of information required to calculate the isolated demand
functions for all N airline fare products are 1) the unrestricted fare product
demand function and 2) the N costs imposed by each additional purchase
restriction bundle. Since no cost is incurred by consumers as a result of
purchasing the unrestricted fare product, the value ci is set to zero. In terms of
the unrestricted fare product, the isolated demand function for any other fare
product i can be calculated as:
fi(Pi)= f1 (Pi + t) (4.20)
where ti represents the total degradation cost associated with fare product i
relative to the unrestricted fare product. It should be noted that if the entire fare
product structure were in place, the total degradation cost associated with fare
product i, ti, would be equal to I cj. As before, fi(e) represents the isolated
jsi
unrestricted fare product demand function. A specific three fare product
example demonstrates the relation between the more-restricted products and the
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unrestricted fare product with Figure 4.8 showing that fare product 2 is lower by
t2 = C2 compared to the unrestricted product while fare product 3 is lower by t3 =
C2 + C3.
Under the assumption of perfect passenger identification and segmentation,
setting the price levels for the N differentiated fare products enables the
calculation of the demand on the flight departure. The number of passengers
purchasing fare product i at any given price level Pi is calculated according to
equation 4.11. Substituting the unrestricted fare product demand function and
the costs incurred by consumers (equation 4.20) into the general modeling
framework passenger demand equation (equation 4.11) yields the passenger
demand for any fare product i in terms of the unrestricted fare product demand
function and the costs of the restriction bundles:
Qi = fi(Pi + ti) - I Qj V ie N (4.21)
j<i
where each j represents a fare product that is less restricted than fare product i
and ti represents the total degradation cost associated with fare product i relative
to the unrestricted fare product. The demand for the N differentiated fare
products can now be calculated along with the revenue generated.
4.5.2 Increasing Cost Model
The constant cost model is by no means the only specification of perceived airline
fare product degradation costs that can be incorporated into the generalized cost
framework. In certain situations, the cost incurred may differ by passenger
rather than being constant. For instance, while the cost incurred for an extra day
of rental car and hotel is well represented as a fixed and constant cost, the
opportunity cost associated with spending a Saturday night away would be
expected to vary with the value of time of a particular individual. Since the value
of time is expected to vary greatly between individuals, a variable cost would
seem to be a more appropriate representation of the opportunity cost incurred by
an individual. In cases where the opportunity costs associated with a bundle of
restrictions dominate the out-of-pocket costs, a variable cost specification may be
preferable.
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It would seem logical that larger value of time costs would be positively
correlated with higher values of willingness to pay. Certainly, travel itinerary
flexibility has more importance to individuals who place greater value on their
time. Passengers having high values of willingness to pay are expected to be
affected to a greater extent by the restrictions that seek to limit their travel
itinerary flexibility. In this case, it may be appropriate to model the fare product
degradation costs facing consumers as an increasing function of willingness to
pay. In the generalized cost framework, a model can be constructed by assuming
that the cost associated with accepting increased purchase restrictions is an
increasing function of willingness to pay.
The increasing cost model described in this section allows for the calculation of
the passenger demand function for the N fare products offered in the market
with increasing costs to passengers depending upon their willingness to pay for
air travel. Mathematically, the cost functions ci(Qi) must be non-increasing in Qi
for all fare products ieN where Qi represents the vector of passenger demands
Qi= (Qj: j = 1, . . . , i). The preservation of the motivated demand function
required for the generalized cost model relies upon the form of costs facing
consumers not disrupting the ordering of consumers by their willingness to pay.
As before, the ordering of the individual passengers by their values of
willingness to pay must remain the same across all restricted fare product
demand functions. Thus, any non-increasing cost function ci(Qi) can be used in
the model, provided that no two passengers switch places on the demand
function fi(Pi). Unfortunately, the passenger willingness to pay ordering is not
guaranteed for all increasing cost functions as it was in the constant cost model.
Thus, the cost function must be checked to determine if it satisfies the ordinality
condition for consumer willingness to pay.
Finally, the computational burden associated with the increasing cost model is
expected to be greater than that of the constant cost model because a function
associated with the incremental cost of each restricted fare product must be
obtained instead of a simple constant. The ability to obtain a serviceable cost
function that correctly represents the experience of passengers must be weighed
against the benefits of using a variable cost model.
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4.5.3 Constant and Increasing Cost Model
While compelling cases can be made for both the constant and increasing cost
models as the most appropriate form of consumer costs, a model incorporating
both types of costs is better still. The constant and increasing cost model
incorporates both an increasing cost component and a constant cost component
in the analysis. The two term degradation cost specification provides increased
modeling flexibility.
The cost function Ci(Qi) = ki + ci(Qi) presented in this version of the model
accounts for the constant cost incurred by passengers in the constant term ki, as
well as the increasing cost captured by the function ci(Qi). Together, the two cost
terms capture both the fixed costs associated with restrictions that are incurred
by all passengers as well as the costs that differ by individual. The assumption of
passengers having higher values of willingness to pay incurring greater costs
remains for the variable cost component and, thus, the cost function overall. As
in the previous model specifications, passengers may not switch places on the
demand function in terms of willingness to pay. The requirements to preserve
ordinality are analogous to those of the increasing cost model since the two
models differ only by the inclusion of the constant cost term which has no effect
on order.
Unfortunately, the calculation of the cost functions associated with the different
fare products becomes increasingly difficult with the additional flexibility in the
framework. The increased data requirement associated with the more flexible
formulation may prove prohibitive in practice.
4.6 Modeling Passenger Diversion
To this point, the ability of the airline to identify and segment passengers by their
willingness to pay has been implicit in the model. Although airlines would like
to believe that such a segmentation is possible, consumers and airlines alike
know that passengers can avoid even the most elaborate segmentation schemes.
In the airline industry, passenger buy down behavior has been called diversion.
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This section addresses the ability of passengers to avoid airline segmentation by
incorporating diversion into the generalized cost model.
The section begins with a motivation of passenger diversion behavior. Next, the
treatment of passenger diversion in the airline yield management literature is
reviewed. Passenger diversion is then incorporated into the generalized cost
model of airline fare product differentiation for the general N fare product case.
The passenger diversion measure is extended to allow for the diversion of fare
product passengers as a function of factors such as fare product price
differentials. Finally, the limiting cases of passenger diversion are discussed.
4.6.1 Passenger Diversion Motivation
The nature of airline fare product differentiation must be examined to correctly
motivate passenger diversion to the lower-priced fare products. In the current
airline environment, almost everyone who has considered the purchase of air
travel has been offered an array of fare products from which to choose. The
many fare products have resulted from the use of second degree price
discrimination or "self-selection" techniques by airlines to identify and segment
the consumer population on the basis of their willingness to pay.
Airlines attempt to segment passengers through a fare product design scheme
that is based on the belief that willingness to pay and the ability to meet purchase
restrictions are highly correlated. The purchase restrictions accompanying the
fare products are intended to make passengers self-select into mutually exclusive
market segments based on their sensitivity to travel itinerary flexibility. It is the
hope of airlines that all consumers choose the most expensive fare products
within their travel budget as a result of the purchase restrictions making the less
expensive options unattractive to them.
Unfortunately for the airlines, the self-selection techniques that they employ are
quite fallible. With passenger diversion, as is often true of imperfections in
market segmentation attempts, surplus is returned to the consumer at the
expense of airline revenue. Passengers commonly purchase air travel services at
prices significantly below what they are willing to pay. Price-insensitive
passengers frequently can meet the restrictions accompanying the lower-priced
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fare products and, thus, are able to buy down. For instance, if a business traveler
knows more than a week in advance of a given flight departure that his travel
plans are firm, he can purchase a three or seven day advance purchase fare
product in lieu of the unrestricted fare product. The discount purchase occurs
even though the traveler may have been willing to purchase the unrestricted
product in the absence of an alternative.
The strict definition of passenger diversion in this dissertation refers to a
consumer purchasing a lower-priced fare product than is intended by the airline
in its attempt to price discriminate. To have incentive to divert, the perceived
total value of the lower-priced fare product must be greater than that of the
higher-priced. Passengers have incentive to divert only if the intrinsic value (e.g.
not including price level) that they place on the higher-priced fare product
exceeds that of the lower-priced fare product by an amount less than the price
differential of the two products. Clearly, diversion would not occur if the
consumers valued the higher-priced fare product more than the lower-priced.
Thus, among all diverting passengers, the lower-priced product must be
preferred to the higher-priced. Moreover, passenger diversion need not be
dependent upon the application of booking limits to the fare products competing
for the available aircraft capacity. The only requirement for passenger diversion
is the existence of differentiated fare products that attempt to segment the
population. Viewed in this way, passenger diversion is simply an avoidance of
airline segmentation techniques.
Airlines could attempt to prevent passenger diversion by modifying their fare
product attributes to better segment the population. To prevent passenger and
travel agent confusion, however, the restrictions associated with the market
selling fares must remain relatively stable over time. Airlines apply booking
limits to the lower-priced fare products as an alternative to frequent restriction
changes in the attempt to limit the revenue dilution occurring from diversion.
Booking limits may induce passengers to purchase higher-priced fare products
when discount services are unavailable on their preferred travel itineraries.
Passengers are said to "sell up" when they purchase a higher-priced fare product
after being denied a discount fare product. The downside to using booking
limits to induce sell up is that some passengers will travel on a competing carrier
or choose not to travel at all when denied their preferred fare product or flight
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itinerary. It is interesting to note that the only passengers who sell up are those
willing to pay enough to purchase the higher-priced fare products. In other
words, only the diverting passengers are candidates to sell up.
To date, the shifting of passenger demand between the fare products has not
been thoroughly addressed in the airline yield management literature. The
modeling of passenger switching behavior between fare products has been
limited to the sell up resulting from denied requests (to the exclusion of true
diversion behavior). The next section reviews the literature related to passenger
switching between fare products and motivates the need for more research.
4.6.2 Passenger Diversion Literature Review
The topic of passenger diversion to lower-priced fare products has received
limited attention in the airline yield management literature. A survey article by
Weatherford and Bodily provided a review of the airline yield management
literature that sought to incorporate passenger diversion (Weatherford and
Bodily, 1992). The article indicated only three relevant references (Belobaba,
1987, Pfeifer, 1989, and Brumelle et al., 1990). The term passenger diversion is
used quite loosely in the survey article to refer to any relaxation of the
assumption that passengers are divided into distinct and independent demand
populations. The lack of references provided with such a broad definition of
passenger diversion makes the gap in the literature concerning passenger buy
down behavior apparent.
In his doctoral dissertation, Belobaba tested the effects of passenger sell up to
higher fare classes on the expected marginal seat revenue (EMSR) seat allocation
optimization for the two fare class case (Belobaba, 1987). Belobaba defined the
probability of a passenger making a vertical shift from fare class i to fare class i-1
on the same flight leg as Pi(v). The shift probability was incorporated into the
EMSR seat allocation formulation and used to calculate an incremental seat
protection level having accounted for expected passenger sell up.
The vertical choice shift probability required that a passenger be refused a seat
for the discount fare product prior to considering the fare class upgrade. The
measure used did not consider the ability of consumers to meet the purchase
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restrictions imposed by the discount fare products, but rather, automatically
assumed that they preferred but were unable to purchase the discount product.
Thus, the result of Belobaba was actually an exploration of passenger sell up
behavior and not diversion (as defined here) that required an unrealistic
behavioral assumption.
Pfeifer modeled what he called passenger diversion to provide an optimal
decision rule for calculating the discount fare class seat allocation in the two fare
class case (Pfeifer, 1989). He assumed two types of passengers within the global
fare product population, shoppers and non-shoppers. Shoppers would not
purchase the higher-priced fare product when denied the discount while non-
shoppers would. Again, all passengers were assumed to prefer the discount fare
product unambiguously if it were available. Pfeifer's method also assumed the
ability of all consumers to meet the requirements of the discount fare product
purchase restrictions. Although the effects of passenger diversion can be
measured using the decision rule developed by Pfeifer, the assumption of
discount fare product dominance does not accurately reflect consumer behavior,
especially when considering the effects of second degree price discrimination
techniques used by airlines.
Brumelle et al. modeled passenger switching behavior as the probability that
passengers will sell up to a higher booking class when the lower booking class is
closed for reservations (Brumelle et al., 1990). The result of their investigation
was an optimal discount seat allocation subject to an upgrade probability
attached to the otherwise independent demand populations (similar to Pfeifer).
Again, the methods employed by Brumelle et al. presented what is more
accurately referred to as the passenger sell up probability which is dependent
upon booking limits initially denying service to passengers at the discount fare.
A rigorous behavioral motivation of passenger switching behavior has not yet
been presented in the literature. The existing work has focused upon shifting
percentages to higher-priced fare products without motivating the underlying
behavior of consumers within the framework of the differentiated fare products.
Contrary to the treatment received in the literature, passenger switching
behavior is not exclusively the result of booking limits and capacity controls
inducing the purchase of higher-priced fare products. Passenger switching more
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commonly results from the ability of passengers to avoid the segmentation
attempts of airlines. Since passengers must initially divert in order to be
candidates to sell up, diversion is, by definition, more prevalent than sell up.
Strictly speaking, passenger buy down to the lower-priced fare products
resulting from the ability to meet the imposed fare product purchase restrictions
has not been considered in any of the modeling approaches claiming to address
diversion. Rather, only the probability that a passenger will purchase the higher-
priced fare product contingent upon being denied the discount fare product, or
passenger sell up, has been addressed. True diversion, or passenger buy down,
under airline fare product differentiation remains to be modeled.
Finally, the treatment of passenger switching between the different fare products
was limited to the two fare class case in all previous articles. There remains a
need for addressing the issues of passenger diversion to the lower-priced fare
products and sell up for the general case of N fare products. Both passenger
diversion as well as sell up can be modeled by extending the generalized cost
model presented in this research. The diversion modeling methodology appears
in the next subsection for the general N fare product case. The discussion of
passenger sell up as it relates to the generalized cost model is postponed until the
following section when booking limits are introduced. The modeling of true
passenger diversion and sell up are performed for the first time in this
dissertation for the general N fare product case, thus extending the airline yield
management literature.
4.6.3 Modeling Passenger Diversion in the Generalized Cost Framework
Without the incorporation of passenger diversion, the generalized cost model
contains several unrealistic assumptions. For instance, it assumes that airlines
have the ability to perfectly identify and segment the population into distinct
groups by their values of willingness to pay. The passenger identification and
segmentation depends upon the price levels of the fare product in this
framework. Thus, not only would the screening device be required to perfectly
identify and segment the population, but also must be able to do so at any
prevailing set of market price levels.
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In addition, passengers falling within the arbitrarily set ranges of willingness to
pay are assumed to unambiguously prefer their designated fare products.
Passengers may only purchase the fare products that the airline intends
according to their willingness to pay and the segmentation scheme. The self-
selection devices used by airlines are, however, far from flawless, leaving a
perfect identification and segmentation unachievable given currently employed
price discrimination techniques. Therefore, realistic modeling requires that
passenger buy down behavior be addressed explicitly.
Mathematical Incorporation of Diversion into the Model
The incorporation of passenger diversion into the generalized cost model
framework requires changes to the objective function of the basic model
formulation. Instead of modeling the revenue received by the airline as the
number of passengers assumed to be segmented into purchasing the fare product
intended, the objective function must allow for the revenue dilution experienced
by passengers able to avoid the airline segmentation scheme. The exact change
in the objective function depends upon the assumed form of passenger diversion.
The calculation of the number of diverting passengers can be performed in one of
two ways: as a percentage of the expected number of passengers or as an
absolute number of passengers. The number of diverting passengers can be a
fixed number or percentage and may be calculated as a function of either
exogenous or endogenous modeling factors.
The first case considered assumes that the number diverting is a fixed percentage
of the passengers expected in any fare product population at the prevailing price
levels. Intuitively, the number of passengers able to divert to the lower-priced
fare products should be related, in some way, to the number of consumers
expected to purchase the higher-priced fare products. Calculating diversion as a
percentage of the expected passengers satisfies this intuition. The model of
diversion can be extended to make passenger diversion percentages a function of
exogenous factors calculated a priori or endogenous factors to be included in the
joint price level optimization formulation.
A concise objective function calculating passenger diversion as an absolute
number would be difficult to implement since the number of passengers
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diverting must be less than the total population for the intended fare product.
This, of course, is guaranteed using the percentage of the population formulation
previously proposed. In the case of an absolute number of diverting passengers,
however, additional constraints would be required in the formulation to prevent
more diversion than is possible from the actual fare product population size. The
operational difficulties associated with incorporating an absolute number of
diverting passengers remove it from consideration here.
The objective function of the model for the N fare product case incorporating
passenger diversion to the lower-priced fare products as a percentage of
passengers expected to purchase the higher-priced fare products appears below:
N N N-1 N
Max R = I Pi-(1- I dij)Qi + I I PjdijQi
i=1 j=i+1 i= j=i+1
where:
dij= % of fare product i passengers who divert to
lower-priced fare product j
The revenue received by the airline is equal to the revenue expected from each
fare product (without consideration of diversion) minus the decreased revenue
associated with the loss of passengers to the lower-priced fare products plus the
amount of revenue gained in the lower-priced fare products from the diverting
passengers. The constraints imposed on the revenue optimization are identical
to the case without diversion, as presented in the basic model description.
The single function representing the demand for OD market air travel for each
isolated fare product reflects the maximum willingness to pay of each consumer
(as in any demand function). Thus, the initial segmentation performed by the
airline assumes that passengers will purchase the highest-priced fare product
that they can afford. For this reason, passengers are not willing to purchase (e.g.
do not divert to) higher-priced fare products, leaving passenger diversion to
occur only to the more-restricted fare products.
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In the diversion formulation, the variables Pi represent the optimal price levels
that should be set to maximize revenues. The variables Qi represent the mapping
of the price levels and degradation costs from the demand functions of the form:
Qi = f(Pi , ck(-) Vksi) - Y f(Pj, ck(-) Vksj) (4.22)
j<i
The variables Qi, however, no longer represent the number of passenger
expected to arrive in each of the fare product groups but rather the number of
passengers that would book each fare product i at price level Pi provided that
diversion did not exist. A new measure is required to represent the actual
number of passengers expected to book each fare product i. For each fare
product i, the number of passengers expected, qi, is defined as:
N i-1
qj = (1- 1 dj)Qi + I djiQj (4.23)
j=i+1 j=1
where the variables are defined as before. The number of passengers expected to
purchase fare product i is simply the number of passengers expected without
diversion, Qi, minus the number of fare product i passengers who divert to
N
lower-priced fare products from i, I dijQi, plus the number of passengers
j=i+1
diverting to fare product i from the more expensive fare products j.
The increase in consumer surplus associated with passenger diversion between
less-restricted fare product i and more-restricted fare product j is equal to :
Consumer Surplus Increase i =Pi - I ck - Pj]dijQi (4.24)
with the variables and functions as previously defined. Figure 4.9 shows the
change in consumer surplus when diversion occurs exclusively from fare
product 1 to fare product 2 in the three fare product example. The hatched box
in the figure represents the consumer surplus that is gained by the passengers
diverting from the unrestricted fare product to fare product 2.
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Figure 4.9 - Generalized Cost Model With Diversion - Three Fare Product
Example - Consumer Surplus and Welfare Changes
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There is an increase in the deadweight welfare loss experienced by the market
when passengers divert. The welfare loss equal to:
Welfare Lossij = [ cjdijQi (4.25)
i<k sjj
is associated with passengers diverting from less-restricted fare product i to
more-restricted fare product j. The dark shaded box in Figure 4.9 shows the
welfare loss associated with passengers diverting from fare product 1 to fare
product 2 in the three fare product example. Both the welfare loss and consumer
surplus gain totals for the OD market can be calculated by summing their
respective values over all less-restricted fare products i and all more-restricted
fare products j.
Varying Diversion Percentage by Exogenous /Endogenous Factors
If the diversion function is a function of exogenous factors, the diversion
percentage can be calculated in advance and optimized in the same way as the
fixed diversion percentages model. For example, the diversion percentages
could be calculated as a function of the degradation costs of the fare products.
Incorporating endogenous factors, such as the price levels of the fare products, in
the diversion function would require that the optimization be performed with
the diversion function explicitly input into the objective function or the constraint
set. The same optimization techniques used to solve the constant diversion
percentage could be employed to solve the modified endogenous diversion
percentage problem.
By allowing the percentage of diverting passengers to vary systematically with
price level, cross price elasticity effects can be incorporated in the model.
Diversion percentages that are dependent upon the price differentials between
the fare products occurring in the market can reflect, for instance, the greater
number of passengers expected to divert as a result of an increased price
discrepancy between the fare products. The diversion function between the fare
products must be input explicitly into the objective function of the revenue
maximization or added to the constraint set. The example of making the
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diversion percentages dependent upon the (endogenous) price differential
between the fare products would be:
N N N-1 N
Max R = I Pi(1- I dij(APij))Qi + I I Pjdij(APij)Qi
i=1 j=i+1 i=1 j=i+l
where:
APij = differential between the price level of fare product i
and each lower-priced fare product j
In this case, the diversion percentages are a function of the endogenous price
differential between the fare products of interest. Such a formulation allows for a
very important aspect of passenger diversion behavior, the fare product price
differentials, to be considered explicitly.
Nature of Costs Facing Diverting Passengers
The relationship between degradation costs and passenger diversion should be
clarified as it relates to the generalized cost model. While diverting passengers
may avoid segmentation by the fare product purchase restrictions in the
generalized cost model, all passengers incur a cost associated with accepting the
additional purchase restrictions of the less desirable airline fare products. Simply
stated, the ability to divert need not lessen the penalty associated with accepting
the more-restricted fare product; the purchase restrictions only fail to prevent the
passenger from purchasing the discounted fare product. The flexibility of the
generalized cost model formulation allows the cost incorporated to be positive,
as motivated above, or zero, if passengers can meet the restrictions imposed by
airlines at no cost.
The fare product degradation cost incurred by diverting passengers differs
depending upon the form of the cost function assumed in the model. For
example, in the constant cost model, the cost associated with accepting the
restriction is simply the identical constant cost incurred by all passengers. In the
increasing cost model, on the other hand, the degradation cost calculation is less
straightforward. The cost incurred by each passenger can be calculated directly
from the degradation cost function since the position of the passenger on all fare
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product demand functions is assumed known. Thus, as long as the passenger
can be identified by his place on the demand function, his perceived degradation
cost can be calculated directly from the cost function.
If identification of the individual passengers and their associated degradation
costs proves to be computationally prohibitive, assumptions can be made
concerning the willingness to pay of the group of diverting passengers to
calculate the expected degradation costs. For example, if the diverting
passengers are assumed to be those with the lowest values of willingness to pay,
the degradation cost can be assumed to be equal to the average value of
willingness to pay within the interval of those more price-sensitive passengers.
In any case, a diverting passenger degradation cost approximation can be made
to make the model operational.
4.6.4 Impacts of Passenger Diversion
The model of demand currently used in most airline yield management systems
groups passengers who actually purchase the discount products as members of
the discount populations even though they may be willing to purchase higher-
priced fare products. The revenue potential of passengers able to beat the
segmentation schemes of airlines who are willing to pay higher amounts for air
travel, if forced, are removed from consideration in potential market revenue
calculations. As a result, such models systematically underpredict the revenue
potential of the market. Diverting passengers are implicitly considered within
the modeling of the independent fare product demand populations, ignoring
their actual willingness to pay for air travel. In other words, the higher value of
willingness to pay of such passengers is removed (not considered) when they are
falsely assumed to be members of the discount population.
The basic framework of the generalized cost model (without diversion) presented
here groups passengers by their willingness to pay. In the extended model,
passengers are allowed to divert to lower-priced fare products than the airline
intends in spite of their willingness to pay. The diverting passengers are initially
identified as members of the higher-priced product population rather than the
discount population. Thus, the revenue potential of the diverting passengers is
explicitly identified in the generalized cost model. Even though the passengers
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may not end up purchasing the fare product for which the airline targets them,
the estimate of market revenue potential identifies their willingness to pay and
purchase that fare product in the presence of perfect fencing capabilities or
binding booking limits. Hence, a more correct representation of market revenue
potential results using the generalized cost model than previously available in
the literature.
4.6.5 Limiting Cases of Passenger Diversion Formulations
The limiting cases of passenger diversion provide insight into the strategies that
an airline should adopt in the presence of ineffective segmentation devices
between fare products. Consider the demand for differentiated fare products
with diversion occurring between adjoining fare products only. As the diversion
percentage for a single fare product approaches 100%, the demand for that
product is driven to zero. All of the demand for a fare product would be lost to
the next-lowest-priced fare product. In terms of the revenue recovered by the
airline and the prices paid by consumers, it is as though the diversion-ravaged
fare product were not offered on the market altogether. In a three fare product
example for the constant cost model, the total diversion of fare product 1
consumers to fare product 2 is represented in Figure 4.10. The total shaded area
in the figure represents the revenue for the airline without diversion while the
darkly shaded area represents what revenue remains for the airline when
diversion occurs.
The diverting passengers would incur the additional costs associated with
accepting the more-restricted fare product resulting in a deadweight welfare loss
for the market. The top portion of the lightly shaded box in Figure 4.10
represents the deadweight welfare loss to the market in the three fare product
constant cost example. The extension to the N fare product constant cost case is
straightforward. It is interesting to note that the airline would be wise to offer
the unpurchased fare product at the price level of the more-restricted,
neighboring fare product. This is true since demand would be greater for the
less-restricted fare product as a result of the decreased degradation costs
associated with it (provided that the segmentation mechanism was completely
ineffective). The airline has added incentive to adopt this strategy since the
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Figure 4.10 - Generalized Cost Model With Diversion at 100% from Fare
Product 1 to Fare Product 2
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deadweight welfare loss does not affect consumer surplus, but rather, only
airline revenue.
The deadweight welfare loss associated with the more-restricted fare product
restriction bundle would be eliminated in the two fare product populations as
well. The hatched area shown in Figure 4.11 represents the welfare loss incurred
by the market as a result of offering both fare products 1 and 2 in lieu of simply
offering fare product 1 when the fence separating the two fare products is
completely ineffective. In the model forms other than constant cost, the lost
welfare differs in amount but nonetheless is taken from airline revenue rather
than consumer surplus.
The next limiting case of interest concerns completely ineffective fences for all
fare products. In other words, all passengers have the ability to divert to the
most restricted fare product. In this case, the market behaves as though there
were a single fare product available on the market. Society, however, must bear
the loss of welfare resulting from the perceived cost of the restrictions as a result
of the single product being the least desirable. No such loss would occur if the
airline offered a single unrestricted fare product, or if the cost to each passenger
of accepting the more-restricted fare product were uniformly zero. Thus, in the
presence of completely ineffective fences, it is to the benefit of the airline,
consumers, and society to offer the unrestricted fare product in isolation instead
of any restricted one. For the three fare class case, Figure 4.12 shows the
increased number of passengers who choose to travel when the unrestricted fare
product 1 is offered in isolation compared to (the most restricted) fare product 3.
With passenger diversion percentages equal to zero, the airlines would have the
ability to perfectly identify and segment the consumer populations by their
willingness to pay. The generalized cost model incorporating passenger
diversion would mirror the model without diversion. The degradation costs
associated with accepting the increased levels of purchase restrictions, however,
would still affect demand. Clearly, this result is expected. It is interesting to note
that from a total market welfare perspective, the no diversion case is the best
possible result for N differentiated fare products considering degradation costs.
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Figure 4.11 - Generalized Cost Model With Diversion - Welfare Loss with
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Figure 4.12 - Generalized Cost Model With Diversion - Single Fare Product
Comparison
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Incorporating passenger diversion into the generalized cost model of airline fare
product differentiation provides the first behaviorally motivated discussion of
passenger switching behavior to appear in the airline yield management
literature. Explicit consideration of passenger buy down behavior for the general
N fare class case was performed for the first time. The incorporation of diversion
represents a significant improvement over previous modeling attempts such as
the standard monopoly price discrimination model presented in Chapter Two
which relies heavily upon the assumption that airlines can perfectly identify and
segment the consumer population by their willingness to pay. The relaxation of
the perfect segmentation assumption more realistically models the situation
facing airlines in the current industry environment. The application of booking
limits to the fare products performed in the next section provides a similar
behavioral motivation of passenger sell up not previously seen in the literature.
4.7 Application of Booking Limits to the Generalized Cost Model
The fixed capacity that exists for every aircraft directly affects the price levels that
are charged by the carriers as well as the number of seats that are allocated to the
different fare products. The capacity constraint can easily be incorporated into
the generalized cost model by adding it to the constraint set. The optimal price
levels can be determined through simple optimization techniques that reflect the
effect of the capacity constraint on price levels. The capacity constraint is fixed
for each departure based on the number of seats on the aircraft.
Applying booking limits to the fare products, however, is not so straightforward.
The booking limits, in general, are set based upon the calculations of the yield
management system as applied by the seat inventory control analysts of the
airline. The booking limits differ by flight departure depending upon the
demand forecasts and the other yield management system inputs. Each flight
departure is subject to a different set of fare product booking limits making a
simple inclusion in the optimization constraint set impossible.
The relationship between pricing and seat inventory control is one of the most
interesting yet virtually unexplored areas in the revenue management field. The
revenue maximizing seat allocations made by airlines are based upon the price
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levels assumed for each fare class. Clearly, any model addressing airline fare
product differentiation need consider the effects of booking limits and other
capacity control devices used by airlines to correctly represent the realities of the
current airline industry environment. Ideally, a joint price level/seat allocation
optimization could be performed. The difficulties associated with introducing
price level into the demand formulations addressed in the previous chapter,
however, have been shown to be prohibitive. The introduction of booking limits
to the generalized cost model provides useful insight into the interactions of
price level and availability for airlines.
4.7.1 Booking Limits Motivation
Binding booking limits force passengers to reconsider their travel options
because they make certain fare products and travel itineraries unavailable. A
passenger who cannot purchase his preferred fare product/travel itinerary
combination must choose an alternative action. The passenger may change fare
products, travel itineraries, or both. In the extreme, the passenger may decide
not to travel altogether. The case considered in the framework of the generalized
cost model is a single flight departure in the OD market. Thus, the only options
available to a consumer whose initial service request was denied are either to
purchase a higher-priced fare product or decide not to travel.
Another fundamental assumption of the static generalized cost modeling
approach is that all passengers arrive during a single booking period. This
assumption presents no problems when supply and demand are equilibrated for
each fare product. When capacity constraints are applied to the available fare
products, however, the possibility that certain passengers will be denied their
preferred fare products becomes quite real. Binding capacity constraints require
that a method be chosen to allocate the limited resources among the passengers
arriving in the single booking period. Although the static modeling assumption
precludes an exact breakdown of passenger arrivals, bounding the maximum
and minimum values attainable from the model can be done by making
assumptions about the order of passenger arrivals within the single booking
period.
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To measure the effects of booking limits on the static model, an arrival processo1 must be assumed within the booking period. For instance, passengers can be
assumed to book in increasing or decreasing order of willingness to pay.
Arrivals occurring in increasing order of willingness to pay would result in a
lower bound on the number of passengers choosing not to travel when booking
limits were applied. Conversely, arrivals in decreasing order of willingness to
pay would provide an upper bound on passenger loss since the diverting
passengers would arrive prior to those within the target population. A random
arrival process within the booking period is also possible. In this case, an
approximation to an average value of expected traffic loss from initial passenger
service denials can be obtained.
Measuring the effects of the application of booking limits to the model also
requires the establishment of rules concerning passenger behavior. The behavior
of passengers who are denied a seat in their preferred booking class must be
specified. The behavior of each passenger will be decided by his position on the
isolated fare product demand functions and a simple assumption concerning sell
up behavior. Clearly, a diverting passenger who is denied a lower-priced fare
product is still willing to travel at the higher price (as demonstrated by his
willingness to pay). Diverting passengers denied the lower-priced fare product
are willing to sell up as high as the fare product to which they are initially
targeted. Since diverting passengers are able to meet the restrictions of the fare
product to which they divert, passengers initially denied a fare product are
assumed to prefer the lowest-priced fare product that is available. Passengers
who are not diverting, on the other hand, will choose not to travel in this
framework since they are not willing to purchase any more expensive fare
product than the one to which they have been targeted by the airline.
4.7.2 Booking Limits Applied to the Model
Under an assumed booking period arrival process, booking limits can be applied
to estimate the impacts of yield management techniques on demand, revenue,
and welfare under the behavioral assumptions of the generalized cost model.
The booking limits can be applied to the fare products either exogenously after
the price levels have been set or endogenously as a constraint in the joint price
level optimization problem. The effects of booking limits on the market can then
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be tested for both methods. Incorporating diversion in the model allows for the
measurement of the effects of passenger sell up occurring after a fare product has
sold out. Applying booking limits to the distribution of passenger demands
allows us to calculate the effects of booking limits on passenger diversion. First,
an example of an exogenous application of booking limits is illustrated.
Consider the three fare class example with booking limits applied to the middle
fare product and diversion occurring between fare products 1 and 2. With
prevailing market price levels P1, P2, and P3, the darkly shaded area appearing in
Figure 4.13 represents the revenue received by the airline. The lightly shaded
area represents the revenue loss resulting from passenger diversion. When
booking limits of BL 2 = Q2 are applied to the flight, (Q2d - Q2) passengers are
denied their preferred fare product. Assuming that passengers arrive in
decreasing order of willingness to pay, the (Q2d - Q2) passengers denied fare
product 2 will choose not to travel. The hatched area shown in Figure 4.14
represents the lost revenue associated with denying service to those passengers
as a result of applying the booking limit BL2. The revenue lost by the airline and
the welfare lost by society as a result of passenger diversion (shown in the lightly
shaded area of the figure) remain lost, even after the booking limits have been
applied. Moreover, the total welfare associated with the passengers choosing not
to travel (revenue and consumer surplus) is lost to the market when they are
denied their preferred fare product.
Figure 4.15 shows the effect on revenue assuming that passengers arrive in
increasing order of willingness to pay. In this case, the (Q2d - Q2) passengers
denied their preferred fare product (2) are those who wanted to divert to fare
product 2 from fare product 1. Having been denied fare product 2, these
passengers are compelled to purchase fare product 1 as initially intended by the
airline. The airline recaptures the revenue represented in the lightly shaded area
of Figure 4.15 as a result of the booking limits. The revenue increase, however,
occurs at the expense of consumer surplus. In other words, the revenue recovery
from the sell up behavior induced by the booking limits is equal to the consumer
surplus that had been gained through the initial passenger diversion. The
hatched area shown in Figure 4.15 represents the airline revenue shifted back
from fare product 2 to fare product 1. In addition, the deadweight welfare loss
resulting passenger diversion between the two fare products (shown in the upper
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box of the lightly shaded area) is returned to the airline (and society) when the
passenger sell up behavior is induced.
Clearly, the assumed arrivals in increasing and decreasing order of willingness to
pay represent the upper and lower bounds, respectively, on market revenue
change for a given set of booking limits. The example also demonstrates the
indeterminance of the effect of booking limits on market revenue in the presence
of diversion. The airline benefits from applying booking limit BL 2 when
passengers with lower values of willingness to pay book first. Conversely,
booking limit BL2 is to the detriment of the airline when the opposite booking
discipline prevails.
Endogenous applications of booking limits can also be performed using the
generalized cost model. Adding booking limits to the constraint set in the joint
price level optimization problem allows the testing of different cabin
configurations under the prevailing demand conditions. Setting fixed capacity
constraints for the first class, business class, and coach class cabins, for instance,
allows the testing of the effects of various cabin configurations on optimal price
levels and the resulting demand and revenue.
Service improvements can be captured in the generalized cost model in the
degradation cost terms. Fixing the capacity of the aircraft and the cabin
configurations, the effects of service improvements in the three cabins on the
optimal price levels can be determined. In addition, the capacity and cabin
configurations can be changed under a fixed fare product structure to evaluate
different aircraft sizes and configurations on the optimal price levels and market
revenues.
4.7.3 Booking Limits Summary
The behavior of the consumer population is more accurately modeled in the
framework of the generalized cost model than the previous attempts in the
literature because of the explicit modeling of passenger diversion. Prior
literature has not rigorously motivated the reason that passengers are willing to
upgrade to higher-priced fare products after being denied a discount fare
product. The discussion of diversion presented identifies the passenger sell up
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potential as simply the total number of diverting passengers. Direct calculation
of the effects of passenger sell up behavior can be performed once booking limits
have been applied to the model.
Because booking limits are the only large scale method to induce sell up, they can
be viewed as damage control devices for airlines aimed at preventing the
revenue dilution effects of passenger diversion that result from ineffective price
discrimination techniques. An important purpose of booking limits is to induce
passengers to pay an amount closer to their actual willingness to pay for air
travel. The airline must be careful, however, not to discourage discretionary
traffic stimulated exclusively through offering lower-priced fare products. In the
absence of sell up considerations, booking limits only serve to maximize the
revenue available from the mix of fare product populations on the aircraft
through the use of yield management seat allocation optimization methods.
4.8 Chapter Summary
The chapter began by motivating the nature of airline demand in the context of
the differentiated fare products currently offered on the market. The exact
nature of the demand facing airlines was then built on the foundations of
consumer perceptions about the cost of the restrictions placed on the fare
products. The generalized cost model provided an estimable model of airline
fare product differentiation which considers the decreased value of the more-
restricted products explicitly when a functional form was assumed for the
degradation costs. It also accounted for the interrelationships between the fare
product price levels. The ability of the airline to perfectly identify and segment
passengers by their willingness to pay was then relaxed to allow for passenger
diversion. Finally, booking limits were applied to enable a more realistic
evaluation of the model.
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Chapter Five
Model Investigations Using the Generalized Cost Model of Airline Fare
Product Differentiation
The number and types of fare products offered, or fare product structure, in an
OD market influences the level of total passenger demand as well as the amount
of revenue earned by the airline. The knowledge of how to set price levels and
modify purchase restrictions to maximize revenue within the existing market
fare product structure would provide an airline with an advantage in the area of
revenue management. The generalized cost model of airline fare product
differentiation presented in Chapter Four can provide an airline with a planning
tool that gives insight into the effects that different price levels and purchase
restrictions have on passenger traffic, airline revenue, or economic welfare,
enabling more informed pricing policy decisions. In this chapter, various tests of
the generalized cost model are performed which illustrate the relationships
between fare product characteristics and market performance measures.
Airlines attempt to segment the consumer population into different market
groups according to their willingness to pay. The multiple fare product structure
now employed by airlines has resulted from second degree price discrimination
or "self-selection" techniques used to maximize revenue (or best cover operating
costs) through such a passenger market segmentation. The benefits and
fallibilities of the self-selection techniques employed, however, are not well
understood and have not been formally addressed in the literature. The
fundamental relationships between fare product attributes, passenger demand,
and airline revenue under the existing fare product structure are revealed using
the generalized cost modeling framework which explicitly considers the market
segmentation strategies employed by airlines.
The incorporation of passenger buy down or "diversion" into the generalized
cost model provides a more realistic modeling of the market demand behavior
actually facing airlines. An understanding of the effects that passengers who
avoid airline market segmentation schemes have on demand and revenue can
help the airline to formulate pricing strategies (or apply capacity controls)
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designed to counteract the revenue dilution of passenger diversion.
Furthermore, variations in the passenger diversion parameters input to the
generalized cost model allows the airline to test the sensitivity of the analysis
results to the level of revenue dilution.
Airlines have the ability to vary certain factors of supply as well as fare product
characteristics to improve revenue performance. For instance, the purchase
restrictions accompanying the fare products offered in the market may be
changed to increase revenues when market price levels are fixed. Alternative
fare products can be compared, using the generalized cost model, to determine
which one is expected to provide the greatest benefit to the airline in the
prevailing OD market environment. In addition, the model can be used to
quantify the effects of variations in the aircraft capacity and configuration
serving a market, offering airline planners a method to increase the revenue
earned in a particular market. An understanding (and quantification) of the
effects that supply factors under the control of the airline have on optimal price
levels and revenue allows marketing planners to better set price levels or modify
supply to maximize revenue, making the generalized cost model a powerful
airline planning tool.
The generalized cost model also quantifies several tradeoffs that airlines face, for
example, demand stimulation versus revenue dilution. In the model, the
increased (degradation) costs facing consumers associated with accepting more
purchase restrictions can be traded off against a higher rate of passenger
diversion occurring between the fare products to provide a comparison of the
revenue impacts of each effect. The impacts of introducing fare products
designed to stimulate demand can be analyzed with proper consideration given
to the amount of revenue dilution expected to occur as a result. More informed
decisions concerning fare product introductions designed to stimulate
discretionary air travel demand can thus be made. Among the other tradeoffs
facing airline planners that are tested in this chapter using the generalized cost
model are the costs and benefits of proposed service improvements and the
problem of aircraft cabin configuration.
The chapter begins by describing how the generalized cost model can be used to
evaluate the demand and revenue expected in the market for a given set of price
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levels. Endogenously determining price levels through a joint optimization of all
fare product price levels using the constant cost formulation of the generalized
cost model provides a measure of the maximum amount of revenue that can be
earned in the current market environment. The fundamental relationships
between optimal price levels and supply factors such as the severity of fare
product purchase restrictions or the configuration of the aircraft are then
discussed based upon the constant cost model outputs using both analytical and
numerical techniques. Finally, different airline pricing policies are tested to
demonstrate the uses of the model as a decision support and planning tool for
airline management.
5.1 Analytical and Numerical Analysis Using the Generalized Cost Model
The primary application of the generalized cost model is to analyze and provide
suggestions for the design and modification of the fare product structure in a
specific air transportation OD market. In a deregulated environment, airlines
exercise control over the price levels and purchase restrictions in all OD markets
to the extent that competition from other carriers does not prevent such control.
To this end, airlines seek to offer the combination of prices and restrictions that
best enhance their revenues. Consequently, the question of how to best set price
levels is of great interest to airlines.
The impacts of pricing decisions vary depending upon the existing OD market
conditions. Market conditions include the passenger price level-demand
relationship, perceived fare product degradation costs, available seat supply, and
the ability of the airline to segment the consumer population. Comparative
statics analysis techniques using the generalized cost model can measure the
effects of changes in the fare product structure or other market conditions on
demand, revenue, and welfare. In particular, the analysis performed in this
chapter seeks to answer the following questions:
1) How can prices be set under fixed market conditions to improve
results?
2) How do market condition changes affect optimal price levels?
3) How can OD market conditions be changed to improve results?
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All analyses are performed from the viewpoint of the airline. Commercial
airlines are interested in making the greatest possible return on investment and,
thus, seek maximum profits. With a fixed aircraft allocation and in turn fixed
operating costs, this amounts to maximizing revenues. Accordingly, the
objective functions of the mathematical optimization formulations presented are
limited to airline revenue maximization with price levels as decision variables.
Other objective functions may be substituted to address different viewpoints (e.g.
that of a regulatory body); however, such analyses are left to future research
efforts.
The power of the model as a planning tool is revealed when it is used to measure
the effects of airline pricing and fare product attribute decisions on traffic,
revenue, and welfare in the OD market. Different airline pricing strategies can be
evaluated based upon their expected impacts on revenue and other market
conditions. Comparisons of model results under different expected market
conditions test the sensitivity of different pricing and fare product design policies
to changes in the OD market environment. In this way, the relationships
between degradation costs, price levels, demand, revenue, and welfare under
different airline OD market conditions can be identified.
Price levels can either be set exogenously or determined through the revenue
maximizations and used to evaluate pricing strategies or initiatives. The impacts
of changes in the OD market fare product structure can be quantified through a
simple evaluation of existing market conditions using the generalized cost model
with exogenously determined price levels. A joint optimization of price levels
for all fare products provides insight for airlines concerning pricing decisions
and their effect on market revenue potential.
The flexibility of the generalized cost model provides the ability to test numerous
behavioral assumptions about demand. This flexibility emanates from the many
versions of the model that can be tested. Different functional forms of demand
thought to characterize markets can be evaluated. Assumptions about the nature
of the fare product degradation costs can also be tested. In addition, the
passenger segmentation assumption can be varied to offer a more realistic view
of passenger behavior. The result is a planning tool with the ability to test the
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relationships most important to pricing decisions in an OD market under varying
scenarios.
In summary, the effects of fare product attributes (e.g. price level) and market
condition changes under a stable fare product structure can be quantified using
the generalized cost model. The conditions existing in the OD market under
study must first be characterized, however, before any analysis can be
performed. The results of the model, under the assumed behavior of passengers
considering travel in the market, can then be used to quantify the impact of the
pricing strategies that an airline seeks to employ. Airline planning decisions can
be improved with the results obtained by using the generalized cost model to
develop a better understanding of the underlying relationships between price
levels, restrictions, demand, and revenue.
5.1.1 Inputs to the Model
The generalized cost model provides a flexible characterization of air travel
demand under different price levels and fare product structures. The model
requires the characterization of several factors influencing travel behavior in the
OD market to be used as inputs. The inputs are required to characterize
passenger behavior so that the results of the generalized cost model can be
evaluated under plausible assumptions. The major inputs to the model are:
1) Demand functions for each fare product
2) Degradation cost functions for each additional restriction bundle
3) Passenger segmentation assumption
4) Price levels for each fare product
5) Aircraft capacity for the OD market
As discussed in the model presentation of Chapter Four, a required input to the
optimization model is the functional form of the perceived degradation costs
facing consumers due to fare product purchase restrictions. The form of the costs
depends upon the assumed sensitivities of the travel population. Within the
context of the joint price level optimization, the perceptions of consumers
considering air travel are of interest to the airlines in the quest to maximize the
revenues received from providing air travel services.
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The selection of a specific functional form of degradation costs facing consumers
determines which form of the generalized cost model should be used for
analysis. For instance, selection of a constant degradation cost facing consumers
leads to the constant cost model being employed. The model allows for
computational testing using any intuitively pleasing functional form of
degradation costs. A practical model implementation, however, may limit the
functional form to an estimable one. The assumption and specification of a
functional form of degradation costs is equivalent to the selection of a model
form and calibration, respectively.
The price-demand relationship existing in the market for the potential air travel
consumers must be defined to properly measure the effects of the fare product
structure on the OD market. In particular, a functional form for demand must be
assumed in order to yield an operational version of the generalized cost model.
The functional form of demand chosen should accurately reflect existing market
conditions. The price elasticity of demand facing different consumers, for
instance, can determine the appropriateness of a given demand formulation.
Constant elasticity demand functions can be selected if passengers are thought to
have a uniform sensitivity to price level changes. Linear demand functions, on
the other hand, imply a measure of price elasticity that changes with willingness
to pay. Both linear and constant elasticity demand functions are used as inputs
to the generalized cost model in this chapter.
Next, assumptions about the ability of the airline to segment consumers into
distinct fare product populations must be made. Most existing yield
management seat allocation models assume the ability of the airline to perfectly
segment the demand population into distinct and independent fare class
(product) populations. In the context of the generalized cost model, a perfect
segmentation assumption is only one alternative. A valuable extension of the
model allows a functional form of passenger buy down, or diversion, behavior to
be chosen. Thus, the ability of passengers to avoid airline segmentation schemes
can be incorporated explicitly. Moreover, variation of the segmentation
assumption allows for the evaluation of different market condition scenarios
when passenger diversion occurs.
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The aircraft capacity serving the OD market must also be identified. The
existence of a well defined capacity constraint depends upon the scope of the
model being considered. If the generalized cost model is being used to analyze
an OD market with multiple flights, the representation of the capacity constraint
is ambiguous. If, however, the OD market is served by only one flight or the
model is being used to evaluate the demand for a single flight, then a capacity
constraint can be applied unambiguously. The examples presented in this
chapter are limited to the single flight/OD market level making the capacity
constraint equivalent to the number of seats on the aircraft serving the market.
An unambiguous capacity constraint also allows for booking limits on each fare
product to be applied to the solution. In other words, meaningful booking limits
may only be applied to a model whose scope of analysis is limited to the single
flight/OD market case. The analysis of booking limits shows the impacts that
capacity constraints on the individual fare products have on traffic and revenue.
The application of booking limits to the solutions allows for the measurement of
passenger sell up in the market when passenger segmentation is imperfect.
If a single flight serves the market, then both booking limits and a capacity
constraint can be applied to the analysis. The evaluation of the effects of the
capacity constraint or booking limits requires the assumption of a booking arrival
discipline within the single booking period (assumed in the generalized cost
model). Without such an assumption, the effects of limits on capacity are likely
to be indeterminate. As previously stated, passenger booking inquiries arriving
in increasing, decreasing, or random order by willingness to pay are the
candidate processes. Evaluation of the model under the different arrival
scenarios provides a more precise look at the effects of price levels and
restrictions on the OD market under availability constraints.
The price levels must be specified to complete the market characterization and
enable an analysis of passenger demand, revenue, and welfare. Price levels can
either be determined exogenously or endogenously and input to the model. The
exogenous calculation of price levels may be the result, for example, of a
competitive equilibrium or of price levels dictated by a regulatory agency. The
endogenous setting of price levels, on the other hand, can be done using non-
linear optimization techniques applied to the generalized cost model. In either
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case, the price levels are used as input to the generalized cost model to determine
the expected demand and revenue in the market under the prevailing conditions.
A more complete discussion of price level determination in the generalized cost
model appears next.
5.1.2 Exogenous Price Level Determination
In the case of externally determined price levels, the evaluation of the existing
environment facing airlines requires the ability to perform analysis given the
current market conditions. Such a situation may result, for instance, when a
regulatory agency dictates price levels for the OD market. The generalized cost
model provides the airline with the ability to evaluate the expected demand,
revenue, and welfare for the market under the prevailing market price levels.
Therefore, the current state of the market can be quantified and used as a base
measure for planning purposes. The demand and revenue figures that are
expected from the prevailing market condition analysis can be compared to the
optimal values obtained using optimization techniques to measure the percent
difference from optimal of existing conditions.
For a general N fare product structure, there are N published fares Pi for all ie N
existing in the market. These price levels will determine the number of
passengers who purchase each of the N fare products under the assumed price
level-demand relationship existing in the market. The generalized cost model
attempts to quantify the level of demand for each fare product given the
prevailing OD market conditions (including price level). The resulting revenue
requires only a trivial calculation as highlighted in the Chapter Four examples.
5.1.3 Price Level Determination by Joint Price Level Optimization
While individual airlines are unable to dictate the price levels in the majority of
their markets, each has the ability to influence the price levels through the
publication of fare products in the computer reservations systems. Thus, it is of
interest to the airline to understand the benefits and pitfalls of raising or
lowering price levels. To gain insight into the effects of price levels on airline
revenue and societal welfare, the joint price level optimization can be used. The
formulation of the joint price level optimization under the assumption that the
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airline can perfectly identify and segment the population by their willingness to
pay appears below:
N
Max R= PiQi
i=1
Subject to:
N
Qi Cap
i=1
Qi a 0 for i =1,...,N
where R = total revenue
Qi= seats allocated to fare product i
Pi = average fare charged to fare product i
N = total number of fare products
Cap = total aircraft capacity
ck = cost associated with accepting the restriction
bundle accompanying fare product k
The optimization requires the joint calculation of price levels for all fare products
to present the best suggestion for setting price levels in the N fare product OD
market under an assumed specification of the price level/demand relationship.
The optimal price levels serve as a performance benchmark to which the
prevailing market fares (or any other set of fares) can be compared. The model
suggests the direction in which price levels should be moved to improve market
revenue performance. The results from the optimal price levels can be compared
to those from the prevailing price levels to demonstrate the proximity of current
conditions to optimality. The analysis also provides information about the
proximity to optimality of any other set of price levels.
The joint price level optimization problem has similar requirements to a simple
evaluation of the generalized cost model. Essentially, the generalized cost model
must be fully specified (with the exception of price levels) to enable the price
level optimization. The constant cost formulation is the form of degradation cost
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function used to demonstrate the optimization here. Additionally, the
optimization formulation requires a functional form of passenger demand to test
the model. In this research, two general forms are used, linear and constant
elasticity. The analysis must be limited to the single flight/single market case to
preserve the integrity of the capacity constraint. Price levels are the decision
variables and, thus, are determined as outputs of the joint optimization. The
evaluation of passenger demand and revenue along with welfare calculations can
be made once the price levels have been determined.
The analysis presented here is identical whether or not the price levels have been
determined optimally or by any other method. The analysis shown focuses on
the results of the joint price level optimization applied to the generalized cost
model. The results of applying the prevailing (or any other) price levels to the
model would produce similar results and is not shown except where insightful
or when optimization is not possible. Nonetheless, the flexibility to evaluate the
model under any prevailing set of price levels should be noted.
5.1.4 Outputs of the Model
The expected values of the following measures can be determined from a fully
specified generalized cost model:
1) Demand
2) Revenue
3) Consumer surplus
4) System welfare
Preferred airline strategies can be obtained by testing proposed changes to the
fare product structure using the generalized cost model under the conditions
thought to represent the current OD market environment. The inputs and
outputs of the generalized cost model can also be used to develop insight into the
underlying relationships between the factors influencing airline travel demand.
The traffic and revenue calculations are unambiguous for all versions of the
generalized cost model. The consumer surplus and welfare calculations require
behavioral assumptions about the passenger booking arrival process within the
single booking period to be identified.
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In summary, the generalized cost model requires several inputs including a
functional form for demand, the degradation costs facing consumers, and a
passenger segmentation scheme. The OD market must be characterized with the
inputs which contain assumptions about the conditions existing in the market.
The generalized cost model may then be used to evaluate the market conditions
in terms of expected passengers, revenue, and welfare. Testing of the specific
functional forms and practical applications of the generalized cost model
comprises the balance of the chapter.
5.2 Constant Cost Model with Linear Demands
Chapter Four introduced forms of the generalized cost model that could be used
to characterize the perceived degradation costs facing consumers considering air
travel. In this chapter, the constant cost model is combined with assumed
functional forms of demand for analytical and numerical analysis. The resulting
model specifications are used to demonstrate the effects of changes to the fare
products in the OD market under different behavioral scenarios. Although most
results are illustrated using a three fare product example, all can be generalized
to the N fare product case.
The constant cost model with linear demand functions will serve as the base case
model formulation against which the majority of comparisons are made.
Although any of the model forms could be used for this purpose, the linear
constant cost model has been chosen for its expository simplicity. To uncover the
underlying relationships between the market characteristics and the optimal
price levels, obtaining a general closed form analytical solution is preferable.
Thus, where possible, such analytical solutions are provided. The simple
formulations of the generalized cost model are amenable to analytical solutions
for the N fare class case and appear first. Numerical examples are provided for
the more complicated model extensions.
The Lagrange multiplier method was used to determine the optimal solution to
the general N fare product joint price level optimization. The solution to the
Lagrange multiplier method was checked to determine whether or not the
necessary conditions of the constrained optimization problem were met. The
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correct result could be easily identified from the sum of the number of
passengers purchasing each fare product at the optimal price levels. That is,
when the total number of passengers is equal to capacity, the Lagrange multiplier
method with a binding capacity constraint provides the optimal solution. When
the capacity constraint does not bind, the Lagrange multiplier term drops out
and the result is a simple unconstrained optimization.
When analytical techniques prove too cumbersome, the joint price level
optimization can be solved using non-linear optimization techniques. For
instance, the optimal solutions to the program can be provided using off-the-
shelf software packages (e.g. GAMS) which perform non-linear optimization.
The more complicated forms of the generalized cost model are solved
numerically using the GAMS package under plausible OD market characteristics.
5.2.1 Capacity Unconstrained Case
Unconstrained optimization yields the optimal price levels for the joint
optimization when the capacity constraint is not binding. In other words, if the
aircraft is not full, unconstrained optimization is the appropriate methodology.
The objective function used (assumed to be from the perspective of the airline) is
a simple revenue maximization. Other objectives could be tested, however, since
airlines are ultimately responsible for the pricing of their services, revenue
maximization seems appropriate.
The basic constant cost model (without diversion) has been solved analytically
using the techniques of unconstrained optimization (or, equivalently, the
Lagrange multiplier method with X = 0) assuming a linear demand function. The
demand function for the linear case appears as follows for the constant cost
model:
Pi=PO - al Qj - cj (5.1)
jsi jsi
Substituting the assumed linear demand functions into the objective function of
the joint price level optimization yields the following simplified objective:
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N N N(i
Max R = PoX Qi - aX Q- a QiQj - cjQi (5.2)
i=1 i=1 V (ij) i=1 j=1
Using simple calculus, the unconstrained optimality condition for each fare
product i is:
gR =Po-2aQi-XQj-Xcj=O (5.3)
dQi j=1
The unconstrained optimal solution in terms of the number of passengers
requesting service using each fare product i is:
N N
PO - I kck 
__ck
.i k=1 .. + k=i+1 (5.4)(N+1)a a
A substitution of the optimal fare product demand levels into the demand
functions yields the optimal price levels for each fare product:
i NW NP kck - iCk (5.5)
k=1 k=i+1 k=i+1
The solution to the unconstrained optimization, of course, is only valid in cases
N
where 2 Qi Cap.
i=1
5.2.2 Capacity Constrained Case
If the aircraft capacity constraint is binding, the Lagrange multiplier technique
provides an analytical solution to the non-linear joint price level optimization
program with linear demand functions. The Lagrange multiplier method
presented assumes that the aircraft capacity constraint is binding and
incorporates that constraint into the objective function with a multiplier term.
Substitution of the linear demand functions and capacity constraint into the
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revenue maximization objective yields the Lagrangian for the capacity
constrained optimization:
N N N i N
Max L = POX Qi - ayQi -a I QiQj- I cjQi - X Cap - I Qi (5.6)
i=1 i=1 V (ij) i=1 j=1 -
Differentiation of the Lagrangian with respect to each fare product demand level
along with the capacity constraint provides the capacity constrained optimality
conditions:
dL PO - 2aQi - I Qj- Xcj- X = 0 (5.7)
j~i j=1
N
dL=Cap -1 Qi=0 (5.8)
di i=1
Solution of the program through back substitutions of the optimality conditions
yields the optimal demand levels for the capacity constrained case:
Q Cap ck - ckl (5.9)j=1 k=j+1 j=i+1 k=i+1 J
Substitution of the optimal demand levels into the fare product demand
functions (equation 5.1) yields the optimal price levels for the OD market:
i H-1 N m
Pi =Po- -i ap +(-) ck - I E ck (5.10)4N N j=1 _m=1 k=m+1 m=j+1 k=j+1 
_
Finally, for the constant cost model with linear demands, the Lagrange multiplier
term has the following form at optimality:
N
= PO - (N+1 )aCap - 1 (N-j+1) c (5.11)
j=1
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when the capacity constraint is binding.
N
The constrained optimal solution is valid in cases where Y Qi > Cap for the
i=1
aircraft serving the OD market.
5.2.3 Numerical Demonstration of Base Case Linear Constant Cost Model
Performance of numerical analysis using the constant cost model with linear
demands is useful to demonstrate the testable applications. A three fare product
"base case" is used for the analysis with the following OD market parameters:
1)P 0 = 600
2) a = 3
3) Cap = 150
4)c1 = 0
5) c2 = 75
6) c3 = 25
Consequently, the linear demand functions for each of the three fare products
available on the single OD market flight are:
P1 = 600 - 3QI (5.12)
P2 = 600 - 3(Q1+Q2)- 75 (5.13)
P3 =600 - 3(Q1+Q2+Q3) - 100 (5.14)
The demand functions place the maximum willingness to pay of any passenger
in the market for fare products 1, 2, and 3 at $600, $525, and $500, respectively.
Moreover, the airline must lower the fare by three dollars to attract an additional
passenger into booking any of the fare products.
The market is served by a single 150 seat aircraft. In the base case, passengers are
assumed to be perfectly segmented between the unrestricted fare product 1 and
the more-restricted fare products 2 and 3. Fare product 1 is unrestricted and the
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cost associated with accepting fare product 2 or 3 instead of the fare product 1 is
$75 or $100, respectively. The degradation cost associated with the unrestricted
fare product is, of course, zero. Fare product 2 has greater similarity (in terms of
imposed consumer costs) to fare product 3 than to the unrestricted product. The
base case represents a situation in which the lower-priced fare products are much
less desirable than the unrestricted, similar to the "value pricing" plan initiated
by American Airlines in 1992 which offered seven and fourteen day advance
purchase, non-refundable excursion fares in addition to the unrestricted product.
The above OD market characterization is used as the basis against which all
variations of the model are tested. Neither passenger diversion nor booking
limits are considered in the base case. In other words, the following parameters
apply in the base case formulation:
1) d 12 = 0
2) d 13 = 0
3) d23 = 0
4) BL1 =0
5) BL 2 =0
6) BL 3 =*
The above parameters are varied to measure their effects on the optimal solutions
later in the chapter when passenger diversion and booking limits are formally
addressed. A derivation of the base case example having variations of a single
parameter, are named, for example, "base case varying d13" when the diversion
percentage from fare product 1 to fare product 3 is changed.
The optimal values of price level, passenger demand, and airline revenue by fare
product appear below in Table 5.1 for the base case:
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Product Passengers Price evenue
FP1 5.58 $406 26235
FP2 39.58 $213 410
FP3 31.25 $94 2930
Table 5.1 Three Fare Product Base Case
The optimal solution would have a binding capacity constraint at approximately
135 seats with the Lagrange multiplier term associated with the capacity
constraint near zero (e.g. an additional seat does not observably change the
optimal solution or decision variables when this market is served by a 135 seat
aircraft).
5.2.4 Varying the Aircraft Capacity
The results of the analysis vary with the capacity of the aircraft serving the
market. Variations in the capacity constraint, however, are only interesting in the
case of joint price level optimization when the capacity constraint is binding. A
single unit relaxation of a binding capacity constraint usually results in the
acceptance of an additional passenger in the lowest fare class except when the
shadow price associated with the capacity constraint (e.g. Lagrange multiplier
term) is zero. While varying the capacity by a single seat only changes the seat
allocation by one seat, when using the joint price level optimization, the optimal
price levels and passenger mix may shift as well.
It is evident from equation 5.10 that an increase in the capacity serving the
market will unambiguously decrease all optimal fare product price levels. Figure
5.1 shows the decrease in all optimal fare product price levels occurring in the
base case varying capacity until the joint optimization capacity constraint ceases
to be binding at 135 seats. The number of passengers carried, on the other hand,
increases up to the point where the capacity constraint no longer binds the
solution as seen in Figure 5.2. Simple optimization sensitivity analysis
guarantees that relaxation of a strongly binding constraint increases the objective
function. The Lagrange multiplier term presented in Equation 5.11 represents
the marginal value of an additional unit of capacity (e.g. another seat) in the OD
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Figure 5.1 - Base Case Varying Capacity - Prices by Fare Product
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market. Thus, a revenue improvement is guaranteed with increased capacity in
all capacity constrained cases except where the capacity constraint is loosely
binding (e.g. the Lagrange multiplier term equals zero, making the revenue effect
of increased capacity neutral). Figure 5.3 shows the increasing revenues in the
OD market resulting from relaxations of the capacity constraint up to the
unconstrained optimal total demand level where the objective levels off.
Figure 5.4 shows the effect of increased capacity on the traffic mix in the OD
market. The optimal traffic mix is dominated by the least-restricted fare product
for low capacities relative to demand. This is expected since when the number of
seats available are quite limited, it benefits the airline to charge higher prices (as
seen in Figure 5.1) and sell a greater proportion of those seats to the passengers
with higher values of willingness to pay. For greater capacities, the unrestricted
fare product progressively loses dominance until the capacity constraint ceases to
be binding. Even so, the unrestricted product still maintains approximately fifty
percent of all passenger traffic under perfect segmentation in the optimization
base case varying capacity.
5.2.5 Varying the Degradation Costs Facing Consumers
The imperfection of second degree price discrimination techniques can be
addressed in two ways, through the increased costs imposed on passengers by
purchase restrictions and the inability of purchase restrictions to identify and
segment the population as intended by the airline. For the former problem,
varying the degradation costs associated with accepting increased purchase
restrictions can be used to measure the effects of imperfect segmentation
techniques. The effects of varying the degradation costs are addressed here. The
latter problem can be addressed through different relaxations of the passenger
segmentation assumptions (e.g. incorporating passenger diversion) addressed in
the next section.
The unconstrained optimal price levels can be rewritten to show the effects of
changing the different types of degradation costs. The transformed optimal price
levels isolate the effects of more-restricted and less-restricted fare products :
197
Base Case Varying Capacity - Total
Revenue
40000.00
35000.00
30000.00
25000.00
20000.00
15000.00
10000.00
5000.00
0.00
MM EHUE EU EU
.
.
,?
m
tm
/
LO LO LO LO toCm I- w ao LInO N
HLH
LO
Capacity
Figure 5.3 - Base Case Varying Capacity - Total Revenue
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i N NC=[1-(Ni)]P-1-(Ni) kck+(N 1_ kCk- X ick (5.15)
k=1 k=i+1 k=i+1
First, the effects of the less-restricted fare products are shown. The effects of the
degradation costs associated with the fare products less restricted than i on the
optimal price level Pi are completely contained within the second of the four
terms in equation 5.15. The following bound clearly holds for each (positive) fare
product i and any number of fare products N:
0 s (N I<1 (5.16)
The effect of the second term of equation 5.15 on optimal price levels is thus,
unambiguously negative. As the degradation costs associated with the less-
restricted fare products increase, the optimal price level decreases. Optimal price
levels vary inversely with the degradation costs associated with the less-
restricted fare products. Therefore, airlines may achieve increases in the optimal
price levels of their fare products through the reduction of the degradation costs
associated with the higher-priced fare products.
Next, the effects of the more-restricted fare product degradation costs are
explored. The degradation costs associated with the fare products that are more
restricted than fare product i are contained in both the third and fourth terms of
equation 5.15. It is easily shown that the following inequality holds in all cases:
N
(Ni) k kck < ick (5.17)
=i+1 k=i+1
The above inequality reveals that as the degradation costs associated with the
more-restricted fare products increase, the optimal price levels of any fare
product fall. In other words, the third term of equation 5.15 dominates the
fourth. The final result is that the negative component of more-restricted fare
product degradation costs always exceeds the positive, resulting in an inverse
proportionality between degradation costs and optimal price levels. Airlines
may achieve increases in the optimal price levels for their fare products by the
reduction of the degradation costs associated with lower-priced fare products.
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In summary, a decrease in the degradation costs associated with any fare product
results in an increase in the optimal price levels for the fare product in the
unconstrained case. Simply stated, the constant cost model with linear demands
tells us that as degradation costs decrease, optimal price levels rise in the absence
of a binding capacity constraint. This result holds whether the decreases in
degradation costs occur for the more-restricted or less-restricted fare products.
Transforming the solution (in terms of price levels) to the capacity constrained
optimization identifies the effects of different types of degradation costs on
optimal price levels in the other supply scenario:
Hi -I
Pi = PO -a Cap + (- ckj=1 m=1 k=m+1 (5.18)
i N i i N m
-(-L)k ck-(j) E ckj=1 m=j+1 k=j+1 j=1 m=j+1 k=i+l
Equation 5.18 shows that the optimal price level for each fare product i are a
function of the degradation costs associated with all fare products. All of the
degradation costs associated with the more-restricted fare products are contained
within the fifth (and final) term on the right hand side of equation 5.18. Clearly,
all costs contained in the final term have a negative impact on the optimal price
level of fare product i. Thus, as in the capacity unconstrained case, the optimal
price levels decrease as the degradation costs associated with the more-restricted
fare products increase.
The effects on the optimal price level of fare product i of the degradation costs
associated with fare products less restricted than i, on the other hand, are not
determinate. For each fare product i, the effect on the optimal price level Pi of the
degradation costs associated with less-restricted fare products (than i) has two
components that impact the optimal price level differently. For any fare product
j less restricted than i, the degradation costs associated with each fare product
that is less restricted than j will lower the optimal number of passengers
purchasing fare product j (as is evident from equation 5.9). Equation 5.1
demonstrates that a decrease in the number of passengers purchasing fare
product j will, in turn, increase the optimal price level of fare product i. This
201
effect on optimal price levels is contained entirely within the third term on the
right hand side in equation 5.18.
Using similar reasoning, the degradation costs associated with each fare product
that is more restricted than each fare product j (less restricted than i) increases the
optimal number of passengers purchasing fare product j and, thus, decreases the
optimal price level for fare product i. The fourth term on the right hand side in
equation 5.18 isolates this negative effect on the optimal price level Pi. The final
result of the effect of the degradation costs of fare products less restricted than i
on the optimal price level Pi is indeterminate because the size of each
degradation cost is variable and neither of the two effects dominate.
Of greater concern to the airline is the effect on revenue of changes in the
degradation costs. The total revenue for the market is simply:
Total Revenue = P Q (5.19)
i=1
Since the quantities of passengers decrease and the optimal price levels increase
with increases in the degradation costs in most cases, a closer look at the effect on
revenue is required. An increase in the degradation costs associated with
accepting a more-restricted fare product is equivalent to an inward shift of the
demand function for that and all more-restricted fare products. As a result,
optimal revenues never increase for the case in which demand for the fare
products is lower. In other words, the decreased demand resulting from the
increased passenger degradation costs more than counteracts the revenue
increases of the price increases in all cases. Thus, high degradation costs are
never in the interest of the airline and every attempt should be made to develop
passenger segmentation techniques with the lowest possible degradation costs
ceteris paribus.
The effect of increasing the degradation costs associated with a single fare
product i is a decrease in revenue for the airline of AciQi when no reoptimization
is performed. A reoptimization would result in a lower revenue (or at best
equal) than in the case with less severe degradation costs because of the
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decreased level of demand that results from the cost increases. The actual
revenue result depends upon the size of the new optimal price and traffic levels.
5.2.6 Variations of the OD Market Demand Levels
The variations of the demand function parameters in the constant cost model
with linear demands, in general, provide intuitive results. An increase in the
parameter P0, or the maximum willingness to pay of any passenger, results in
higher demand levels and higher optimal price levels for both the capacity
constrained and unconstrained cases. Mathematically, these results are seen in
equations 5.4,5.9,5.5, and 5.10, respectively. Clearly, the optimal revenue also
increases with increased willingness to pay in the travel population.
Increases in the slope of the demand functions produce a downward effect on
optimal price levels for both the capacity constrained and unconstrained cases.
The effect on passenger demand of changes in the slope, however, differ in the
capacity constrained and unconstrained scenarios. Passenger demand at
optimality decreases with increases in the demand function slope in the
unconstrained case. Accordingly, the effect on revenue in the unconstrained case
is downward for any increases in the slope. This is also intuitively pleasing since
an increase in demand function slope represents increased sensitivity to price
level within the travel population.
The effect on passenger demand of changes in the slope of the demand function
in the capacity constrained case is not determined due to the variability of the
degradation costs. If the degradation costs associated with fare products less
restricted than i are large relative to the costs accompanying the more-restricted
fare products, then the slope has an upward effect on the optimal Qi. Large
degradation costs on the fare products more restricted than i produce the
opposite effect on Qi with respect to increases in demand function slope.
Unfortunately, the effect on revenue is not determined either.
5.2.7 Benefits of Introducing More Fare Products
As the number of differentiated fare products offered in the market increases, the
revenue potential for the airline also increases. Consequently, the ability to
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perform an increasingly disaggregate passenger segmentation enhances the
expected revenue of the airline. Unfortunately for the airline, there are
diminishing returns to increasing the number of fare products offered on the
market, even assuming perfect passenger identification and segmentation . The
constant cost model demonstrates that the revenue improvement per fare
product becomes progressively smaller as more fare products are introduced. In
the limit, the revenue contribution of adding fare products approaches zero.
Lower levels of passenger demand mitigate the revenue impact of introducing
additional fare products. Recall that increasing the degradation costs associated
with any of the fare products is equivalent to an inward shift in the demand
function for that product. The resulting optimal revenue after a demand function
has shifted inward cannot be greater than that prior to the shift. Thus, the
generalized cost model in the absence of degradation costs determines an upper
bound on the effects on total revenue of the introduction of additional fare
products onto the market.
The generalized cost model improves upon the existing models of airline fare
product differentiation by introducing the demand curbing effects of perceived
passenger degradation costs associated with the more-restricted fare products.
Under the existing models (equivalent to the generalized cost model without
degradation costs), airlines systematically overpredict the effects of introducing
additional fare products to the market. While the diminishing returns on
additional fare product introductions are still apparent in the previous models,
their impact may be significantly less than predicted leading to unrealistic
performance expectations. Nonetheless, an exploration of the upper bound on
the revenue impacts of introducing additional fare products to the market is
instructive and appears next.
For the capacity unconstrained case with no degradation costs, the optimal price
levels and expected demand are shown below:
P. PO - O (5.20)
N+1
Qi = 0 (5.21)C . (+)
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Equation 5.20 demonstrates that the optimal price levels increase for each of the
fare products as N increases. Equation 5.21 ensures a decrease in the demand for
each fare product as additional fare products are introduced. In addition, an
even distribution of passengers among the fare products is guaranteed by
equation 5.21 with total demand for the flight of:
o = NPO (5.22)iota' 
-(N+1)a
Total demand increases in N and approaches the asymptotic limit of:
as o tall = (5.23)
The total expected revenue in the optimal capacity unconstrained case for N fare
products is:
Revenue N =(N )[P02 (5.24)
which shows the total OD market revenue to be increasing in N and approaching
the asymptotic limit:
aslN n Revenue N) = (5.25)
The change in revenue experienced by the airline as the number of fare products
offered is increased from N to N+1 for the capacity unconstrained case appears
below:
ARevenue [(N+1 ) N P1 NO (5.26)
AN N+2 N+1 j 2a J
The above relation shows that the final result of the optimal price level increases
among an increasing number of evenly distributed passengers is an increase in
revenue for the market as additional fare products are introduced. Equation 5.26
also shows that the exact size of the revenue increase resulting from an
additional fare product introduction depends not only upon the number of fare
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products already offered on the market, but also on the demand parameters for
the market. Although a revenue increase is guaranteed from the introduction of
new fare products, in the limit, the revenue increment is driven to zero:
lim ARevenue 0 (5.27)as N 
-c AN /
demonstrating the diminishing returns to additional fare product introduction in
the optimal capacity unconstrained case.
For the capacity constrained case, the optimal price levels and expected demand
are:
P = PO - a()ap (5.28)
_ Cap (5.29)
N
In contrast to the capacity unconstrained case, the total passengers cannot exceed
the aircraft cabin capacity leaving total passengers constant and equal to
capacity. Therefore, the increase in optimal price level that occurs for each fare
product as N increases also results in increased revenues for the airline since
passengers are evenly distributed among the fare products once again. The total
revenue for the OD market flight is:
* IR~N+1 I[aCap2
Revenue N = POCap - N 1 a2rJ (5.30)
and approaches an asymptotic limit of:
aslm (Revenue N) = PoCap - aCp (5.31)
In the capacity constrained case, the increase in total revenue received by the
airline from offering an additional fare product (under perfect segmentation) is:
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ARevenue [(N+1) _(N+2 aCap] (5.32)
AN N N+1 . 2
as the number of fare products is increased from N to N+1. As the number of
fare products N becomes large, the revenue increment resulting from the
introduction of an additional fare product becomes smaller. In fact, the revenue
increment is driven to zero as N becomes very large:
lim ARevenue = 0 (5.33)as N 
-o AN /
Thus, the diminishing returns to fare product additions are replicated for the
optimal capacity constrained case.
An alternative view of revenue potential is offered by examining total system
welfare. The upper bound on total revenue achievable by the airline is equal to
total welfare in the capacity unconstrained case. With a binding capacity
constraint, the upper bound on total revenue equals the total welfare available to
the passengers with the highest values of willingness to pay (up to capacity).
The limit of total revenue as N approaches infinity is:
Revenue UB = f [Po - aqdq (5.34)
where
Qmax = the maximum demand allowable for the OD market flight
In the optimal capacity unconstrained case, equation 5.34 is equivalent to
equation 5.25 since Qmax is equal to the maximum level of demand in the market
(at zero price level) given in equation 5.23. Qmax is equal to the total number of
available seats in the optimal capacity constrained case, making the solution of
equation 5.34 equivalent to equation 5.31.
Some simple examples provide insight to the impact of the addition of fare
products to the market. With no binding capacity constraint, 80% of the total
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potential revenue gain can be achieved by offering four fare products (dividing
equation 5.24 by equation 5.25). Ninety percent of the revenue can be guaranteed
from the introduction of nine fare products in the unconstrained case.
Introducing the next 90 fare products leads to only a 9% improvement in revenue
(assuming perfect segmentation). The incremental revenue returns to additional
fare products decrease quite rapidly as Figure 5.5 illustrates for the capacity
unconstrained case. In the capacity constrained case, the total potential revenue
gain is dependent upon the parameters PO, a, and Cap (dividing equation 5.30 by
equation 5.31). Hence, the exact revenue potential in the capacity constrained
case is OD market specific.
Practical constraints also limit the ability of the airline to offer more fare products
and should be considered when contemplating increased passenger
segmentation attempts. When an airline introduces a new fare product, costs are
incurred as a result of such factors as increased advertisement and added service
offering complexity. The costs of offering additional fare products are likely to
exceed the revenue benefit when several fare products are already offered. In
addition, the ability to segment passengers into smaller populations becomes less
likely when significant segmentation has already been achieved. The number of
fare products that can be offered by a carrier is also limited by the capabilities of
the computer reservations systems. The reservation system data bases are
limited in the number of fare products that they store due to the shortcomings of
the storage capacity of the reservations systems at many carriers. Finally, many
consumers already resist the "complicated" fare product structure on the market
today. An increase in the number of fare products may confuse or upset such
consumers.
5.2.8 Effects of Degradation Costs on Fare Product Introductions
When degradation costs are included in the generalized cost model, the positive
revenue impacts of introducing additional fare products to the OD market are
mitigated. The generalized cost model with degradation costs is compared to the
case of zero degradation costs in an exploration of the effects of perceived
passenger cost on the revenue improvements available from increasing the
number of fare products.
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The degradation costs associated with each fare product on the market are set to
$5 and then $10 in the examples presented. In other words, the (incremental)
degradation cost ci associated with each fare product i is equal to $5 and $10,
respectively, in the two cases presented. For example, the total degradation costs
associated with fare product 3 are $10 and $20, respectively, in the cases.
Similarly, the fare product 4 degradation costs are $15 and $30. As expected,
increasing degradation costs (ci) reduce total optimal revenue increasingly as
shown in Figure 5.6. The lower the perceived value of the fare products on the
market, the less impact that additional fare product introductions have on total
revenue.
Although lowered, the revenue impact remains non-negative when degradation
costs are varied ceteris paribus. A non-negative revenue impact is guaranteed in
all cases where the fare product structure is only varied by the addition of a
single fare product (regardless of the associated degradation costs). Thus,
although increased degradation costs mitigate the positive revenue impacts of
fare product introductions onto the market, even large degradation costs cannot
cause additional fare product introductions to have a negative revenue impact
for the case of perfect passenger segmentation and identification.
5.3 Constant Cost Model with Linear Demands Allowing Passenger Diversion
The assumption that airlines are able to perfectly identify and segment the
consumer population by their willingness to pay is relaxed in this section. The
impacts of ineffective fences on the OD market can be quantified using the
generalized cost model by varying the assumptions surrounding the passenger
segmentation made by the airline. Unfortunately, obtaining analytical solutions
to the constant cost model allowing passenger diversion becomes too
complicated to yield intelligible results even for simple cases. As a result, only
numerical analysis using the GAMS optimization package is performed when
measuring the effects of passenger diversion. The optimal solutions to the model
extensions with diversion are compared to each other and referenced to the no
diversion case to make insights concerning the impacts of passenger diversion.
C
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Examples of three fare product markets are used to demonstrate the effects of
passenger diversion on the optimal solution to the joint price level optimization
problem through comparisons to the base case model (without diversion) and
cross-comparisons varying input parameters. In the generalized cost model,
diverting passengers are assumed to be initially segmented into purchasing a
higher-priced, less-restricted fare product. Then, as a result of their ability to
meet the imposed restrictions, they purchase a lower-priced fare product. Hence,
passenger diversion may only occur from higher-priced, less-restricted fare
products to lower-priced ones. In the initial three fare product example, fare
product 1 consumers are allowed to divert to fare product 2 exclusively while
fare product 2 consumers may not divert. This scenario is referred to as the base
case varying d12. Passengers are allowed to divert between the other fare
products in subsequent examples.
It should be noted that the diverting passengers are still subject to the
degradation costs associated with the more-restricted products that they
purchase. In the base case varying d12, for example, passengers diverting from
fare product 1 incur a cost of $75 when they purchase fare product 2. In other
words, although the fencing mechanism is imperfect, the diverting passengers
are still inconvenienced by the added travel restrictions. The sole benefit
received by the diverting passenger is the added consumer surplus received from
the lower price level of the more-restricted fare product (net of degradation
costs).
5.3.1 Basic Impacts of Passenger Diversion
The passenger diversion effect of primary concern to airlines is the revenue
dilution that results from passengers purchasing fare products less expensive
than intended. When passengers divert to the lower-priced fare products as a
result of their ability to meet the purchase restrictions imposed by airlines, the
revenue received by a carrier may be reduced in addition to other optimality
conditions being changed. The negative revenue impacts of diversion are
expected to increase with the number of passengers diverting. Figure 5.7 shows
the expected decline in revenue for the optimal price level solution as passenger
diversion between fare product 1 and fare product 2 increases in the base case of
the linear constant cost model varying d12. In the figure, and all future figures
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addressing passenger diversion, dij is defined as the percentage of diversion
occurring from fare product i to fare product j.
A decrease in optimal revenue does not, however, always result from increased
diversion. In the case where diversion occurs from fare product 1 to fare product
3 exclusively (seen in Figure 5.8), the impact of increased diversion is revenue-
neutral when a 60% diversion rate is exceeded. Thus, while increasing the level
of passenger diversion generally results in a decrease in optimal airline revenues,
the effect can be revenue neutral as witnessed in the specific case (base case
varying d13) presented in Figure 5.8.
Without diversion, the unrestricted fare product commands nearly seventy
percent of the revenue for the entire flight. As the percentage of diversion from
fare product 1 to fare product 2 increases, the amount of revenue received from
the unrestricted fare product decreases and, in the limit, is driven to zero. Figure
5.9 highlights the declining importance of the unrestricted fare product to
optimal revenue performance as fare product 1 passengers divert increasingly.
In contrast, the revenue received from fare product 2 at optimality increases as a
result of the increased demand from diverting passengers. In fact, fare product 2
possesses over seventy percent of the revenue share among the fare products at
100% diversion exceeding the revenue share dominance of fare product 1 in the
no diversion base case.
Interestingly, not only is the revenue once earned by fare product 1 transferred to
fare product 2 in the optimal solution, but also to fare product 3 as seen in Figure
5.10. There is upward pressure on both the optimal price levels and demand for
fare product 3 as Figures 5.11 and 5.12 demonstrate. The percentage of revenue
earned by fare product 3 with increased fare product 1 diversion increases from
under 9% to almost 29% aided by an increase in traffic share from 23% to 46%.
As expected, in the face of increasing fare product 1 diversion, fare products 2
and 3 increase in importance in both revenue and passenger share. Overall, the
number of passengers carried for each of the lower-priced fare products increases
while the total number of passengers carried decreases as shown in Figures 5.12
and 5.13, respectively. Therefore, while the importance of the lower-priced fare
products increases (in terms of both traffic and revenue per fare product), the
final effect on traffic and revenue is negative in the presence of diversion.
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Looking more closely at the optimal price levels, Figure 5.11 shows that
passenger diversion from fare product 1 to 2 puts upward pressure on the
optimal fare levels for all three fare products. It is reasonable that an airline
would want to accept fewer passengers at a higher fare level in the presence of a
high diversion percentage for the unrestricted fare product. The results of the
optimization considering passenger diversion suggest that a revenue maximizing
airline should raise price levels to counteract the revenue dilution effects of
diversion.
As the diversion percentage increases, the optimal solution to the three fare
product example approximates the two fare product case. The only differences
between the two fare product case and the three fare product case with 100%
diversion for fare product 1 are the added degradation costs for the two "selling"
fares. In fact, the optimal price levels from the joint price level optimization for
two fare products with zero degradation costs on the restricted fare product yield
results identical to the 3 fare product case with d12 diversion. With degradation
costs, however, the optimal three fare product solution with 100% fare product 1
diversion produces less revenue than the optimal two fare product case.
Therefore, two fare products with an effective fence between them may improve
revenue for the airline over three fare products having significant diversion
when degradation costs are considered. Airlines should pay close attention to
diversion considerations when designing new fare product for the market
because of the revenue dilution effects that may occur from higher-priced fare
product passengers buying down.
The cost of diversion in terms of total revenue is expected to decrease as the fare
products from which passengers divert become more restricted (and less
expensive). In this way, when a passenger segmentation scheme fails for the
passengers with the highest values of willingness to pay, the revenue impact is
potentially greater than when passengers with lower values of willingness to pay
divert. Figure 5.14 presents a comparison of the revenue impacts of passenger
diversion in the cases where passengers divert from fare products 1 to 2 and 1 to
3. In the figure, for any fixed level of passenger diversion from fare product 1,
the negative revenue impact is greater when passengers divert to fare product 3
than when diversion occurs to fare product 2.
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Similarly, passengers with lower levels of willingness to pay who divert are
expected to have less of an impact on airline revenues. This effect is reflected by
the comparison of passenger diversion from fare product 2 to 3 to that from fare
product 1 to 3 also presented in Figure 5.14. The negative revenue effect of
diversion from fare product 2 to fare product 3 is significantly less than that from
fare product 1. Thus, the cost to the airline of diversion from passengers with
higher values of willingness to pay who purchase less-restricted fare products
than intended is greater ceteris paribus.
5.3.2 Varying the Degradation Costs Associated with Fare Products
The base case provides only a single instance of a fare product structure facing
consumers in the OD market. Changes in the fare product structure or consumer
perceptions of the costs associated with purchase restrictions can change the
optimal solutions to the joint price level optimization problem. In this section,
the sensitivity of the generalized cost model to changes in the fare product
structure (as exhibited in the degradation costs) is tested. The results seek to
demonstrate the effect on optimal price levels, passenger demand, airline
revenue, and societal welfare of varying the fare product structure (degradation
costs) when airline passenger segmentation schemes are imperfect.
The degradation costs associated with fare product 2 are varied from the base
case model to examine the sensitivity of the optimal results to changes in the
degradation costs. Specifically, the degradation cost associated with fare product
2 relative to fare product 1 varies from zero to $100 in increments of $25. Fare
products 1 and 2 are identical in the eyes of consumers when the degradation
cost associated with fare product 2 is zero. A degradation cost of $100, on the
other hand, makes fare product 2 identical to fare product 3 since the total
degradation cost associated with fare product 3 is held at a constant $100 more
than the unrestricted fare product (1) for all of the tests. As before, the results of
the joint price level optimization are calculated under varying passenger
diversion (d12) percentages.
As the degradation costs associated with the restricted fare products increase, the
cost of diversion to the airline (and welfare) increases. This is expected since
each diverting passenger able to purchase the more-restricted fare product incurs
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the (increased) associated degradation costs. Figure 5.15 shows the decrease in
total optimal revenues that occur as fare product 2 is made increasingly less
attractive to consumers. The total market welfare reduction appears in Figure
5.16 and, as expected, increased degradation costs result in larger welfare
reductions.
Recalling that an isolated increase in the degradation costs associated with a
single fare product is equivalent to an inward shift in the demand for that fare
product, decreased demand levels for fare product 2 are shown in Figure 5.17 as
the fare product 2 degradation costs are increased. In contrast, the total number
of passengers actually purchasing fare products 1 and 3 at optimality actually
increase as shown in Figures 5.18 and 5.19, respectively. This makes sense since
increasing fare product 2 degradation costs makes fare products 1 and 3 more
attractive relative to fare product 2 ceteris paribus. Overall, however, the fare
product 2 traffic losses dominate and the total passenger levels decrease with the
increased degradation costs as Figure 5.20 demonstrates.
Figures 5.21 and 5.22 show that the optimal price levels associated with fare
products 1 and 2, respectively, are higher with lower fare product 2 degradation
costs. Fare product 2 looks relatively less attractive to fare product 1 as fare
product 2 degradation costs increase. Fare product 1 commands a higher price
level ceteris paribus as it becomes relatively more attractive to consumers. In
addition, there is increasing pressure to lower the number of passengers
diverting to the less-attractive fare product since fare product 2 is priced lower as
c2 increases. Lower fare product 1 demand can only be achieved by raising the
its price level.
A discontinuity of the fare product 1 price levels appears in Figure 5.21 when the
passenger diversion percentage between fare products 1 and 2 reaches 100%.
Not only do the fare product 1 price levels drop significantly, but their
"ordering" with respect to degradation costs also shifts. In the case with 100%
diversion occurring from fare product 1 to 2 only, it should be noted that the fare
product 1 price level no longer effects the objective function allowing alternate
optima to exist for the joint price level optimization one of which is the situation
appearing in Figure 5.21; another is the continuous solution. In fact, the optimal
fare product 1 price level can take on any value greater than or equal to the
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Figure 5.18 - Base Case Varying Degradation Costs - FP1 Passengers Carried
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Figure 5.19 - Base Case Varying Degradation Costs - FP3 Passengers Carried
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Figure 5.20 - Base Case Varying Degradation Costs - Total Passengers
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Figure 5.21 - Base Case Varying Degradation Costs - FP1 Price Level
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Figure 5.22 - Base Case Varying Degradation Costs - FP2 Price Level
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optimal fare product 2 price level. Therefore, the discontinuity shown in the
figure need not exist.
The optimal fare product 2 price level has upward pressure with increased
diversion since captive demand is being shifted down from fare product 1. The
diverting fare product 1 passengers are captive to fare product 2 as long as P2
remains less than P1 + c2. It is therefore in the interests of the airline to charge
the diverting fare product 1 passengers the highest possible price level for fare
product 2. Thus, the optimal fare product price 2 level must shift upward
increasingly to compensate for the downward pressure applied by the increasing
degradation costs. Optimal fare product 3 price levels, on the other hand, are
higher for the fare product structures with higher fare product 2 degradation
costs as Figure 5.23 demonstrates. The higher values of the optimal price level
for fare product 3 reflect its relative improvement (in consumer perceptions)
compared to fare product 2 and the lower number of total passengers carried
when degradation costs are increased.
5.3.3 Tradeoff Between Degradation Costs and Passenger Diversion
Ideally, airlines would like to perfectly segment passengers by their willingness
to pay while imposing no fare product degradation costs upon them. To this
end, airlines attempt to design fare product purchase restrictions that provide the
best segmentation while imposing the least cost on consumers. Due to the
practical constraints of fare product design, however, airlines generally face a
choice between the severity of the costs imposed by the segmentation device and
the level of passenger diversion occurring. Once again, the airlines must
confront the demand stimulation versus revenue dilution tradeoff. The nature of
this tradeoff can be quantified using the assumed passenger diversion
percentages and degradation costs input to the generalized cost modeling
framework. The results of such an analysis can be used to measure the benefits
and pitfalls of proposed fare product modifications aimed at preventing
passenger diversion.
For the three fare product base case with diversion between fare products 1 and 2
only, imagine that the restrictions accompanying fare product 2 may be modified
to reduce the degradation costs (associated with fare product 2) by $50. To do so,
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Figure 5.23 - Base Case Varying Degradation Costs - FP3 Price Level
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however, results in an increase in the passenger diversion percentage from 20%
to 40% as a result of the decreased effectiveness of the more lenient purchase
restrictions. The airline faces a choice between the decrease in the degradation
costs with an increase in the passenger diversion rate and maintaining the status
quo.
Examining Figure 5.15, a $50 dollar decrease in the fare product 2 degradation
costs and the associated increase in passenger diversion from 20 to 40% results in
a net increase in expected airline revenues of $917 over the prevailing conditions.
From a revenue perspective, the airline would be advised to modify the current
fare product structure by reducing the degradation costs associated with fare
product 2 and accepting the increase in passenger diversion.
Although fare products with higher degradation costs have more negative
revenue impacts in the constant cost model without diversion ceteris paribus, the
positive revenue effects of decreased passenger diversion may counteract the
increased degradation costs. While airlines should strive to introduce fare
products with the lowest possible degradation costs, this should not be done at
the expense of large increases in diversion. Airlines considering new fare
product designs must consider the effects of both perceived consumer
degradation costs as well as diversion to best enhance their fare product
structures.
5.3.4 Admitting that Passenger Diversion Exists May Improve Results
The cost to airlines resulting from passenger diversion can be substantial as
shown in the above examples. Although it is unlikely that the airline can prevent
passenger diversion from occurring, the revenue dilution effects of diversion can
be minimized if the nature of passenger diversion is known. Simply stated, an
airline that admits to having a diversion problem can recuperate some of its
losses through improved pricing decisions. This subsection seeks to demonstrate
that the costs of denying the existence of passenger diversion can be great for the
airline in terms of missed revenue opportunities. Joint optimization of price
levels taking into account the diversion percentages believed to exist in the
market can suggest the preferred pricing strategy for a carrier to pursue under a
given fare product structure.
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The gap between the two total revenue curves shown in Figure 5.24 presents the
difference in revenues between the airline admitting and denying the existence of
passenger diversion behavior in the base case of the constant cost model with
linear demands, varying d12 (the diversion rate between fare products 1 and 2).
The revenue difference is quite small for low diversion percentages. As
diversion increases, however, the revenue gap increases. In the limit, over a 14%
improvement in revenue exists when the carrier admits that 100% diversion
occurs from fare product 1 to 2 in the example.
The price level optimization for the base case varying d12 increases the optimal
price levels for fare products 1, 2, and 3 shown in Figure 5.11 when the proper
level of passenger diversion is predicted. The percentage difference between the
fare product 1 optimal price level in the two cases is 15.4% for a 95% diversion
rate between fare products 1 and 2 compared to the no diversion case as shown
in Table 5.2. Percentage differences of 58.7% and 66.6% exist between the
optimal price levels of fare product 2 and 3, respectively, for a 95% fare product 1
to 2 diversion rate relative to the no diversion case. When passenger diversion is
ignored, the price levels are held to values lower than is optimal for the airline
(i.e., at the levels in the zero diversion rate case in Figure 5.11). The result of
ignoring passenger diversion for the airline in the first diversion case is a loss of
revenue caused by pricing the fare products too low (e.g. below the optimal price
levels for the amount of diversion occurring in the market).
Airline Policy Ignore Admit ercent
Diversion Diversion ifference
Percentage Diversion 95% 95%
Revenue $25691 $29519 +14.9%
FP1 Price $406 69 +15.4%
FP2 Price $213 $337 +58.7%
FP3 Price $98 $156 +66.6%
Consumer Surplus $17357 $9813 -43.5%
Passengers 135 115 r15.4%
Table 5.2 Effects of Ignoring and Admitting Diversion on the Base Case with
95% Diversion between Fare Product 1 and Fare Product 2C
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Figure 5.24 - Base Case Varying d12 - Total Revenue: Admitting vs. Ignoring
Diversion
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The joint price level optimization performed under the assumption that
passenger diversion exists allows the airline to improve its revenues by charging
prices that reduce the revenue dilution caused by diverting passengers. The
revenue improvement is achieved, however, at the expense of consumers as
witnessed by the decrease in consumer surplus shown in Figure 5.25. In effect,
the reoptimization of the joint price level problem shifts much of the gain in
consumer surplus resulting from diversion back to the airline. Total market
welfare is maintained at a constant level as long as the total number of seats sold
does not change leading to a one-to-one tradeoff between airline revenue and
consumer surplus.
5.3.5 Effects of Passenger Diversion on Introducing More Fare Products
This subsection discusses the measurement of the effects of offering more fare
products on market revenues and consumer surplus when passengers can divert
to more-restricted fare products. Overall, the existence of passenger diversion in
the market only serves to lower the total revenues earned by the carrier resulting
in a lesser revenue gain for additional fare products than when no diversion may
occur ceteris paribus. The effect of introducing more fare products when
passenger diversion exists in the market, however, is not determined. The
interactions between the fare products determine whether the introduction of an
additional fare product will have a positive or negative revenue effect. For
instance, a fare product that has a lower price than any one currently offered
with virtually no attached purchase restrictions would almost certainly have a
negative revenue impact on the market resulting from diversion increases.
The introduction of an additional fare product to the market may result in
positive incremental revenues if the passenger diversion percentages are small
and do not change markedly resulting from the introduction of the new fare
product. In the limit, the optimal solution with infinitesimally small passenger
diversion percentages approaches the no diversion result. In this case, the
introduction of an additional fare product is likely to be revenue positive. On the
other hand, if many more passengers are able to divert as a result of the
ineffective fence that accompanies the newly introduced fare product, it is
possible that introducing an additional fare product will have a negative effect
on revenue. In either case, measuring the effects of adding fare products to an
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OD market must be made using predictions about the nature of passenger
diversion that occurs (or will occur) between the fare products.
The introduction of a new fare product to a market in which passenger diversion
is present may result in increased or decreased revenues in contrast to the
guaranteed positive revenue impact occurring in the no diversion case. Thus, it
is important to incorporate a proper measure of passenger diversion into the
generalized cost model since its incorrect omission can change the preferred
strategy of an airline.
5.4 Linear Constant Cost Model with Diversion: Applying Booking Limits
In this section, booking limits are applied to the constant cost model of airline
fare product differentiation to demonstrate the effects on the optimal solution to
the joint price level optimization of capacity controls on the individual fare
products. Booking limits are applied to the constant cost model with diversion
and used to provide a look at passenger sell up behavior in the presence of
capacity constraints.
Investigating the effects of capacity controls on demand, revenue, and welfare
can help to provide insight into the methods used by airlines to mitigate the
revenue dilution problem. In this section, the application of booking limits to the
constant cost model with diversion provides a more realistic look at the
passenger demand situation facing commercial airlines. While the analysis
performed here is limited to the static case, there is benefit to exploring the
effects on demand and revenue of the application of booking limits to the
generalized cost model with diversion. Insights concerning passenger behavior
in the presence of booking limits are of particular value to airlines when
considering changes in the OD market fare product structure.
5.4.1 Measurement of Passenger Diversion Recovery Potential
The revenue losses incurred by the airline when passenger diversion exists in the
market can be substantial and airlines seek to minimize them. The previous
section demonstrated one method to reduce diversion losses: by admitting that
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diversion is a problem and performing a reoptimization of prices based upon the
level of passengers diversion expected to occur in the market. Applying booking
limits to the fare products provides another method for airlines to curtail losses
resulting from passenger diversion.
Reversing the negative revenue impact of passenger diversion using booking
limits can be achieved by inducing the diverting passengers to purchase higher-
priced fare products or, ideally, the fare products for which the airline has
targeted them. In other words, booking limits are designed to reverse passenger
buy down behavior. For each individual fare product i, the number of diverting
passengers from that fare product who may be induced to sell up from lower-
priced fare products j by applying booking limits is:
N
Diversion Recovery Potential i = I dijQi (5.35)
j=i+1
For the OD market, the number of passengers potentially selling up is simply
equal to the total number of diverting passengers or:
N-1 N
Total Diversion Recovery Potential = 2 2 djjQj (5.36)
i=1 j=i+1
since passengers targeted to the lowest-priced fare product (N) cannot divert to a
lower-priced fare product.
Each diverting passenger results in lost revenue for the airline. The revenue loss
to the airline as a result of diversion for each fare product i is:
N
Revenue Lossi = I (Pi - Pj)dijQi (5.37)
j=i+1
since the airline was originally expecting to earn Pi for each diverting passenger
targeted for fare product i but instead received only Pj. The resulting revenue
loss for the OD market is :
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N-1 N
Total Revenue Loss = Y 2 (Pi - Pj)dijQi (5.38)
i=1 j=i+1
It is dear from equation 5.38 that the revenue loss is amplified by increased
diversion percentages and large price differentials. The total revenue lost by
diversion is the maximum amount that can be recovered by applying booking
limits to the solution.
Similarly, the deadweight welfare loss associated with passengers diverting from
each fare product i to the lower-priced fare products is:
N
Welfare Lossi = I I ckdijQi (5.39)
j=i+1 i<k j
making the total loss for the OD market:
N-1 N
Total Welfare Loss = ckdijQi (5.40)
i=1 j=i+1 i<k j
Equation 5.40 demonstrates that the welfare loss results exclusively from the
degradation costs associated with the lower-priced fare products incurred by the
diverting passengers. Larger numbers of diverting passengers and high values
of degradation costs result in increased welfare loss and thus, recovery potential.
In fact, with zero degradation costs for the lower priced fare products, the
welfare loss is eliminated. Again, society would benefit from a reduction in
degradation costs.
Passenger diversion results in a consumer surplus gain at the expense of airline
revenue and societal welfare. For any fare product i, the consumer surplus gain
associated with passenger diversion is:
N
Consumer Surplus Gaini = Pi j- ck - Pj] dijQ (5.41)
j=i+1 L <k j J
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The measure of changing consumer surplus simply represents the shift of
revenues away from the airline to the consumer minus the deadweight welfare
loss to the market associated with the increased degradation costs. An increase
in degradation costs results in a decreased consumer surplus gain. Not only do
increased degradation costs reduce optimal welfare and revenue increasingly but
also decrease the amount of consumer surplus. Thus, degradation costs are a
detriment to all ceteris paribus.
The total gain of consumer surplus for all fare products offered in the origin to
destination market is:
N-1 N
Total Consumer Surplus Gain = I [(Pi - ck - P dijQi (5.42)
i j=i+1 L izk j J J
Consequently, the maximum consumer surplus that can be recovered by the
airline is shown in equation 5.42. It is interesting to note that with zero
degradation costs for the lower-priced fare products, the consumer surplus gain
and the revenue loss are equal (e.g. no welfare is lost).
5.4.2 Passenger Switching Behavior in the Presence of Booking Limits
Revenue recovery from the application of booking limits can only result from the
inducement of diverting passengers to purchase higher-priced fare products or
"sell up". In the context of booking limits, an increase in the revenue earned by
the airline through passenger sell up behavior may only result from the denial of
lower-priced fare products to the diverting passengers. To begin, passenger fare
product switching behavior must be defined to properly measure the effect of
booking limits on the solution to the joint price level optimization. The
measurement of revenue, welfare, and consumer surplus impacts can then be
explored under the assumed switching behavior.
All diverting passengers are willing to purchase the fare products for which they
were initially targeted by the airline. When allowed to divert, however, they
prefer to purchase the lowest-priced fare products for which they are able to
meet the restrictions. When booking limits force diverting passengers to sell up,
the general rule for passengers in terms of sell up behavior is that they purchase
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the lowest-priced fare product available to them under the prevailing booking
limits. Diverting passengers denied a seat at the price level of the lowest-priced
fare product that they are able to purchase seek to purchase the next-lowest-
priced fare product until availability enables them to book a fare product.
Consumers attempt to purchase fare products up to and including the fare
product for which they were targeted by the airline. If the consumer is denied
his targeted fare product and all lower-priced fare products that he is eligible to
purchase, he will choose not to travel.
A simple example using a three fare product example with diversion from fare
product 1 to fare product 3 (exclusively) highlights the sell up and diversion
behavior undertaken by consumers in the presence of booking limits. With no
binding booking limits, passengers diverting from fare product 1 will purchase
fare product 3. Diverting passengers unable to purchase fare product 3 because
of an exceeded booking limit will purchase fare product 2 if available. Recall that
passengers able to meet the restrictions associated with fare product 3 are
guaranteed to be able to meet the fare product 2 restrictions and have been
assumed to prefer the lowest priced fare product for which they can meet the
restrictions. If, however, fare product 2 is unavailable due to booking limits, the
diverting passengers will purchase fare product 1 (for which they were targeted
by the airline). It is never logical for the airline to place booking limits on the
unrestricted fare product in the generalized cost model since passengers cannot
divert to it. Thus, fare product 1 provides no sell up opportunity.
Airlines using booking limits also risk denying passengers service who normally
would be willing to travel at the prevailing price levels but are not willing to sell
up to the higher-priced fare products. For example, a passenger hoping to divert
from fare product 2 to fare product 3 who is denied a seat for both fare products
3 and 2, does not have a willingness to pay high enough to elicit the purchase of
fare product 1. Thus, this fare product 2 passenger represents a lost passenger
booking instead of a candidate for sell up when fare product 2 and 3 booking
limits are binding. The potential for service denials introduced by booking limits
makes their revenue impacts uncertain.
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5.4.3 Recovery of Diversion Losses Using Booking Limits
The order of passenger bookings within the single booking period assumed in
the constant cost model determines the amount of sell up behavior versus
passenger service denials occurring in the market when booking limits are placed
on the individual fare products. Calculations of shifts in the market performance
measures of revenue, welfare, and consumer surplus, in the presence of booking
limits are also affected by the order of passenger bookings and the assumed
behavior of passengers. This subsection addresses the recovery potential for
these market performance measures when booking limits are applied.
Booking limits which prevent the diversion of all passengers without causing
passengers not to travel would allow the airline to capture all of the sell up
potential in the market without diluting revenue. In theory, a complete recovery
of revenue (and welfare) potential through the application of booking limits is
possible. This can only be achieved, however, when the price levels prevailing in
the market are the optimal price levels for the no diversion case. This is logical
since the induced sell up of all diverting passengers would lead to a replication
of the optimal solution to the no diversion case.
The sole purpose of applying booking limits to the generalized cost model is to
prevent passenger diversion. Accordingly, the revenue recovery provided by the
application of booking limits results from the prevention of passenger diversion.
Unfortunately, there is a danger that the use of booking limits to prevent
passenger diversion may lead to denied passenger bookings. Airlines face a
tradeoff between the possibility of denying passengers service and inducing
diverting passengers to sell up when booking limits are applied to the
generalized cost model. A positive revenue contribution from the application of
booking limits to the generalized cost model may only be achieved if the
incremental revenues gained from passengers denied seats for lower-priced fare
products through induced sell up exceeds the revenue loss from passengers
targeted to the lower-priced fare product who are denied seats and consequently
decide to forego travel.
While the losses associated with diversion are independent of the arrival process
in the market, the recovery of these losses through the application of booking
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limits is not. In other words, the effects of passenger sell up behavior on revenue
depends upon the arrival discipline in the market. The amount of revenue and
welfare recovered may vary widely for the same market conditions with
different arrival processes. The lost revenue and welfare can only be gained back
by the airline and society when a correct application of fare product booking
limits is used with an amenable passenger arrival discipline within the single
booking period. The passenger arrival process may circumvent the revenue
recovery tactics attempted by the airline.
Limited bounding analysis can be performed when an arrival process is assumed
within the single static period. The passenger denial/sell up tradeoff can be
bounded by the cases of passenger bookings in increasing and decreasing order
of willingness to pay. Passenger arrivals in increasing order of willingness to pay
can achieve optimal system revenues equal to the optimal no diversion case
while passengers arrivals in decreasing order cannot. When passengers arrive in
increasing order of willingness to pay, a binding booking limit associated with a
single fare product induces all diverting passengers to sell up while not denying
service to any passengers targeted to the restricted fare product. Passenger
arrivals in decreasing order of willingness to pay, on the other hand, result in the
denial of service to passengers targeted to the lower-priced fare product without
inducing a single diverting passenger to sell up. Consequently, bookings in
increasing order of willingness to pay are more effective in helping the airline to
achieve its revenue maximizing goal when booking limits are used in this way.
5.4.4 Passenger Bookings in Increasing Order of Willingness to Pay
The optimal solution to the no diversion case (resulting in maximum system
revenue) can be replicated in the case with diversion when booking limits are
applied and passengers arrive in increasing order of willingness to pay. When
the booking limits are set equal to the total number of passengers for each fare
product in the optimal no diversion case, the optimal solution to the case with
diversion replicates the no diversion optimal solution. All revenues, consumer
surplus, and societal welfare are restored to their levels in the no diversion case.
In other words, the case of passenger arrivals within the single booking period in
increasing order of willingness to pay can result in an optimal solution equal to
that in the no diversion case when optimal booking limits are applied.
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Specifically, the decreased welfare and revenue resulting from the diverting
passengers are returned to their no diversion levels while the consumer surplus
gains made by the diverting passengers are removed.
Figure 5.26 presents the base case varying d12 in which the entire 50% of
diverting fare product 1 passengers sell up to the higher-priced unrestricted fare
product as a result of booking limits being placed on fare product 2. The hatched
area represents the deadweight welfare loss recovered due to the diverting
passengers being forced to sell up. The lightly shaded area shown in the figure
represents the consumer surplus that is lost when the passengers diverting to
fare product 2 are forced to sell up to fare product 1. Finally, the combination of
the consumer surplus and recovered welfare areas represents the revenue
returned to the airline.
As demonstrated in the previous section, higher revenues are earned by the
airline when diversion is admitted by the airline and optimal price levels are set
assuming a diversion percentage occurring in the market. Table 5.3 shows the
greater optimal revenues ($32573) for the 50% diversion base case in which the
airline admits diversion compared to when diversion is ignored ($31322). When
optimal booking limits are applied to the model, however, the opposite is true.
irline dmit gnore dmit gnore
Policy iversion Diversion iversion Diversion
Booking Perfect Perfect None None
Limits
Revenue 36577 37575 32573 31322
FP1 Price 06 5 06 5
FP2 Price 213 290 213 290
FP3 Price $94 133 94 133
Table 5.3 Comparison of Perfect Booking Limit Applications: Passengers
Book in Increasing Order of Willingness to Pay
The optimal solution to the base case with d12 diversion in which the airline
reoptimizes price levels (admit diversion) and optimal booking limits are applied
(which eliminate diversion in the market altogether) provides a total revenue of
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Generalized Cost Model With d12 Diversion at 50%
Three Fare Product Example
Booking Limits Application With
Bookings in Increasing Order of Willingness to Pay
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Figure 5.26 - Generalized Cost Model With d12 Diversion at 50% - Three Fare
Product Example: Booking Limits Application With Bookings in Increasing
Order of Willingness to Pay
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$36577 as shown in Table 5.3. In the case where d12 diversion is not admitted
(ignore diversion) and booking limits are applied that eliminate diversion, airline
revenues are equal to $37575. The case in which the airline has both reoptimized
price levels and applied optimal booking limits to correct diversion has resulted
in lower revenues than when optimal booking limits are applied without a
reoptimization of price levels. This implies that price level reoptimization
admitting diversion, while providing increased revenues in the absence of
booking limits, is likely to result in a lower revenue potential for the market.
Therefore, the airline faces a choice when the techniques of booking limits and
acknowledgment of diversion are available to it. The airline may attempt to
optimize revenues accepting that passenger diversion is going to proliferate or it
may attempt to curb diversion by applying booking limits. A combination of the
two methods may also be chosen as the preferred strategy, however, any
admission of diversion may render the optimal solution unattainable. Blindly
applying both diversion-correction methods, however, may lead to lower
revenues.
5.4.5 Passenger Bookings in Decreasing Order of Willingness to Pay
For passenger arrivals in decreasing order of willingness to pay, on the other
hand, the optimal solution to the no diversion case can never be replicated when
diversion exists regardless of the booking limits applied. When booking limits
are applied, the diverting passengers are always the first to arrive for booking.
The diverting passengers with the highest values of willingness to pay are, thus,
guaranteed first chance at securing seats for the lower-priced fare products. The
passengers targeted for the lower-priced fare products book after all diverting
passengers have already made their purchases. Recall that the targeted
passengers cannot be induced to sell up to higher-priced fare products.
Therefore, with passenger bookings in decreasing order of willingness to pay, no
revenue can be recovered by forcing diverting passengers to sell up without
rejecting all passengers targeted to the lower-priced fare product.
Figure 5.27 shows the revenue and welfare lost by the application of booking
limits (the optimal booking limits for the case in which passengers arrive in
increasing order of willingness to pay) when passengers arrive in decreasing
249
Generalized Cost Model With d12 Diversion at 50%
Three Fare Product Example
Booking Limits Application With Bookings
in Decreasing Order of Willingness to Pay
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Figure 5.27 - Generalized Cost Model With d12 Diversion at 50% - Three Fare
Product Example: Booking Limits Application With Bookings in Decreasing
Order of Willingness to Pay
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order of willingness to pay. The lightly shaded area in the figure represents the
revenue loss associated with the denial of service to the passengers initially
targeted to fare product 2. The revenue dilution associated with diversion from
fare product 1 to 2 (shown in the hatched area of Figure 5.27) still plagues the
airline and the booking limits do nothing to prevent it. In fact, the booking limits
only serve to worsen the revenue performance of the carrier by denying seats to
passengers targeted to fare product 2. Total revenue is equal to $25081 in the
case with booking limits in contrast to the $32573 total revenues for the case
without booking limits.
Airline dmit gnore dmit gnore
olicy iversion Diversion iversion Diversion
Booking Yes: As in Yes: As in No No
Limits able 5.3 able 5.3
Revenue 25081 24460 32573 31322
FP1 Price 06 5 06 45
FP2 Price 213 290 213 290
FP3 Price 94 133 94 133
Table 5.4 Comparison of Perfect Booking Limit Applications: Passengers
Book in Decreasing Order of Willingness to Pay
With the counterproductive application of booking limits performed when
bookings occur in decreasing order of willingness to pay, the case in which price
levels are reoptimized admitting the existence of diversion outperforms the case
in which diversion is ignored (as shown in Table 5.4) in contrast to when
passenger arrivals occur in increasing order of willingness to pay. When booking
limits are applied to the base case varying d12, the actual revenue total is
expected to fall somewhere below the upper bound of $37575 (e.g. the no
diversion optimal solution) but the exact result depends upon the specific arrival
process and booking limits actually occurring in the market.
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5.4.6 Booking Limits Summary
In summary, the impact of booking limits on the optimal solution to the joint
price level optimization is not determined unless the booking arrival process of
passengers within the single static booking period is known. The revenue result
can, however, be bounded from above assuming, as before, an arrival process in
increasing order of willingness to pay. The lower bound on revenue can drop as
low as zero with an illogical application of booking limits, however, a more
realistic lower bound can be set depending upon the existing market conditions.
The total revenue recoverable (sell up potential) from the application of booking
limits remains limited to the amount of revenue lost from passenger diversion.
With an unknown booking arrival process, the benefits of reoptimizing price
levels based on the amount of diversion assumed to exist in the market are
unclear as well when booking limits are introduced. Thus, knowledge of the
booking process has a direct impact on the chosen airline price setting and
booking limit strategy.
5.5 Applications of the Generalized Cost Model
The generalized cost model can be used for other airline marketing applications
in addition to the analysis of the relationships between price levels, restrictions,
and other market conditions. The section begins by using the model to evaluate
the revenue impacts of different aircraft configurations on the flight in the
market. The impact of introducing fare products into the existing market fare
product structure is then explored. The constant cost model is once again the
chosen specification but, this time, constant elasticity demand functions are also
used for some of the analysis. As before, other model formulations and demand
specifications may be used in virtually the same manner with slight
modifications.
5.5.1 Aircraft Configuration Application
The generalized cost model can be used to measure the effects of a variation in a
cabin configuration when more than one class of service is offered on the aircraft.
Since a primary difference in cabin service level is the size of the seat, increasing
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the number of premium class seats decreases the total capacity of the aircraft. In
this way, the cabin configuration can directly affect revenue. The lowered
capacity resulting from an increased number of premium class seats must be
traded off with the revenue benefits of the price levels paid by first and business
class passengers. The total revenue impacts determined by applying the model
can be used to evaluate the preferred cabin configuration when more than one
configuration or aircraft type is available (or proposed).
A three class cabin configuration example is used to demonstrate the uses of the
constant cost model as a tool for the evaluation of airline marketing planning
decisions. Unrestricted fare products are offered to consumers in each of the
three different cabin classes of service:
1) First Class (F)
2) Business Class (J)
3) Coach Class (Y)
Three additional constraints must be added to the formulation of the joint price
level optimization problem to account for the fixed cabin capacities:
QF QFmax (5.43)
QJ QJmax (5.44)
QY 5 QYmax (5.45)
where QImax = the capacity of cabin I
The constant cost model is evaluated assuming a constant elasticity demand
function in the three cabin class example. The general functional form for
demand in the constant elasticity case appears below as input to the constant cost
model:
i b)i
Pi =I Qk - Y, Ck (5.46)
k=1 )k=1
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The formulation of the generalized cost model is identical to that presented in
section 5.1 of the dissertation with the addition of constraints 5.43,5.44, and 5.45.
The three cabin base case has the following OD market parameter values:
a
b
Cap
QFmax
Qjmax
QYmax
cF
cy
= 2500
= -3
= 293
= 35
= 134
= 124
= 0
= 50
= 50
Thus, the demand functions for the three fare products in the three different
cabins for the OD market are:
PF = a(QF)b
Pj = aQF + QJ)b - C1
Py = a(QF + QJ + Qy)b -(cT + cy)
(5.47)
(5.48)
(5.49)
in the three cabin class base case for fare products F, J, and Y, respectively.
The degradation costs associated with each fare product represent the decrease in
level of service from first to business and finally, to coach class. It may be more
intuitive to view the degradation costs as the improvement in level of service
from coach class to business class to first class. In the example, the business and
first class services are valued at $50 and $100 more than coach class, respectively,
by all passengers.
Neither booking limits nor passenger diversion are assumed to exist in the three
cabin class base case. Mathematically, the following parameters apply in the
constant elasticity three cabin class base case formulation :
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1) dFJ = 0
2) dFy = 0
3) djy = 0
4) BLF = **
5) BLj = 00
6) BLy = 0o
The optimal values of price level with resulting passenger demand and airline
revenue by fare product (and cabin) appear below in Table 5.5 for the three cabin
classes:
Product Passengers Price Revenue
F 35 $764 $26753
S134 $402 $53902
Y 124 $276 $34282
Table 5.5 Three Cabin Class Base Case
The two aircraft configuration applications tested using the constant cost model
with constant elasticity demands are the measurement of the effects of service
improvements and the variation of actual cabin configurations on revenue. The
model can be used by airlines to measure the expected revenue impacts of their
proposed marketing decisions providing decision support to marketing planners.
The effects of service improvements on revenue are explored first followed by
the impacts of variations in cabin configuration.
Measuring the Effects of Service Improvements on a Fixed Cabin Configuration
In the short term, the configuration of an aircraft must remain fixed. Obviously,
seats cannot be interchanged on a flight by flight basis. Therefore, it is of interest
to the airlines to know the effects of the fare product structure on revenues for a
fixed aircraft cabin configuration. In this vein, airlines considering introducing
service improvements in OD markets have interest in knowing the revenue
benefits or hazards of their actions. Service improvements are defined as
increases in the amenities provided to a cabin class such as upholstering seats
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with leather, installing cellular phones in seat backs, or garnishing each salad
with an additional olive.
Prior to making a fixed cost service improvement to an aircraft cabin, an airline
would like to determine the number of trips required to recuperate the capital
outlay. The ability to judge the length of time required to pay off a service
investment would aid marketing planners in their assessment of fixed cost
investment decisions. An airline also has interest in knowing whether or not the
revenue return justifies a service improvement requiring a recurring investment.
Airline marketers would value a measurement of the recurrent benefit or loss
expected from a proposed service improvement when making resource
allocation decisions. The generalized cost model quantifies the revenue impacts
of both fixed and recurrent cost service improvements for different cabin classes
under the optimal (or any other) set of price levels.
To perform a cost-benefit evaluation of service improvements in a particular OD
market, the effect on the optimal fare product price levels of making a fixed or
recurrent cost investment is also of interest to airline planners. For instance, if an
airline is unable to charge price levels that approximate the optimal, the length of
time required to recover the fixed cost investment increases. The expected
revenue returns to service improvements under a given set of price levels
provided by the generalized cost model allows airline planners the ability to
measure the expected revenue impacts of service improvements taking into
consideration the fare product structure and pricing decisions being made in a
particular market. The revenue effect information can be used to evaluate the
advisability of investing in proposed service improvements.
In the three cabin class base case example, consider first a fixed cost investment
of $1,500,000 for the improvement of the business class cabin. For instance, the
airline may plan to install a personal video screen in each seat back along with a
fax machine for the exclusive use of the business class cabin. The proposed
service improvements are expected to result in a decrease in the degradation
costs associated with the business class cabin by $25 for all passengers relative to
first class. The constant cost model can be used to determine the impact of the
change on the OD market.
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The results of the service improvements on the optimal price levels with
resulting demand and revenue are shown in Table 5.6. At optimality, the total
flight revenue for the base case of the three cabin configuration example equals
$114,938. When the service improvement is made, optimal flight revenue is
improved by $3350 per flight to $118,288. Thus, at a minimum, it would take the
airline 450 flights to earn back the fixed cost required for the service level
improvement.
ase Base More Service
E $50 $25
Revenue $114938 118288
Price 764 764
j Price 02 $427
Y Price 276 $276
F Passengers 5 35
J Passengers 134 134
Y Passengers 124 124
Table 5.6 Fixed Cost Service Improvement
The optimal price level for the business class cabin increases as a result of the
decreased degradation costs from the fixed cost improvement. The optimal price
levels for the first and coach class cabin, on the other hand, remain the same after
the service improvement. Since the example is capacity constrained, the number
of passengers carried at optimality does not shift with the decreased degradation
costs. Thus, the degradation cost reduction translates directly into increased
airline revenue from the increased business class price levels.
A variable cost investment may also be investigated using the generalized cost
modeling framework. The airline marketing department considers a service
improvement which requires a recurrent investment of $20 per passenger per
flight in the business class cabin. For instance, passengers may be
accommodated in the airline's members only or first class lounge prior to
departure. The degradation costs associated with the business class fare product
are expected to be reduced by $10 when the service improvement is made. The
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airline has chosen to make the improvement if the recurrent investment has a
positive net impact on system revenues.
The impact of the service improvement on optimal price levels and the resulting
revenue and demand levels are presented in Table 5.7. Total market revenue
would be improved by $1340 dollars (from $114,938 to $116,278) when the
service improvement is put in place. The total number of business class
passengers carried is equal to 134 in the example making the total expected cost
of the service improvement per flight $2680. Since the revenue cost outweighs
the revenue benefit, a negative net revenue contribution would be made by the
service improvement and thus, the change should not be made.
ase Base More Service
2 50 $0
Revenue 114938 116278
F Price 764 764
j Price 02 12
Price 276 276
F Passengers 5 5
J Passengers 134 134
Y Passengers 124 124
Table 5.7 Variable Cost Service Improvement
It should be noted that the cost of the variable cost service improvement is
simply twice the benefit and this is translated directly into the optimal solution.
The simplicity of the results comes from the binding capacity constraint in the
optimal solution. A decrease in degradation costs for a single fare product when
the capacity constraint is binding generally results in a decrease in the optimal
price level for that fare product only. The generalized cost model would provide
less trivial results for capacity unconstrained cases. The limitations of the
constant elasticity formulation, however, required that the capacity constrained
case be used to present realistic results. Thus, in the interests of demonstrating
the flexibility of the generalized cost model, somewhat simplistic test case results
are presented.
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Measuring the Effects of Varying the Cabin Configuration
It is also of interest to airlines to evaluate different cabin configurations for a
given route if, for instance, there is flexibility in the assignment of aircraft to the
market. Clearly, the analysis used to evaluate the cabin configuration of an
aircraft serving multiple routes with multiple demands becomes increasingly
complex. Nonetheless, the evaluation of cabin configurations using the
generalized cost model can lead to improved aircraft assignments for a given
market when there is scheduling flexibility of a common aircraft type with
different configurations. It should be noted that similar analysis can be
performed when airlines are able to switch aircraft types.
In the three cabin example, the aircraft cabin configuration is varied to
demonstrate the effects on revenue of trading off seats between the coach and
premium class cabins. The Boeing 747-200 series aircraft operated by United
Airlines are configured in two different ways and provide a realistic example of
cabin configuration differences within the same airline. The 747-200 YI
configuration has 35 first class seats, 134 Connoisseur@ (business) class seats, and
124 economy class seats (OAG, 1993). Coincidentally, the United 747-200 YI
configuration matches the three cabin class example base case exactly. The 747-
200 YR configuration, on the other hand, has 18, 79, and 266 seats in the three
cabin classes, respectively. The YI configuration has a total of 293 seats while the
YR has 363 total seats.
The use of the YI configuration increases the per seat revenue potential (with
higher numbers of first and business class seats) but decreases the total number
of seats available on the aircraft. Consequently, the revenue effects of using each
configuration are dependent upon the market conditions. The generalized cost
model can be used to determine the preferred aircraft configuration in terms of
revenue contribution on a market by market basis. The results derived from the
optimal price levels for the two United 747-200 aircraft configurations in the
three cabin class base case varying configuration type appear in Table 5.8.
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Aircraft 47-200 YI 47-200 YR
Revenue 114938 122854
F Price 764 954
j Price 02 94
Price 276 $251
F Passengers 5 18
SPassengers 134 79
Y Passengers 124 266
Capacity 293 363
Table 5.8 Comparison of United Airlines 747-200 Aircraft Configurations
The optimal revenues available for the YI configuration in the three cabin base
case are $114,938 while they are $122,854 for the YR configuration. The YR
configuration dominates the YI configuration in terms of optimal revenue
performance for the specific market analyzed. The optimal revenue returns only
result, however, when the carrier charges optimal price levels in the market.
The optimal first and business class price levels for the YR configuration are $190
and $92 dollars greater than for the YI, respectively. Thus, the optimal price
levels are much higher for the premium class passengers when the YR
configuration is used. The relative scarcity of premium class seats in the YR
configuration leads them to be more valuable to consumers with the high level of
demand that exists in the example market. The optimal coach class fare level, on
the other hand, is $25 lower for YR configuration. This results primarily from the
high level of market demand (all results are capacity constrained) and the greater
number of passengers that may be accommodated aboard the YR aircraft.
From purely an optimal revenue perspective, the YR configuration should be
used to serve the market when having aircraft assignment flexibility and
dictating market price levels. Inability to set, and have passengers pay, price
levels approximating the optimal ones, however, may change the preferred
aircraft configuration for the market. In either case, the generalized cost model
may be used to evaluate the preferred aircraft type or configuration for any set of
market price levels.
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The important interrelationship between capacity provision and market price
levels can be addressed in the generalized cost modeling framework. The model
provides a method to incorporate the effect of pricing decisions and demand
characteristics into capacity allocation decisions. The incorporation of the impact
of market price levels into aircraft capacity decisions provides the foundation for
the development of planning tools that synthesize two of the most important
areas of marketing planning.
The examples presented here presume a fixed aircraft configuration which can be
evaluated from a revenue impact perspective. Optimizing the actual
configuration for a given type of aircraft using the generalized cost modeling
framework requires a reformulation of the problem that introduces cabin sizes as
decision variables. Additional constraints would need to be added to ensure that
the optimal cabin configurations are spatially feasible for the fixed aircraft size.
Although such an application is of great interest to airline planners, it is left to
future research efforts.
5.5.2 Proposed Fare Product Introductions and Modifications
The marketing departments of airlines attempt to segment the market and
stimulate demand through the introduction of different types of fare products
onto the market. The decision support tools available at most major carriers that
quantify the effects of different fare product introductions are quite limited. The
effects of introducing different fare products can be quantified using the
generalized cost model helping to fill this decision support void. The
information provided can be used by airline marketing managers to determine
the most favorable changes to the fare product structure among their proposals.
Varying the fare product mix in a market can have a major effect on the demand
and revenue in an OD market. The introduction or removal of a fare product, for
instance, can determine whether or not many passengers decide to travel. A fare
product that is priced lower than any one currently available on the market can
stimulate a large amount of incremental demand. Unfortunately, while such a
fare product is intended to stimulate demand, it may only serve to dilute
revenues if the segmentation devices (i.e., restrictions) accompanying it are
ineffective in the prevention of passenger diversion.
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The introduction of a new fare product with restrictions similar to an existing
fare product can also make an existing fare product redundant on the market.
For example, the introduction of a fare product with identical (perceived)
restrictions to an existing fare product with a lower price level will drive the
demand for the existing fare product to zero. Clearly, no rational consumer
would purchase a fare product that is dominated in all attributes by another
(ignoring availability constraints). The effect of any fare product introduction is,
of course, dependent upon the existing fare product structure and the attributes
(restrictions and price level) of the new service offering. The generalized cost
model can help to measure the effects of fare product introductions onto the
market under any fixed fare product structure.
A simple glance at the generalized cost model formulation allows the
identification of where a new fare product fits into the fare product inferiority
hierarchy. The degradation costs accompanying the proposed fare product allow
for the calculation of a demand function for that fare product from the
unrestricted fare product. The degradation cost associated with each prospective
fare product must, of course, first be quantified. The position of the isolated
demand function in the locus of isolated demand functions can then be
determined from the degradation costs relative to the other fare products in the
generalized cost model. The model can then be used with the addition of a new
fare product or a change to an existing fare product and used to predict the
effects on optimal price levels and revenue of the proposed changes to the fare
product structure.
The price level of the fare product being introduced to the market can be
determined either endogenously or exogenously. When offered pricing
flexibility, however, it is preferable to optimally (and endogenously) determine
the price level for the fare product to be introduced. Nonetheless, the generalized
cost model provides flexibility in the determination of price levels that may
prove quite valuable to airline marketing planners.
Comparison of Alternative Fare Products
Imagine that an airline is considering introducing a new fare product onto the
market but is unsure which of two potential candidates will have the most
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positive (or least negative) impact on revenue. For example, the airline may
consider the addition of a three or seven day advance purchase non-excursion
fare product to the three fare product base case with linear demands. The
degradation cost associated with the three day advance purchase fare product is
$25 dollars less than that of the seven day and $25 more than the unrestricted. In
terms of the fare product hierarchy, both of the additional fare product
candidates fall between the unrestricted and seven day advance purchase
excursion fare products.
From the perspective of the airline, introducing the fare product with the lowest
degradation costs is always preferable under perfect segmentation. The
preferred fare product may differ, however, depending upon the amount of
passenger diversion existing in the market. In the example, the expected
diversion rate from the unrestricted fare product to the 3 day advanced purchase
is assumed to be 40% compared to the 20% assumed for the 7 day advanced
purchase. Diversion is not expected to occur between the other fare products.
Thus, while passengers prefer the 3 day advanced purchase fare product and
demand for it is greater ceteris paribus, the increased diversion from the
unrestricted fare product may counteract this benefit in terms of revenue
performance. The constant cost model base case with linear demand functions is
used in the example presented to evaluate which fare product should be
introduced by quantifying the total effect on market conditions expected.
Table 5.9 presents a detailed comparison of the two fare product introduction
scenarios relative to the existing market fare product structure. Total revenues
are greater with the introduction of the 7 day advance purchase fare product
which generates $36747 compared to the $36454 earned when the 3 day advance
purchase fare product is introduced. The airline would be better served by the
introduction of the seven day non-excursion fare product since the negative
revenue impacts from the added diversion introduced by the three day advance
purchase fare product outweigh the benefits of the lower degradation costs.
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Fare Product None AP3 AP7
Introduction
Diversion to 0% 40% 20%
New FP
Revenue 37575 36454 36747
Unrestricted 406 $71 453
FP Price
New FP $342 $305
Price
E7NR Price 213 186 179
E14NR Price 94 81 77
Passengers 135 140 141
Table 5.9 Effects of Introducing Non-Excursion Fare Products
As expected, the optimal price level of the AP3 fare product is higher than that of
the AP7 when they are introduced separately. The decreased AP3 degradation
costs as well as the increased diversion cause the higher optimal price levels for
all market fare products relative to the AP7 introduction.
The introduction of either of the fare products, however, leads to a reduction in
total revenue from the $37575 earned by the 3 fare product base case without
diversion. Thus, the introduction of additional fare products which cause
diversion is shown, in this case, to have a negative revenue impact overall.
While the seven day advanced purchase fare product performs better than the
three day, the introduction of either product would result in lesser revenue
performance than currently exists. The potential hazards of introducing fare
products that are ineffective at containing passenger diversion has once again
been demonstrated using the model.
Restricted Optimization When Price Levels for Certain Fare Products are Fixed
Consider next an airline introducing fare product on the market for which the
price level has already been fixed as a result of a system-wide marketing
initiative. If a marketing promotion or executive policy by the airline forces the
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price level of a certain type of fare product to remain at a specified level, the
airline can still optimize the remainder of the fare product price levels since the
pricing department still exercises flexibility in their pricing. It should be
observed, however, that the optimal airline revenue can never increase (and is
likely to decrease) as a result of the additional constraint(s) being added to the
joint price level optimization.
The general case entails two subgroups of fare products in which the airline must
take as given the exogenously determined price levels of the first subgroup while
being able to freely determine the price levels of the second. The airline can
optimally set the price levels of the second subgroup given the specified price
levels for the first. Price levels can be jointly optimized in a restricted form to
yield the optimal price levels of the fare products for which there is pricing
flexibility. The methodology is demonstrated below by fixing the price level of
the most-restricted fare product in the existing fare product hierarchy of the three
fare product constant cost model base case with linear demands.
The restricted optimization problem must be formulated with the added
restriction of the exogenously determined fare product 3 price level. In this case,
fare product 3 has been increased from the optimal value of $93.75 to $125 as a
result of a management attempt to increase fare levels on short haul routes. The
constant cost model is used to calculate the optimal price levels for the two fare
products (1 and 2) under the direct control of the airline pricing department (e.g.
not dictated by the fare increase initiative).
The additional constraint added to the formulation of the restricted joint price
level optimization appears below for the three fare product base case:
P3 = 600 - 3(Q1+Q2+Q3) - 100 = 125 (5.50)
The optimization is performed using the GAMS non-linear optimization package
in the same way as before, differing only by the additional constraint on the
optimal price level of fare product 3. More complex examples of fare initiatives
may place restrictions, for example, on the price differentials of certain products
and require more detailed constraint set modifications but can be modeled in the
generalized cost framework nonetheless.
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The optimal values of price level with resulting passenger demand and airline
revenue by fare product appear below in Table 5.10 for the three fare product
base case and the related case in which the price level of fare product 3 is
constrained to equal $125:
ase Base onstrained
evenue $37575 37361
P1 Price $406 $417
FP2 Price 213 233
FP3 Price 94 125
P1 4.58 51.11
Passengers ____________
FP2 9.58 6.11
Passengers r______ r_____
FP3 31.25 27.78
Passengers I
Passengers 135 125
Table 5.10 Impacts of Constraining the Fare Product 3 Price Level
The fixed $125 price level of the fourteen day advanced purchase fare product
leads to optimal revenues of $37361 compared to the $37575 earned in the
unrestricted case. Thus, the cost of the initiative in the market is expected to be
$214 per flight in the OD market. The total revenue change is not drastic,
however, due in part to the optimal fare level of fare product 3 being close to
$125 in the unrestricted optimization.
As expected, the optimal revenue result is lower than in the unrestricted case.
The optimal price levels for fare products 1 and 2 are higher ($417 and $233,
respectively, compared to $406 and $212) in the restricted optimization. The less-
restricted fare product price level increases are expected since total demand
levels are held artificially low at 125 passengers compared to the 135 passengers
carried in the unrestricted case which drives fare levels up. Therefore, the
increase in the fare product 3 price level has led to increases in the optimal fare
levels of the other fare products. Dictating the price level of a single fare product
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in the market not only affects that fare product but also can change the optimal
price levels of the other fare products in the market. Airlines must thus be
careful of the interactive effects that fare initiatives may have on the desired
levels of other fare product prices.
5.6 Conclusions of the Modeling Analysis and Chapter Summary
The chapter has demonstrated the analyses available using the generalized cost
model for airline fare product differentiation. Some of the relationships
underlying demand, revenue, welfare, and costs were uncovered using the
model as a tool for analysis. Practical applications were highlighted for the
potential use of the model as a planning tool. Conclusions about the uses and
applications of the generalized cost model appear in the following chapter along
with directions for further research.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions and Future Research Directions
The generalized cost model of airline fare product differentiation developed in
this dissertation provides the first comprehensive framework that addresses how
airline fare products, service bundles composed of airline prices and purchase
restrictions, are viewed by consumers. The research presented here represents a
departure from both the independence assumptions of existing yield
management models and the techniques of stated and revealed preference
measurement found in random utility models. Most notably, the incorporation
of a cost for the inconvenience associated with meeting increased purchase
restrictions and the interdependence of fare product price levels more accurately
represents the purchase decisions confronting potential air travel consumers.
The amount of revenue earned by the carrier, as well as the amounts of societal
welfare and consumer surplus, vary depending upon the nature of the airline
fare product "degradation" costs and of course, price levels. The types of
economic efficiency achievable also vary when passenger inconvenience costs are
assumed.
The main result of this research is a microeconomic model of airline fare product
differentiation (and price discrimination) that incorporates the elements of
product degradation, imperfect market segmentation, and capacity controls. A
synthesis of the important factors associated with the prevailing fare product
structure is provided by the model. In particular, the nature of the
interrelationships between price levels and other airline fare product and service
attributes are studied. The model can also be used to expose the relationships
that exist between fare product attributes such as price level and purchase
restrictions, and market performance measures like demand, revenue, and
welfare.
6.1 Research Conclusions and Contributions
The conclusions presented here are subdivided into those pertaining to the
generalized cost model and those involving the characterization of the airline
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fare product structure that prevails in the current U.S. deregulated passenger air
transportation markets. The findings are by no means mutually exclusive but the
general division has been made for the sake of expository clarity. The
conclusions of the airline fare product differentiation review appears first
answering the question of how the prevailing fare product structure relates to
issues of economic efficiency in the market.
6.1.1 Conclusions of Airline Fare Product Differentiation Review
The research presented in this dissertation examined the nature of airline fare
product differentiation. The current structure of airline fare products was
described in the context of the economics price discrimination literature.
Contrary to the contentions of some (e.g. Frank, 1983), price discrimination does
in fact exist in the differentiated fare product structures that dominate the airline
industry today. All airline fare products offered contain second degree price
discrimination or "self-selection" techniques, according to the definition used in
the economics literature. Passengers self-select airline fare products according to
their desired degree of travel flexibility as demonstrated by their choice of
different bundles of fare product attributes.
A priori screening techniques or third degree price discrimination are also
employed by airlines through such marketing promotions as student and senior
discounts. Purchase restrictions and capacity controls are added to all fare
products (promotional or not) available for purchase, however, and make the
screened populations self-select on top of meeting any initial a priori screening
criteria. Thus, any accurate characterization of airline fare product
differentiation must model second degree price discrimination explicitly since it
has been found to dominate the passenger market segmentation techniques used
by airlines.
The special structure of the airline fare products existing in the U.S. domestic
market today was identified and discussed in the context of product
differentiation and price discrimination. An inferiority hierarchy was found to
exist for the majority of fare products being sold. The hierarchical structure that
currently exists on the market, the assumption of fare product independence, and
the required pricing of fare products under increasing purchase restrictions
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supports the inferiority hierarchy characterization made in the dissertation. The
generalized cost modeling framework has been developed based upon this
representation of the actual airline fare product structure currently facing
consumers. The yield management seat allocation techniques previously
developed do not explicitly consider the interdependence of the fare products
based upon their price levels and purchase restrictions. Thus, the generalized
cost model formulation provides insight into the interrelationships of the fare
products which clearly exist but have not previously been addressed.
The dissertation also addressed questions of efficiency concerning the current
practice of airline fare product differentiation. First, the question of exchange
efficiency was addressed. The existence of imperfect competition, the
impracticality of supply-demand equilibration, and the inability to define an
unambiguous measure of short run marginal costs all prevent efficiency in
exchange from occurring in airline markets. With exchange efficiency
unattainable, the feasibility of achieving Pareto optimality was then addressed.
Although previously hypothesized to be attainable in the current airline fare
product environment, the research performed here demonstrates that costs
incurred by airline passengers as a result of applied purchase restrictions make a
Pareto optimal allocation of airline seats practically impossible when degradation
costs are explicitly incorporated. In the context of the generalized cost model,
Pareto optimality was shown to be infeasible because of the existence of
degradation costs for the restricted fare products. The possibility of a more
efficient allocation from an improved market segmentation method exists since a
deadweight welfare loss results when any passenger incurs a cost resulting from
an applied purchase restriction. Thus, two common metrics of economic
efficiency have been shown to be infeasible in practice.
In spite of the Pareto and exchange inefficiencies, a different type of efficiency
was shown to exist in the airline industry today: allocative efficiency. Allocative
efficiency is defined as providing a limited availability service (or product) to
those consumers who value it most. Any such allocation benefits society
provided that resources have already been expended to produce that service.
The identification of the allocative efficiency properties of airline fare product
differentiation provides the first evidence of tangible benefits resulting directly
from price discrimination as currently practiced by airlines.
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Previous justifications for airline price discrimination have pointed to factors
such as the contribution to fixed costs made by the additional passengers who
would not travel unless offered a discount and the potential benefits provided by
an airline earning such contributions. It has been argued that the contributions
to fixed costs could be used to increase the frequency of flights in a market or
decrease overall fare levels in the long term. Such benefits depend upon the
airline reallocating resources to provide service improvements for consumers,
which is by no means guaranteed. The allocative efficiency resulting from price
discrimination, on the other hand, provides tangible benefits in terms of travel
flexibility provided to passengers who place a premium on service for excess
demand flights. In this vein, the differential mark-ups over marginal costs paid
by these passengers can be thought of as payment for the assurance of seat
availability on peak flights.
The probability of an efficient allocation was shown to be increased by a correct
application of the airline yield management seat allocation techniques now in
place at most carriers. The ability to secure a preferred flight itinerary with
limited notice enables an airline to deliver service to those passengers who value
it most on flights where demand exceeds supply. Conversely, relaxation of seat
inventory controls on lower demand flights allows seats that would may have
gone empty to be filled with passengers seeking discounts when flexibility-
sensitive consumers face little danger of displacement. In summary, the yield
management systems currently used at most major carriers have been shown to
enable a desirable resource allocation in terms of allocative efficiency and to
provide tangible benefits to consumers.
The requirements of a fare product structure that could support allocative
efficiency in airline markets were also identified. Offering fare products with a
wide range of price levels aimed at specific segments of the travel population is
necessary for an efficient allocation process. This enables a finer-grained
passenger segmentation. It was shown that the greater the level of passenger
segmentation, the closer to allocative efficiency that an airline can come. In fact,
the case of first degree price discrimination in which each consumer is identified
and made to pay his exact willingness to pay guarantees allocative efficiency for
the airline in the deterministic case. Although first degree price discrimination is
unattainable, the closer the approximation, the more likely allocative efficiency
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can be attained. Of course, an effective application of seat inventory control
strategies must also be performed to enable an efficient resource allocation.
Efficiency discussions about the general nature of airline fare product
differentiation provide insight into the characteristics of current practice in the
industry. This dissertation shows that current methods, when properly applied,
can result in an efficient allocation of resources particularly when demand
exceeds supply. Although the equity of airline price discrimination is not clear,
the more complete understanding of the efficiency characteristics of airline
marketing techniques clarifies an evaluation of the equity of current industry
practice. Having analyzed the underpinnings of the fare product structure, the
conclusions and contributions of the generalized cost modeling framework based
on the identified fare product structure appear next.
6.1.2 Conclusions of the Generalized Cost Model
Passengers neither view airline fare products as commodities nor as independent
service offerings. The generalized cost model provides incorporates both the
negative effects of purchase restrictions and the interrelationships of airline fare
product price levels. Purchase restrictions applied to fare products decrease their
value ceteris paribus and thus, lower the price commanded by the fare product.
Such costs have not been considered previously in the yield management seat
allocation models presented in the literature. The fare product interrelationships
have, in general, been assumed away by viewing the different airline fare
product (class) demands as independent.
As a result of the inherent dependence of airline fare products competing for
space on the same aircraft, the interaction between price levels and purchase
restrictions in the current practice of airline fare product differentiation should be
explicitly considered in airline marketing planning models where possible. The
generalized cost model of airline fare product differentiation incorporates the
costs associated with the inconvenience of accepting additional restrictions
associated with a given travel itinerary. The effect on demand of the increased
levels of fare product restrictions as modeled here demonstrates the relationships
between fare product attributes and demand from the perspective of a rational
consumer.
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Traditional airline yield management methods have failed to identify the utility
that passengers purchasing lower-priced fare products have for higher-priced
fare products when the price differential between the two fare products is
lowered (i.e., cross elasticities have been omitted). In other words, all passengers
in the market purchasing lower-priced, more-restricted fare products would
purchase less-restricted fare products if the price were right. Most models
predict demand levels with passenger buy down behavior implicitly assumed to
exist in the population without predicting its level. An underprediction of the
market revenue available to the airline has likely resulted from basing
measurements of revenue potential upon observations of realized demand.
Moreover, attempts at price discrimination have not been addressed in the airline
yield management models. The framework of the generalized cost model
incorporates the assumption that the airline can identify and segment passengers
by their willingness to pay for air travel in an attempt to reconcile airline price
discrimination techniques with an estimable model of airline passenger demand
under fare product differentiation.
The incorporation of passenger diversion relaxes the perfect passenger
identification and segmentation requirement initially assumed in the generalized
cost model, allowing a characterization of airline OD market demand under
imperfect price discrimination. The model can then be used to quantify the
revenue dilution impacts of passenger diversion. This dissertation presents the
first comprehensive discussion of the imperfections of airline price
discrimination techniques with a proper behavioral motivation. The generalized
cost model incorporates the passenger segmentation methods practiced by
airlines with explicit consideration given to the imperfections in the
segmentation techniques and their impacts.
The view of booking limits taken in the airline yield management literature has
been as a method to restrict the sale of seats to independent fare products
(classes) within a shared capacity to maximize expected revenue. The task of
booking limits has been the protection of available seats for passengers willing to
pay a higher price in exchange for the ability to obtain a seat reservation,
regardless of when they book. The use of booking limits as devices used to limit
the number of diverting passengers has received little attention in the literature.
The generalized cost model incorporates booking limits as tools to reduce the
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negative revenue impacts of passenger buy down behavior resulting from
market segmentation imperfections.
Previously, the effects of passenger sell up have been addressed with no rigorous
behavioral motivation. Passenger sell up behavior was first motivated and then
incorporated into the generalized cost modeling framework developed in this
dissertation. It was shown that, in order to properly address passenger sell up
from a behavioral standpoint, passenger diversion must be combined with
capacity constraints. Applying booking limits is shown to either induce
passengers to buy a higher-priced fare product than they would prefer under
unlimited fare product availability or to discourage them from traveling,
depending upon their value of willingness to pay. The exact effects of applying
booking limits to prevent passenger diversion are dependent upon market
conditions such as the passenger booking process which dictate the amount of
sell up behavior of passengers compared to rejected passenger demand.
The only passengers who are candidates to sell up to higher-priced fare products
are those who have initially diverted from higher-priced fare products. This
results from departures from the assumption that airlines have perfectly
identified and segmented the population by their willingness to pay. After
having initially been segmented, certain passengers divert to the lower-priced
fare products as a result of their ability to meet the imposed purchase restrictions
of the lower-priced fare products despite having a higher value of willingness to
pay. Passenger diversion can only be reversed by placing capacity controls on
the fare products and inducing passengers to sell up. Accordingly, the sell up
potential for any OD market is exactly equal to the amount of revenue dilution
that has occurred as a result of passenger diversion.
The impacts of introducing additional fare products onto the market were also
explored using the generalized cost model. Under the assumption of a perfect
passenger segmentation and identification, introducing an additional fare
product guarantees an increase in revenues for the airline. Even in the case of
perfect segmentation, however, there exist decreasing returns to the introduction
of additional fare products. When the perfect segmentation assumption is
relaxed, the effect of introducing additional fare products becomes
indeterminate. Since passenger diversion is believed to exist in all markets, the
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airline should carefully evaluate the fare products slated for introduction. The
generalized cost model provides a means to evaluate proposed fare product
introductions to estimate their revenue impacts under various passenger
diversion and OD market price-demand relationship scenarios. The expected
impacts of any changes to the prevailing fare product structure can be directly
calculated from the model. The applications presented in Chapter Five provide
examples of how to evaluate fare product introductions.
Airlines face several tradeoffs when evaluating their fare product structures.
Among these is the tradeoff between the severity of restrictions facing consumers
and the amount of passenger diversion existing in a market. The exploration of
the demand stimulation versus revenue dilution tradeoff presented in this
dissertation provided some insight into the choices facing airline planners
designing new fare products (or modifying existing ones). Within the context of
the generalized cost model, the degradation costs and passenger diversion rates
embody this tradeoff. The quantification of revenue impacts of alternative fare
products can be used to provide decision support to airline pricing analysts.
Another tradeoff facing airline planners is the determination of capacity for a
particular market. Insight into the effects of capacity on optimal price levels and
revenues can provide decision support for aircraft capacity allocation decisions.
For instance, the increase in revenue potential resulting from increasing capacity
may not justify the increased costs incurred by providing that additional capacity
to serve a market. With greater capacity, average fare levels and thus
incremental revenues, are likely to fall. If most of the passengers in a market
have been accommodated with the existing capacity, allocation of additional
capacity at increased cost makes little sense ceteris paribus. In this way, the
preferred provision of capacity (and aircraft configuration) is also dependent
upon the demand characteristics of the market. This dissertation has provided
insight into capacity and configuration questions using the generalized cost
model. Cost estimates concerning capacity decisions can be combined with the
generalized cost model to improve fleet planning and aircraft scheduling
decisions.
The generalized cost model has been shown to be a useful framework for
analysis for airline planners, as illustrated by the examples presented in this
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dissertation. Important resource allocation decisions as well as general
guidelines for the pricing and design of airline fare products are provided
through applications of the model. Potential uses of the generalized cost model
as a planning tool have been demonstrated through the applications shown in
Chapter Five and discussed here. In conclusion, the generalized cost model
provides the foundation for the development of valuable decision support tools
for airline planners.
6.2 Future Research Directions
The generalized cost model provides a method to evaluate the relationships that
underlie passenger demand and airline revenue, in the context of the current
structure of airline fare product differentiation. The model provides a method to
evaluate airline pricing policies and other marketing decisions facing airline
planners. Certain improvements to the basic model may provide even greater
insights and are suggested below. In addition, issues surrounding the estimation
of the generalized cost model are addressed. Finally, further applications and
extensions of the model may unveil even more relationships important to airline
pricing analysts but are left to future research efforts.
6.2.1 Extension of the Generalized Cost Model to the Dynamic Case
A static modeling methodology has been used in this research. Among the
advantages of the static modeling methodology are that it is easier to estimate as
a result of the lesser data requirements and, hence, greater data stability offered.
The difficulties of model calibration for the multiple OD markets that face major
airlines place a premium on lesser data requirements. The model also allows for
comparative statics analysis to uncover the underlying relationships between
price level, purchase restrictions, passenger demand and revenue. In reality,
however, the booking process for airline fare products is a dynamic one which
would be more appropriately addressed using a dynamic model. Such an
extension would limit the types of analysis that could be performed by the model
(e.g. no comparative statics) as well as significantly increasing the difficulty of
model estimation. As a result, a dynamic formulation of the generalized cost
modeling framework is left to future research.
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6.2.2 Introducing Stochasticity to the Generalized Cost Model
The assumption that demand levels are deterministic for a given set of fare
product price levels could be relaxed to provide a more robust model of
consumer fare product purchasing behavior. While the ability of the generalized
cost model of airline fare product differentiation to provide basic guidelines for
the setting of price levels and the results of changing market conditions is useful,
a more realistic characterization of demand may provide an improved estimate
of the impacts under uncertain market conditions.
Introducing stochasticity to the price level-demand relationship occurring in the
OD market under different fare product structures would require the use of
stochastic functional forms of demand. The difficulties associated with stochastic
mapping functions, however, are great. Techniques are available, however,
which allow the incorporation of uncertainty into demand functions. For
instance, the parameters associated with a chosen functional form of demand
could be taken from an assumed distribution using an expected value and input
to the generalized cost modeling structure. Alternatively, values could be
generated randomly from an estimated distribution and used to simulate
asymptotic results.
Stochasticity is more easily incorporated into the degradation costs as compared
to the demand characterizations, at least in the case of the constant cost model
since only a constant must be calculated with uncertainty. In the constant cost
model, the single degradation cost value may be calculated from an assumed
distribution of a single parameter that has resulted from an estimation based on,
for example, survey results. The constant cost model could be evaluated using
an expected value or simulations that randomly generate values of the
degradation costs facing consumers to highlight the market variations under
stochastic degradation costs.
Unfortunately, the calculation of stochastic demand or degradation cost
functions provide too little benefit in the absence of a model estimated using
actual data to be addressed in this dissertation. The incorporation of such
stochastic elements, as well as an actual model calibration, can be achieved
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through further research explorations in the area of airline fare product
C differentiation.
6.2.3 Estimation of Demand Functions
The generalized cost model may be calibrated based upon the assumptions made
concerning the price-demand relationship in the market and the nature of
degradation costs facing consumers. Once a precise form of the generalized cost
model has been selected (e.g. the constant cost model with linear demand
functions) a specific parameter estimation can be performed using presently
available or, at least, collectable data sources.
The United States Department of Transportation (exhaustive 10%) coupon
sample is available to all carriers (in the case of U.S. domestic airlines). The
D.O.T. sample is supplemented by a coupon sample conducted by the individual
carrier which reflects purchases of air travel on that carrier only. These coupon
counts provide revealed preference data concerning the actual air travel choices
that passengers have made. Unfortunately, the effects of passenger diversion
between the fare products and the effects of booking limits have been implicitly
incorporated within the fare product purchases. In addition, no information
about the costs incurred by passengers associated with accepting additional
bundles of purchase restrictions can be determined from the realized coupon
data. Therefore, the willingness of passengers to pay for the available fare
products cannot be determined from the ticket count data since the only
information that is available is the realized amount that passengers have paid.
Moreover, the data tell nothing about the effects passenger diversion, passenger
sell up, and rejected booking requests although they are included implicitly in
the data figures. Additional stated preference data must be gathered in order to
estimate a demand function and degradation costs for the market.
Conducting a telephone survey to collect stated preference data about fare
product choices could provide the information necessary to estimate the demand
functions as well as the degradation costs for the different airline markets for
which the generalized cost model is used to analyze. Although conducting a
telephone survey would present many practical problems to an airline, it is likely
that the wide array of airline marketing applications provided by the generalized
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cost model would prove to be adequate reason to overcome the practical
difficulties. The costs of conducting a study for every market served by even a
small carrier would likely be prohibitive so the results of a survey on a limited
set of markets could be used to infer the behavior of passengers in a number of
markets deemed to be similar.
Unfortunately, any passenger preference survey aimed at isolating passenger
sensitivities to price levels and purchase restrictions would be difficult to
conduct for many reasons. For instance, deriving a measure or estimate of
passengers willingness to pay is best achieved by asking questions (either
directly or indirectly) about how much they are willing to pay for air travel.
Respondents would have incentive to misrepresent the truth in this case for fear
that a correct answer may result in higher air fares for them. Of course, such
biases are inevitable when such sensitive questions are being asked. Correction
of the biases would be necessary to place confidence in any demand functions
calculated based upon stated preference data.
In addition, a questionnaire would likely include questions thought to be
sensitive by many respondents, such as income level. It is likely that significant
error will be introduced when directly asking questions concerning willingness
to pay, for instance. Such response biases need to be addressed in any empirical
estimation of demand incorporated into the generalized cost model. In spite of
the sensitivity and error questions, however, such a questionnaire appears to be
the only recourse for modeling demand under airline fare product
differentiation.
Moreover, travel agents and other point of sale people have been reluctant to
allow such a survey of their customers to be performed. Potential customers are
likely to resent being questioned about their purchases when they are calling to
book air travel. Thus, proper incentives should be offered to both perspective
respondents aimed at reducing response bias as well as the point of sale contacts
(i.e., travel agents). Clearly, an airline conducting a survey through its own
distribution channels need not worry about the latter type of compensation
although additional bias correction may be warranted.
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Such a survey of consumer preferences would allow the estimation of
C willingness to pay for all passengers within the market under study. The
sensitivities of passengers to increased purchase restrictions could also be
estimated from the passenger survey. Thus, an estimate of an assumed
functional form of passenger degradation costs could be made. All of the
information necessary to estimate the generalized cost model could be achieved
from the stated preferences in a passenger survey.
6.2.4 Expanding the Scope of the Generalized Cost Model
The analysis presented in this dissertation focused on a single flight, single OD
market system for a single carrier. More often in the current industry
environment, several airlines offer many different flights in each OD market and
each carrier operates a multiple OD market route network. More realistic
applications of the model would require that more flights and OD markets be
incorporated into the analysis. The extension of the generalized cost model to
the multiple flight, multiple OD market would provide the framework for more
powerful airline marketing planning and analysis tools. In this way, the route
structure of a carrier could be explicitly considered in the analysis.
The generalized cost model of airline fare product differentiation only treated the
case of monopoly. The majority of airline markets have some degree of
competition. The extension of the generalized cost model to the cases of perfect
and imperfect competition would provide more realistic insights into the actual
pricing and fare product design questions facing airlines considering competitive
effects. A model extension incorporating the interactions between carriers would
provide information about the best decisions for a carrier within the existing
competitive environment.
6.3 Final Conclusions
Airline revenue management consists of two interrelated functions, seat
inventory control and fare product design. Although substantial theoretical
work has been done on the airline seat inventory control problem, questions of
fare product design and pricing have not previously been addressed. Prior
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research efforts have focused on how to maximize revenues given a fixed airline
fare product structure and separate, uncorrelated demands for each of the
differentiated service offerings. The equally important question of how to design
or modify the underlying fare product structure to improve revenues has, until
this point, been ignored. Without a theoretical foundation of fare product design
and pricing, only part of the airline revenue management problem has been
explored.
The behavioral foundations of passenger demand in the presence of fare product
differentiation and price discrimination motivated in this dissertation have
provided the first comprehensive framework for analyzing airline fare product
structures. A modeling framework for the heretofore unaddressed problem of
pricing airline fare products under the current structure of price discrimination
and product differentiation has thus been established. Moreover, many of the
fundamental relationships that underlie prices and purchase restrictions in the
face of a differentiated fare product structure have been identified.
The research performed in this dissertation has contributed a framework for the
evaluation of fare product design based on a behavioral motivation of passenger
demand under fare product differentiation and price discrimination, thereby
expanding the knowledge base by addressing the full scope of the revenue
management problem. This theoretical discussion of fare product design and
analysis of its impacts has provided an expanded vision of the airline revenue
management function explicitly considering the current techniques of fare
product differentiation. The management of airline seat inventories through
pricing, and its relationship to seat inventory control and aircraft scheduling, can
be performed more effectively as a result of the relationships uncovered in this
dissertation.
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